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Intrusive memories and associated symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) represent a significant public health problem, often leading to persistent physical 
and psychological difficulties experienced by victims long after the traumatic event, 
contributing to healthcare costs and loss of productivity. Research examining etiological 
factors that contribute to PTSD is needed in order to expand basic knowledge and to 
inform the development of prevention and intervention strategies. Although acute alcohol 
intoxication has the potential to impact established risk factors for the development of 
intrusive memories (e.g., via stress response, cognitive processing), and trauma—
particularly sexual assault—often occurs under the influence of alcohol, the influence of 
peritraumatic (i.e., at the time of assault) alcohol intoxication on post-assault trauma 
symptoms is not well understood. To address this issue, the current study utilized an 
experimental design, including lab-based alcohol administration (high dose of .72 g/kg, 
low dose of .36 g/kg, and a placebo beverage), a well-accepted analog trauma exposure 
paradigm (a film with distressing or “traumatic” content), and ecological momentary 
assessment of intrusive memories. Results from 98 community women (ages 21 to 30, 
without a personal history of victimization) revealed peritraumatic intoxication did 
impact the occurrence of intrusive memories. Specifically, a marginally significant 
indirect effect showed that alcohol myopia disrupted cognitive processing and formation 
   
 
of trauma memories, resulting in increased intrusive memories at high levels of 
intoxication. At the same time, those who consumed high or low doses of alcohol 
displayed a dampened stress response, which reduced intrusive memories. Findings 
highlight the influence of peritraumatic cognitive impairment and stress response on the 
development of intrusive memories. Though alcohol influenced these risk factors 
simultaneously and in opposite directions, overall, participants in the high dose condition 
reported more intrusive memories than those in the placebo and low dose conditions. 
These findings reflect the importance of prevention and intervention programs aimed at 
reducing alcohol-involved victimization.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Sexual assaults against women occur with startling frequency. About 18.3% of 
women in the U.S. report a history of rape and 44.6% of women report experiencing 
other sexual violence in their lifetime (Black et al., 2011). Sexual assaults often lead to a 
host of negative outcomes for victims, including the development of posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD). In fact, about 2 in 5 rape victims develop symptoms of PTSD 
(Kilpatrick, Resnick, Ruggiero, Conoscenti, & McCauley, 2007), which include 
intrusions, avoidance, cognitive and emotional changes, and hyperarousal (American 
Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). PTSD symptoms, in turn, are associated with an 
increased risk of suicide attempts, comorbid mental health diagnoses (Pietrzak, 
Goldstein, Southwick, & Grant, 2011), and physical health problems (Pacella, Hruska, & 
Delahanty, 2013). The high prevalence and suffering associated with assault-related 
intrusions make research examining risk factors essential to informing interventions. As 
reviewed below, current theoretical models have illuminated key processes involved in 
the development of intrusive memories, and point to certain peritraumatic (i.e., occurring 
at the time of assault) cognitive processes and stress-related responses that appear to be 
key in the development of intrusions. However, current models do not account for other 
peritraumatic factors that may affect cognitive and stress-related reactions associated with 
intrusions. In the case of sexual assault, alcohol intoxication is important to consider, 
given that about half of victims are under the influence of alcohol at the time of assault 
(Abbey, Zawacki, Buck, Clinton, & McAuslan, 2004). Because alcohol has the potential 
to impact key mechanisms contributing to intrusive memories, it is imperative to 
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understand the role of peritraumatic intoxication in the development of post-assault 
intrusions. The present study fills this need.  
Intrusive Memories 
Intrusion symptoms (referred to as “re-experiencing symptoms” in the DSM-IV; 
APA, 2000) have long been considered a hallmark of PTSD (e.g., Foa, Steketee, & 
Rothbaum, 1989). Although individual symptoms and symptom clusters that make up 
PTSD have recently been at the focus of much debate (see Brewin, 2013; Friedman, 
2013; Maercker & Perkonigg, 2013), diagnostic criteria in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM-5; APA, 2013) and recent theoretical reviews 
(e.g., Brewin, 2013; Ehlers, Hackman, & Michael, 2004) reaffirm the centrality of 
intrusive memories to the understanding of PTSD. In fact, intrusion symptoms were 
retained as the first listed symptom cluster in the DSM-5 despite other changes in 
diagnostic criteria.  
Although the term, “intrusive memories,” has previously been used 
interchangeably with “involuntary memories” and “flashbacks,” these terms actually 
represent distinct phenomena (Kvavilashvili, 2014). Intrusive memories refer to 
spontaneous recollections that are typically experienced as disturbing. Although positive 
intrusive memories are possible, intrusive memories are most often accompanied by 
negative affect. In addition, intrusive memories are also repetitive in nature. That is, 
intrusive memories often involve recurrent recollections of the same image or memory. 
Not only are intrusive memories symptoms of PTSD (APA, 2013), but due to the 
distressing nature of repetitive intrusions, an individual may also make attempts to avoid 
intrusive memories, which is also a symptom of PTSD.  
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In contrast to intrusive memories, involuntary autobiographical memories can 
include a broad range of personal memories. Specifically, involuntary autobiographical 
memories refer to spontaneous recollections of past events that can be positive, negative, 
or neutral. Involuntary autobiographical memories were first noticed by Ebbinghaus 
(1885/1964), but were relatively neglected in cognitive psychology until Berntsen (1996, 
1998) began to research this phenomenon. Although occasionally referenced in the 
context of trauma memories and PTSD (e.g., Berntsen, 2009), involuntary 
autobiographical memories do not necessarily evoke a desire to avoid the recollections in 
the way intrusive memories do (Kvavilashvili, 2014).  
Intrusive memories (as defined by PTSD symptom B1) can also be distinguished 
from flashbacks (B3), which involve “dissociative reactions” (APA, 2013). This 
dissociative quality of flashbacks can refer to a sense that the memory is occurring “here 
and now” (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) or that there is a sense of “nowness” associated with the 
trauma memory (Brewin, 2014; Ehlers et al., 2004). In other words, a flashback may be 
experienced as “reliving” the event (Kvavilashvili, 2014) and may involve a temporary 
loss of connection with the present (Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010). 
Flashbacks are also typically accompanied by a high degree of physiological arousal and 
involve negative affect (Kvavilashvili, 2014). Moreover, although intrusive memories can 
occur in the context of a variety of other mental disorders (see Hackmann & Holmes, 
2004) including depression (e.g., Reynolds & Brewin, 1999) and complicated grief 
(Boelen & Huntjens, 2008), flashbacks are specific to PTSD (Bryant, O’Donnell, 
Creamer, McFarlane, & Silove, 2011). Further, compared to intrusive memories in 
depressed patients, flashbacks (defined as intrusions experienced by those with PTSD) 
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appear to have a more dissociative or “here-and-now” quality (Birrer, Michael, & 
Munsch, 2007; Reynolds & Brewin, 1998, 1999) and involve more sensory information 
(Parry & O’Kearney, 2014).  
One way to resolve the use of inconsistent terminology in past research is to 
conceptualize spontaneous memories along a continuum from involuntary 
autobiographical memories to flashbacks, with intrusive memories falling in the middle 
(Kvavilashvili, 2014). Intrusive memories, which are the focus of the present study, 
include distressing thoughts or images of a prior event. Intrusive memories involve more 
negative emotion than memories that are simply involuntary, but may not involve a sense 
that the event is happening in the moment, as is the case with flashbacks. Intrusive 
memories therefore represent a moderately distressing phenomenon linked to PTSD 
symptoms that can be evoked through experimental laboratory procedures, without risk 
for long-term symptoms of PTSD (see Holmes & Bourne, 2008; James et al., 2016).  
Intrusive Memories and Other PTSD Symptoms  
Intrusive memories (and the more severe experience of flashbacks) are considered 
a hallmark of PTSD due to their potential to increase and perpetuate associated PTSD 
symptoms. For example, the disturbing nature of intrusive memories may motivate an 
individual to avoid reminders of the trauma (e.g., going out of one’s way to avoid seeing 
the location where the trauma occurred). An individual may also worry that the 
experience of intrusive memories is abnormal and make negative appraisals of intrusion 
symptoms, such as “I’m going mad” or “I’ll never get over this” (Ehlers & Clark, 2000, 
p. 322). These negative appraisals may produce maladaptive attempts to reduce intrusive 
memories (e.g., avoidance of trauma reminders, thought suppression). Avoidance is 
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problematic because it may prevent the individual from experiencing the trauma memory 
in the absence of fear. A lack of disconfirming evidence for this memory-fear response 
pairing can contribute to the persistence of a pathological fear structure associated with 
trauma reminders (Foa, Huppert, & Cahill, 2006; Foa & Kozak, 1986). Regularly 
experiencing a fear response may also contribute to a sense of current threat and 
hyperarousal. In addition, avoidance is known to interfere with making meaning of the 
trauma memory and integrating it into an autobiographical context, a process that is 
conceptually linked to the maintenance of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). On the other 
hand, successful elaboration of a trauma memory into a meaningful narrative account is a 
key component of empirically supported PTSD interventions (e.g., Cognitive Processing 
Therapy [CPT]; Resick, Monson, & Chard, 2017). Given that intrusive memories are 
integral to the development and maintenance of PTSD, understanding their etiology is of 
crucial importance to informing intervention and prevention efforts.  
Risk Factors for Intrusions 
Cognitive processes. PTSD has been conceptualized as a disorder of memory 
(e.g., McNally, 2006). In addition to experiencing intrusive memories and flashbacks, 
individuals with PTSD often exhibit difficulty intentionally recalling the traumatic event. 
Instead, trauma memories are frequently remembered in a disorganized and fragmented 
manner (see Brewin 2014; Foa & Riggs, 1993). In addition, trauma narratives in those 
with PTSD often involve a focus on sensory and perceptual information (see O’Kearney 
& Perrott, 2006). Ehlers and Clark (2000) propose that the apparently discrepant 
experiences of increased intrusive memories and deficits in intentional recall are related 
in that one serves to increase the other. These authors suggest that disruption in the 
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trauma memory (e.g., increased sensory information, lack of contextualization) can lead 
to a persistent sense of current threat, and is therefore a core ingredient for the 
development and maintenance of intrusive symptoms. In addition, a disorganized trauma 
memory can simultaneously reduce one’s ability to voluntarily retrieve the memory and 
increase the likelihood of cue-driven recollections (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), which may 
manifest as intrusive memories. Supporting Ehlers and Clark’s theoretical supposition, 
disorganized trauma memories have been linked empirically to both intrusive memories 
(Halligan, Clark, & Ehlers, 2002) and PTSD symptoms broadly (Halligan, Michael, 
Clark, & Ehlers, 2003; Harvey & Bryant, 1999; Jones, Harvey, & Brewin, 2007).  
Yet, what causes this disruption of the trauma memory in the first place? The 
answer may lie in the way the trauma is first encoded into memory. Theorists have 
identified two forms of cognitive processing that are of relevance here: data-driven 
processing and conceptual processing (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Roediger, 1990). Data-
driven processing refers to low-level cognitive processes in which an individual focuses 
on the sensory information and perceptual input. On the other hand, conceptual 
processing refers to higher-level cognitive processes in which one makes meaning of the 
experience as well as organizes and integrates the trauma memory into the context of 
other autobiographical memories. In a parallel manner, the well-known dual 
representation model of PTSD (Brewin, 2001, 2014; Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; 
Brewin et al., 2010) distinguishes between contextualized representations of a traumatic 
event that can be integrated into personal memories over time (C-reps) and sensation-
based representations (S-reps). In each of these conceptualizations, data-driven 
processing (or S-reps) in the absence of conceptual processing (or C-reps) is associated 
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with increased intrusive memories. That is, data-driven processing has been associated 
with strong perceptual priming (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Roediger, 1990), which can in turn 
increase the likelihood that later perceptual cues in the environment will evoke poorly 
elaborated and disorganized trauma memories (e.g., Halligan et al., 2002), resulting in 
intrusive and distressing memories (e.g., Ehring, Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2008; Halligan et 
al., 2002, 2003). These cognitive risk factors have been examined and supported in both 
correlational studies with trauma survivors and lab-based trauma analog studies in 
participants without a trauma history (see Holmes & Bourne, 2008).  
Stress response. In addition to cognitive processing of traumatic events, 
increased peritraumatic stress, as indicated by strong physiological reactivity (e.g., heart 
rate) and emotional responding during the trauma event, has been identified as a risk 
factor for the development of intrusive memories. Conceptually, the importance of the 
stress response can be understood in terms of classical conditioning, in which specific 
sensory cues in the environment become conditioned stimuli by virtue of pairing with a 
traumatic event (see Rescorla, 1988). Later encounters with these sensory cues may elicit 
a conditioned stress response similar to that experienced at the time of the trauma. Pitman 
(1989) suggests that strong stress responses lead to “super conditioning” and subsequent 
increases in intrusive memories. Similarly, Ehlers and Clark (2000) discuss the role of 
associative priming in the development of intrusions.  
Prior research supports the role of a strong stress response in the development of 
intrusive memories and related PTSD symptoms. Specifically, increased heart rate 
assessed immediately after a traumatic event has been associated with increased risk for 
PTSD and associated intrusions up to six months later (e.g., Kuhn, Blanchard, Fuse, 
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Hickling, & Broderick, 2006; Shalev et al., 1998). Although some studies report non-
significant or even negative associations between peritraumatic heart rate and subsequent 
PTSD (e.g., Blanchard, Hickling, Galvoski, & Veazey, 2002; Buckley et al., 2004; 
Ehring, Ehlers, Cleare, & Glucksman, 2008), a meta-analysis suggests that, overall, 
resting heart rate immediately after a trauma is positively associated with subsequent 
PTSD (weighted effect size of r = .20; Pole, 2007). Likewise, increased heart rate while 
viewing a sexual trauma film has been linked to greater reporting of intrusive memories 
(Weidmann, Conradi, Gröger, Fehm, & Fydrich, 2009). Together, these studies support 
the role of fear conditioning in the development of intrusions and associated PTSD 
symptoms.  
In addition to heart rate, negative emotional responding to a traumatic event has 
been linked to intrusive memories and other PTSD symptoms. Although the predictive 
validity of specific negative emotional responses associated with the DSM-IV-TR’s 
Criterion A2 (e.g., fear, helplessness, or horror; APA, 2000) has not been supported for 
PTSD (see for example Friedman, Resick, Bryant, & Brewin, 2011), this criterion does 
not capture all peritraumatic reactions. Bovin and Marx (2011) recommend that the 
peritraumatic experience be considered more broadly, including a focus on the emotions 
of fear, anger, sadness, and disgust, each of which have been associated with PTSD. 
These negative emotions may have implications for peritraumatic cognitive processing, 
and thus the development of intrusive memories.  
Although strong emotions generally enhance memory, memory can be impaired 
when strong emotions are accompanied by heightened physiological arousal (Bennion, 
Ford, Murray, & Kensinger, 2013). As first explicated by Yerkes and Dodson (1908), 
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moderate arousal can improve memory, whereas extreme arousal can impair 
performance. Easterbrook’s (1959) cue utilization hypothesis suggests that when one is 
highly aroused or experiencing a strong emotion such as fear, one can only attend to the 
most central and important cues (at the cost of peripheral, irrelevant cues). Consistent 
with these hypotheses, strong negative emotions during stressful events have been shown 
to produce a narrowing of attention to the most central information (e.g., a perpetrator’s 
knife; Christianson, 1992). Although this narrowing of attention to a weapon (“Weapon 
Focus”; e.g., Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987; Loftus & Macworth, 1978) can be partially 
attributed to the unusual nature of the object, physiological arousal also contributes to this 
effect (see Fawcett, Russell, Peace, & Christie, 2013).  
Such narrowing of attention during a trauma can impair processing of peripheral 
information, and in turn contribute to disorganization of the trauma memory (Foa & 
Riggs, 1993), thereby increasing intrusive memories (e.g., Halligan et al., 2002). Further, 
empirical research also supports the role of strong peritraumatic emotions in the 
development of intrusive memories. For example, the content of intrusive memories often 
reflects stimuli temporally associated with the most distressing aspect of the event (i.e., 
“hotspots”; Holmes, Grey, & Young, 2005), possibly because these stimuli are 
interpreted as warning signals of upcoming distress (the Warning Signal Hypothesis; 
Ehlers et al., 2002). Empirical support for the role of peritraumatic affect as a contributor 
to intrusions also comes from meta-analytic findings linking emotional arousal during 
trauma exposure to increased PTSD symptoms (Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss, 2003). 
Overall, although physiological arousal and valence of emotion have been 
conceptualized as orthogonal components of affect (LaBar & Cabeza, 2006), both have 
   
 
10
implications for the development of intrusive memories. Extreme peritraumatic arousal 
(which can be observed through increased heart rate) can lead to strong associative 
priming (Pitman, 1989), increasing the likelihood that subsequent reminders will lead to a 
conditioned fear response and associated intrusions (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). When 
accompanied by heightened arousal, strong emotions can also lead to a narrowing of 
attention and impaired cognitive processing (Bennion et al., 2013). Accordingly, both 
increased heart rate and strong negative emotions at the time of the trauma have been 
associated with intrusive memories and related PTSD symptoms (e.g., Ozer et al., 2003; 
Pole, 2007). 
Summary of risk factors for intrusions. In sum, the occurrence of intrusive 
memories can be impacted by cognitive, physiological, and emotional factors. 
Specifically, the frequency of intrusive memories has been linked to more disorganized 
trauma memories (Halligan et al., 2002), more data-driven processing (Ehring et al., 
2008; Halligan et al., 2002, 2003), and heightened physiological (e.g., heart rate; 
Weidmann et al., 2009) and emotional arousal (Holmes et al., 2005; Ozer et al., 2003). 
When one experiences physiological arousal in the presence of strong, negative emotions, 
one’s focus becomes limited to only the most central, important information 
(Easterbrook, 1959). This focus often involves processing basic sensory information (i.e., 
data-driven processing), which may limit capacity for higher-level processing (i.e., 
conceptual processing). Data-driven processing (in the absence of conceptual processing) 
during the trauma can contribute to poorly elaborated trauma memories characterized by 
a high degree of sensory information without appropriate context (i.e., disorganization in 
trauma memory). In turn, when sensory cues are experienced in the environment, 
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intrusive memories are easily triggered and, without appropriate contextualization, can 
evoke a sense of current threat.  
Peritraumatic Alcohol Intoxication 
The theory and findings reviewed above illuminate key processes involved in the 
development of intrusions. Alcohol intoxication at the time of the event may also impact 
this process. As early as World War I, some suggested that the sedative properties of 
alcohol could protect against traumatic stress by producing “a decrease of critical self-
consciousness and anxiety” (Mott, 1919, p. 224). More recently, Ehlers and Clark (2000) 
remarked that alcohol use could be one of many factors that influence cognitive 
processing of a traumatic event (but did not elaborate on the possible nature of this 
influence). Similarly, Kaysen, Bedard-Gilligan, and Stappenbeck (2017) suggested acute 
alcohol intoxication might impact one’s subjective experience of a potentially traumatic 
event and, in turn, affect post-trauma symptoms and recovery (though they too 
acknowledged that mechanisms remain unclear). Despite these conjectures, researchers 
have only recently considered the potential for peritraumatic alcohol use to alter later 
intrusive memories in empirical studies. As detailed below, this work reveals that alcohol 
intoxication during exposure to a traumatic event may indeed impact key cognitive, 
physiological, and emotional risk factors for intrusive memories. 
Alcohol myopia. The Alcohol Myopia Model (AMM; Giancola, Josephs, Parrott, 
& Duke, 2010; Steele & Josephs, 1990) provides a useful theoretical lens through which 
to consider the impact of peritraumatic intoxication on symptom development. This well-
supported model holds that the pharmacological effects of alcohol intoxication produce a 
narrowing of attention, which restricts the range of internal and external cues perceived 
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and processed by the intoxicated individual. Myopia is said to produce a shortsightedness 
characterized by an increased focus on immediate, superficial information to the 
exclusion of a longer-term perspective (Steele & Josephs, 1990). One lab study involving 
alcohol administration found that myopia was positively associated with impaired 
memory for peripheral aspects of events while leaving memories for central information 
unaffected (as reported while still intoxicated; Schreiber Compo et al., 2011). Alcohol 
myopia has also been demonstrated using the Simons and Chabris (1999) “gorillas in our 
midst” clip. Specifically, compared to those in a placebo condition, participants who 
drank alcohol were more likely to miss the gorilla due to a narrowed focus on counting 
the number of passes (Clifasefi, Takarangi, & Bergman, 2006). In further support of 
alcohol myopia, Harvey, Kneller, and Campbell (2013) showed that alcohol narrowed the 
focus of foveal attention to central information using an eyetracker. 
In the present study, alcohol myopia is expected to impact previously identified 
risk factors on intrusive memories. Specifically, the shortsightedness brought on by 
alcohol myopia is expected to interfere with conceptual processing of traumatic events 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000), limiting individuals to data-driven processing of salient 
perceptual cues. Alcohol myopia is also expected to exacerbate the narrowing of attention 
associated with affect-laden stress responses (Christenson, 1992). In this manner, 
alcohol-related myopia is predicted to increase intrusive memories by reducing 
conceptual processing, thereby increasing reliance on data-driven processing and creating 
associated disruptions in trauma memories.  
Alcohol and stress-response dampening. At high doses, alcohol is also known 
to have anxiolytic effects, decreasing one’s physiological response to stress—a 
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phenomenon known as stress-response dampening (Levenson, Sher, Grossman, Newman, 
& Newlin, 1980; Sayette, 1999). Stress-response dampening appears to be dose-
dependent (in the absence of distracting information), operating only at levels of 
intoxication high enough to achieve physiological anxiolytic effects (Donohue, Curtin, 
Patrick, & Lang, 2007). In support of this process are findings that high doses of alcohol 
are associated with reduced heart rate (Sayette & Wilson, 1991; Sayette, Smith, Breiner, 
& Wilson, 1992), as well as reduced facial affect (Sayette et al., 1992). As such, stress-
response dampening at high levels of peritraumatic alcohol intoxication is expected to 
override previously discussed myopic effects on cognitive processing displayed at low 
doses. Instead, at high doses of alcohol intoxication, stress-response dampening is 
expected to decrease data-driven processing, reduce disruption in the trauma memory, 
and ultimately lead to a reduction in intrusive memories when compared to a placebo. 
Summary of peritraumatic alcohol intoxication. In sum, acute alcohol 
intoxication has implications for cognitive, physiological, and emotional risk factors for 
intrusive memories. One important manifestation of intoxication is alcohol myopia, 
which narrows one’s of attention to the central, most salient cues at the cost of more 
peripheral cues (Steele & Josephs, 1990). Reminiscent of attentional narrowing displayed 
during times of high physiological and emotional arousal, alcohol myopia is similarly 
expected to exacerbate cognitive processes that lead to intrusive memories. However, at 
high doses, alcohol is also known to dampen responses to stress, potentially interfering 
with the physiological arousal required to activate the cognitive risk factors for intrusive 
memories.  
Peritraumatic Alcohol Intoxication and Intrusions 
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Correlational studies. Despite this evidence that alcohol intoxication impacts 
mechanisms responsible for intrusive memories, little work has focused on the role of 
peritraumatic alcohol use in the development of intrusive symptoms. This lack of 
knowledge is concerning in light of findings that about 50% of women who are sexually 
assaulted were drinking at the time (Abbey et al., 2004). A few studies have examined 
current PTSD symptoms in relation to peritraumatic alcohol use, as reported 
retrospectively by victims. For instance, some studies examining self-reported drinking 
prior to a sexual or physical assault (Kaysen et al., 2010; Peter-Hagene & Ullman, 2016) 
or other traumatic event (Maes, Delmeire, Mylle, & Altamura, 2001) indicate that 
peritraumatic alcohol use initially buffers against intrusions and other PTSD symptoms. 
However, findings from Kaysen and colleagues’ (2010) study showed that alcohol use 
prior to an assault was associated with more persistent intrusive symptoms up to six 
months post-assault.  
Some recent studies have asked female victims of sexual assault to report 
retrospectively how intoxicated they were prior to the assault. Those studies involving 
college students with a history of sexual assault revealed that greater peritraumatic 
intoxication (as assessed subjectively and retrospectively) was associated with more 
current distress (Blayney & Read, 2015) and PTSD symptoms (Blayney, Read, & Colder, 
2016). Similar findings were revealed in a community sample of women who 
experienced sexual assault (Jaffe et al., 2017). Specifically, when controlling for severity 
of the assault, greater levels of peritraumatic intoxication (but not alcohol use alone) were 
associated with more severe symptoms of PTSD, particularly intrusive symptoms (Jaffe 
et al., 2017). 
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In contrast to the above studies that have focused on the presence or absence of 
victim substance use, as well as level of intoxication during the assault, other research has 
categorized sexual victimization experiences based on perpetrator tactics (e.g., giving a 
potential victim alcohol, using force). For example, in a national study (Kilpatrick et al., 
2007), sexual assault experiences were categorized as drug- or alcohol-facilitated rape (in 
which the perpetrator gave drugs or alcohol to a woman to facilitate a sexual assault), 
incapacitated rape (in which the woman became voluntarily intoxicated but was so 
impaired she could not consent), and forcible rape. Findings from this sample suggest 
that compared to those who did not experience a given type of assault, victims of drug- or 
alcohol-facilitated rape (OR = 1.87) and forcible rape (OR = 3.46) were at increased risk 
for PTSD, but victims of incapacitated rape were not (Zinzow et al., 2010). Further, rapes 
involving both victim intoxication/incapacitation and force were more likely to result in 
PTSD than either intoxication/incapacitation or force alone (Zinzow et al., 2012). Other 
work has identified three classes of sexual assault using cluster analyses: alcohol-related, 
high-violence, and moderate-severity sexual assaults (Peter-Hagene & Ullman, 2014). 
These authors reported that alcohol-related assaults led to more severe symptoms of 
PTSD than modest-severity assaults, but were associated with similar or lower levels of 
PTSD than high-violence assaults. Consistent with these findings, Brown, Testa, and 
Messman-Moore (2009) found that incapacitated rape led to an intermediate degree of 
PTSD compared to sexual assaults that involved verbal coercion alone, and forcible 
rapes. On the other hand, no differences in PTSD symptoms were found between victims 
who were non-impaired, impaired, or incapacitated at the time of a sexual assault 
(Littleton, Grills-Taquechel, & Axsom, 2009).  
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A related literature involving victims of motor vehicle accidents and other injuries 
has examined associations between drug and alcohol screenings at hospital admission and 
subsequent PTSD. Like findings with sexual assault victims, these results have been 
mixed, with some studies linking intoxication to increased risk for PTSD (McFarlane et 
al., 2009; Richmond & Kauder, 2000), while others report lower risk for PTSD 
(Mellman, Ramos, David, Williams, & Augenstein, 1998), or no association between 
alcohol intoxication and later PTSD (Zatzick et al., 2002).  
Summary of correlational studies. In sum, most prior research on the impact of 
peritraumatic intoxication on PTSD symptoms has been correlational in nature. These 
studies involve participants who have personally experienced traumatic events, and are 
therefore strong in external validity. However, these studies also contain a number of 
threats to internal validity that could contribute to the mixed findings. For instance, the 
use of alcohol prior to an actual trauma may be confounded with other variables that 
affect the development of PTSD. As an example, alcohol-related sexual assaults differ 
from other sexual assaults in a variety of ways, including degree of perceived threat and 
type of perpetrator (Peter-Hagene & Ullman, 2014). Correlational studies with trauma 
victims therefore cannot isolate the influence of alcohol. Mixed correlational findings 
may also be a consequence of inconsistent methodologies. Measures of intoxication vary 
across studies (e.g., positive vs. negative alcohol screen, blood alcohol content above or 
below .08, retrospective self-report of alcohol use). Within studies using objective 
measures of intoxication at hospital admission, there is inevitable variability between 
subjects in the amount of time since the trauma. Studies also vary in the length of time 
between trauma exposure and PTSD symptom assessment, as well as in the type and 
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degree of trauma exposure being studied (e.g., assault vs. motor vehicle accident). 
Moreover, because this work is correlational, there is no way to test causal relations 
between intoxication and intrusive symptoms.  
Experimental studies. Compared to such correlational studies, experimental 
studies offer a number of methodological advantages. Specifically, manipulating acute 
alcohol intoxication in the laboratory setting prior to an analog trauma exposure allows 
for the examination of causal effects of intoxication. Further, the increased internal 
validity afforded by experimental control permits a more precise examination of the 
pharmacological effects of alcohol on intrusive memories. Though ethical and safety 
concerns necessitate limits to the amount of alcohol administered and the degree of stress 
induced in a lab setting, potentially limiting external validity, highly controlled 
experimental studies provide an important complement to correlational work in this area.  
To date, two such experimental studies have examined the dose-dependent effects 
of peritraumatic alcohol intoxication on intrusive memories (Bisby, Brewin, Leitz, & 
Curran, 2009; Bisby, King, Brewin, Burgess, & Curran, 2010). In these studies, 
participants were administered either a placebo, a low dose of alcohol, or a high dose of 
alcohol, then were exposed to a 12.5-minute film of road traffic accidents, which served 
as an analog trauma. Participants were asked to record subsequent intrusive memories of 
the film in an online daily diary for seven days following the film. These studies also 
involved other self-report questionnaires, physiological assessments, and memory tasks. 
Results from the first of these studies (Bisby et al., 2009) supported the proposed direct 
effects of alcohol on intrusive memories, in that participants in a low-dose alcohol 
condition had greater intrusions than those in the placebo condition, while those in a 
   
 
18
high-dose alcohol condition had fewer intrusions than those consuming a placebo 
beverage. Although these authors attributed the increased intrusions at low doses to 
reduced explicit memory, they were unable to account for the reduced intrusions at high 
doses. In the second study by this team, Bisby and colleagues (2010) again found an 
inverted U-shaped association between alcohol dose and intrusions, such that low doses 
of alcohol produced a significant increase in intrusions over the placebo dose. Findings 
supported viewpoint-dependent memory as one possible mechanism underlying the 
alcohol-intrusions relationship. These studies provide important initial evidence that 
alcohol intoxication may have direct effects on the development of intrusive memories 
following exposure to an analog trauma. Notably, however, this work does not examine 
the effects of alcohol on other established contributors to intrusive memories as potential 
underlying mechanisms accounting for alcohol’s dose-dependent effects on intrusive 
memories. It also remains unclear whether these findings would extend to other types of 
(analog) traumas, including sexual assault. 
Summary and Current Study 
 To summarize, intrusive memories are an important component of PTSD that are 
experienced as distressing and often follow a sexual assault. Prior research implicates 
various risk factors in the development of intrusive memories following sexual assault. 
Data-driven processing in the absence of conceptual processing has been associated with 
disorganization of the trauma memory, which in turn has been linked to increased 
intrusive memories. Heightened physiological arousal and strong emotional responses, 
which can lead to fear conditioning and attentional narrowing, have also been implicated 
in the development of intrusive memories and related PTSD symptoms. A separate 
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literature suggests that acute alcohol intoxication can impact these cognitive, 
physiological, and emotional processes relevant to intrusive memories. Specifically, 
alcohol can exacerbate the attentional narrowing associated with strong affective 
responses, and may limit one to data-driven processing. Although alcohol myopia is 
expected to increase with level of intoxication, at high doses of intoxication, alcohol can 
dampen one’s physiological stress response. This effect may override myopic processes 
at high levels of intoxication, reducing fear conditioning and subsequent intrusions.  
The present study integrates theoretical and empirical literatures on trauma-
related intrusive memories and acute alcohol intoxication. Building on this work, the 
current study involved examining a model accounting for the direct and indirect effects of 
known risk factors and alcohol use on trauma-related intrusions (see Figure 1.1). 
Specifically, this model was examined using an experimental lab design involving 
alcohol administration, a well-accepted analog trauma exposure paradigm (a trauma 
film), and behavioral measures of key constructs (e.g., alcohol myopia, stress responses). 
Findings from this study should clarify the role of alcohol intoxication in the 
development of intrusive memories and are expected to highlight the importance of 
prevention and intervention programs aimed at reducing alcohol-involved victimization.  
Drawing on Bisby et al.’s (2009, 2010) recent studies—the only prior work 
examining intrusive symptoms following lab-based alcohol administration—a basic 
premise of the model is that low levels of alcohol intoxication will produce greater 
intrusive memories than the placebo drink, but that high levels of intoxication will 
produce fewer intrusive memories than the placebo drink (path 1A). Although intrusive 
memories are expected to decrease over time for all levels of alcohol intoxication, the 
   
 
20
rate at which intrusions decrease is expected to vary by dose. Specifically, low levels of 
intoxication should be associated with more persistent memories, but high levels of 
intoxication will be associated with intrusions that decrease more rapidly (path 1B). 
Alcohol’s influence on cognitive factors will inform these overall effects. Consistent with 
the Alcohol Myopia Model (Steele & Josephs, 1990), intoxication is expected to produce 
a narrowing of attention to the most salient, or central, features of the trauma film, 
resulting in impaired memory for peripheral information (Schreiber Compo et al., 2011; 
path 2A). This attentional narrowing is predicted to interfere with conceptual processing 
of the film in a meaningful, organized manner, thereby limiting intoxicated participants’ 
processing of the film to a sensory level (i.e., data-driven processing, path 2B) and 
disrupting the formation of trauma memories (path 2C). Similarly, alcohol dose is 
expected to relate to stress response as indicated by heart rate and facial affect, with high 
doses dampening stress responding (Donohue et al., 2007; path 3A). An increased stress 
response, which is associated with attentional narrowing in the absence of alcohol 
(Christianson, 1992), is expected to be associated with increased data-driven processing 
(path 3B) and disruption of the trauma memory (path 3C). Finally, increased data-driven 
processing of sensory information, which is expected to lead to increased temporal 
disorganization in trauma-related memories (Halligan et al., 2002; path 4A), should be 
associated with increased intrusive memories (e.g., Ehring, Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2008; 
Halligan et al., 2003; paths 4B, 4C). These aims and hypotheses can be summarized as 
follows. (Path identifiers in Figure 1.1 correspond to the listed hypotheses below.) 
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Figure 1.1. Conceptual model.  
 
Aim 1: Examine the direct effects of peritraumatic alcohol intoxication on intrusive 
memories. 
Hypothesis A: Compared to a placebo condition, low levels of alcohol 
intoxication will lead to higher levels of intrusive memories following the trauma 
film, while high levels of intoxication will lead to lower levels of intrusive 
memories following the trauma film. 
Hypothesis B: Although intrusions will decrease over time for all participants, 
reductions will be slower for those with low levels of alcohol intoxication and 
faster for those with high levels of intoxication. 
Aim 2: Investigate the impact of alcohol myopia on cognitive factors. 
Hypothesis A: Greater alcohol intoxication will be associated with reduced 
memory for peripheral details of the trauma film (reflecting alcohol myopia); 
memory for central details of the film will not vary by intoxication level. 
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Hypothesis B: Greater alcohol myopia will be associated with increased 
processing of sensory information (i.e., data-driven processing) in the trauma film 
and reduced ability to make meaning of the trauma film (i.e., conceptual 
processing). 
Hypothesis C: Greater alcohol myopia will be associated with more temporal 
disorganization in memory for the trauma film. 
Aim 3: Investigate the impact of stress responding on cognitive factors. 
Hypothesis A: High levels of alcohol intoxication will result in stress-response 
dampening as indicated by reduced heart rate and negative facial affect. 
Hypothesis B: Increased stress responding (i.e., heart rate and facial affect) will 
be associated with increased processing of sensory information (i.e., data-driven 
processing) in the trauma film and reduced ability to make meaning of the trauma 
film (i.e., conceptual processing). 
Hypothesis C: Increased stress responding will be associated with more temporal 
disorganization in the memory for the trauma film.  
Aim 4: Examine the effects of cognitive factors on intrusive memories. 
Hypothesis A: Data-driven processing of the trauma film will be positively 
associated with disorganization in memory for the trauma film.  
Hypothesis B: Increased data-driven processing and reduced conceptual 
processing will be associated with more frequent and persistent intrusive 
memories of the film. 
Hypothesis C: Increased temporal disorganization in memories of the trauma 
film will be associated with more frequent and persistent intrusive memories. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHOD 
Overall Design  
This investigation involved a between-subjects experimental design to examine 
the influence of cognitive, physiological, and emotional factors and acute alcohol 
intoxication on intrusive symptoms during a weeklong period following an analog trauma 
exposure in a community sample of women. Participants were randomized into an 
alcohol condition (placebo, low dose, high dose) and then viewed a film clip depicting a 
sexual assault. Facial affect and heart rate during the film were recorded. After film 
viewing, participants completed measures to assess their cognitive processing and 
memory of the event. During the next seven days, participants completed daily diaries 
assessing the frequency, content, and distress associated with intrusive memories of the 
film. At the week’s end, participants returned to the lab to complete one final intrusion 
diary, an additional self-report measure of memory for the trauma film, a follow-up 
assessment of distress, and a thorough debriefing.  
Participants 
Participants were 98 women recruited from Lincoln, Nebraska. To participate, 
individuals had to be between 21 (legal drinking age) and 30 years of age, an age range at 
high risk for sexual assault victimization (Ogle, Rubin, Berntsen, & Siegler, 2013). 
Because of risks associated with alcohol consumption, a number of additional exclusion 
criteria were employed based on previously developed procedures (Eckhardt, 2007; 
Giancola, 2002, 2004; Giancola et al., 2009; Watkins, DiLillo, & Maldonado, 2015; see 
Appendix A for the full telephone screening interview.) Specifically, individuals were 
required to endorse social drinking (defined as drinking three or more standard drinks per 
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occasion, at least twice a month; e.g., Godlaski & Giancola, 2009) to participate. 
Individuals were excluded if they reported: (a) current or past alcohol treatment, or 
hospitalization due to alcohol use; (b) serious psychological symptoms; (c) a condition or 
medication in which alcohol consumption is medically contraindicated; (d) any past 
serious head injuries (as indicated by the HELPS Brain Injury Screening Tool; Picard, 
Scarisbrick & Paluck, 1991); (e) current pregnancy (also assessed via a urine pregnancy 
test administered upon arrival); (f) nursing an infant; or (f) the presence of a positive 
breath alcohol concentration (BrAC) upon arrival. Given that the amount of alcohol 
administered was based upon participant weight, individuals under 6 feet and weighing 
over 250 pounds, and individuals over 6 feet and over 300 pounds, were excluded for 
safety reasons.  
To reduce the likelihood of an adverse reaction to the potentially distressing film, 
additional inclusion/exclusion criteria were employed. Drawing on procedures used by 
Weidmann and colleagues (2009), participants were excluded if they reported a personal 
history of sexual victimization, which is the traumatic event depicted in the film used in 
the present study. In particular, participants were excluded if they endorsed any sexual 
abuse prior to the age of 14, assessed via three screening questions of the Computer 
Assisted Maltreatment Inventory sexual abuse subscale (CAMI; DiLillo et al., 2010). 
Participants were also excluded if they endorsed a history of forcible sexual assault since 
the age of 14, assessed via four questions from the Sexual Experiences Survey (SES-F; 
Koss & Gidycz, 1985). Further, because daily diary data were collected through an app, 
ownership of an Android or Apple smartphone or tablet was required for participation.  
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Of 364 individuals who responded to recruitment materials (see procedures 
below), 316 completed a telephone screening interview to determine eligibility. Figure 
2.1 depicts the flow of participant recruitment and reasons for exclusion. Of 124 
participants who were eligible to participate, 98 participants completed the first 
laboratory session. The 26 individuals lost to follow-up did not differ from the 98 
participants by age, t(122) = −0.87, p = .386, or ethnic minority status, χ2 (1) = 0.89, p = 
.346, as indicated on the telephone screen.  
 
Figure 2.1. Flow chart of participant recruitment.  
Expressed interest 
(n = 364) 
Screened for eligibility 
(n = 316) 
Eligible to participate 
(n = 124) 
Session 1 Participants  
(n = 98): 
 
Placebo (n = 34) 
Low dose (n = 32)  
High dose (n = 32)  
No longer interested (n = 12) 
Lost to follow-up (n = 36) 
Ineligible (n = 192): 
•  Gender (n = 1) 
•  Age (n = 6) 
•  Weight (n = 8) 
•  No smartphone (n = 1) 
•  Medication contraindicated (n = 35) 
•  Medical complication (n = 11) 
•  Serious head injury (n = 2) 
•  History of substance use problems (n = 6) 
•  Serious psychological symptoms (n = 3) 
•  Low frequency of drinking (n = 68)  
•  History of child sexual abuse (n = 22) 
•  Forcible sexual assault (age 14+;  n = 29) 
Lost to follow-up (n = 26): 
•  Never scheduled (n = 3) 
•  Cancelled (n = 17)  
•  No show (n = 5) 
•  Withdrew in Session 1 prior to alcohol 
administration (n = 1) 
Session 2 Participants  
(n = 97): 
 
Placebo (n = 33) 
Low dose (n = 32)  
High dose (n = 32)  
Withdrew between sessions (n = 1) 
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The final sample of 98 participants had an average age of 23.03 years (SD = 2.19, 
range = 21 – 30). All participants identified as female (recruitment materials advertised 
this as a study for “women”), though other options for gender identity were given 
(including male, transgender – female to male, transgender – male to female, and other). 
With regard to sexual orientation, 87.8% identified as heterosexual, 10.2% as bisexual, 
and 2.0% as lesbian/gay. Regarding ethnicity, 14.3% reported they were Latino, 
Hispanic, or of Spanish origin. In addition, 84.7% identified as White, 13.3% as Asian, 
4.1% as African American, 0.0% as American Indian, and 5.1% as “Other” (participants 
could endorse more than one category). Although women were recruited from the 
community at large, 76.5% reported they were currently a student. Given this large 
percentage, we began asking more detailed questions about student status mid-way 
through data collection. Of 50 participants who answered these detailed questions, 20.0% 
were not students, 46.0% were undergraduates at University of Nebraska-Lincoln (UNL), 
4.0% were undergraduate students at other local institutions, and 30.0% were graduate 
students at UNL. Participants reported between 12 and 23 years of formal education 
including kindergarten (M = 17.10, SD = 2.04). With regard to marital status, 90.8% were 
single, 8.2% were married, and 1.0% was divorced. Regarding relationship status, 66.7% 
were either in a romantic relationship (n = 52) or married (n = 8). Participants reported a 
wide range of annual income (or family income if a financially dependent student), with 
9.2% reporting income of $0 – $5,000, 9.2% reporting $5,000 – $10,000, 24.5% 
reporting $10,000 – $20,000, 15.3% reporting $20,000 – $30,000, 7.1% reporting 
$30,000 – $40,000, 7.1% reporting $40,000 – $50,000, 3.1% reporting $50,000 – 
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$60,000, 2.0% reporting $60,000 – $70,000, and 22.4% reporting an annual income over 
$60,000.  
Measures of Primary Study Variables 
Lab Tasks. 
Alcohol administration. Alcohol administration procedures mirrored those 
established by Bisby and colleagues (2009, 2010) and currently in use in the lab of Dr. 
David DiLillo, primary sponsor of this project. Participants were randomly assigned to a 
placebo or, similar to prior studies (Bisby et al., 2009, 2010), a low or high dose alcohol 
condition. A single-blind, no-information design was utilized to understand the 
pharmacological effects of alcohol (Martin & Sayette, 1993). Specifically, participants 
were told they might be assigned to a high dose alcohol condition, a low dose alcohol 
condition, or a no-alcohol condition, but were not informed about which beverage they 
received until after all study procedures were complete. 
Alcohol conditions. Women in the alcohol conditions were administered a dose of 
.36 g/kg (for the low dose condition) or .72 g/kg (for the high dose condition) of 95% 
alcohol (Everclear) mixed at a 1:5 ratio with a mixer (orange juice). For example, a 150-
lb woman in the low dose condition would have been given 32.58 ml Everclear and 
162.90 ml orange juice. A 150-lb woman in the high dose condition would have been 
given 65.15 ml Everclear and 325.75 ml orange juice. Participants were allotted 20 
minutes for beverage consumption, or up to 30 minutes if more time was needed. BrAC 
was assessed using the Intoximeter Alco-Sensor FST Breathalyzer (calibrated monthly; 
tolerance of ± .003% immediately following calibration). Participant BrAC was tested 
following an absorption period of 15 minutes (and if needed, again at 22 and 30 minutes 
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post-drink consumption). After reaching a BrAC of at least .030% in the low dose 
condition or .070% in the high dose condition (or after 30 minutes absorption if the target 
BrAC was not reached), participants completed the Alcohol Consumption Questions, 
which included questions about beverage taste, perceived intoxication and impairment, 
and presumed beverage condition (see Appendix A). Then, participants proceeded with a 
baseline heart rate assessment and trauma film viewing (detailed below). 
Placebo condition. Four milliliters of alcohol were added to each placebo 
beverage and alcohol was sprayed on the rim of the placebo beverage glass. Because 
alcohol placebo manipulations are effective for only approximately 30 minutes after 
beverage consumption (Bradlyn & Young, 1983), immediately after drink consumption, 
participants in the placebo group had their BrAC tested, then proceeded with the Alcohol 
Consumption Questions, baseline heart rate assessment, and trauma film viewing. 
 Trauma film paradigm. Participants viewed a 10.5-minute clip showing a sexual 
assault from the French-language feature film Irreversible by Gaspar Noé, originally 
released in France in 2003. The film was shown to participants on a 17-inch display 
laptop via OpenSesame, an open-source software program used to design psychology 
experiments. English subtitles were not displayed to avoid detracting attention from the 
visual images. The clip consists of a single unbroken shot, mimicking memory formation 
of personal events. A recent study (Weidmann et al., 2009) comparing a number of film 
clips with distressing content recommends the Irreversible segment for use in trauma film 
studies, due to its consistent ability to induce increased heart rate, negative affect, and 
intrusive memories, all of which are variables of interest in the present study. Although 
Weidmann et al. (2009) used a 13.5-minute clip, which showed both a sexual and 
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physical assault (physical assault not depicted in the current study), Arnaudova and 
Hagenaars (2017) validated the use of a trauma film with sexual content alone. 
Specifically, they found that a two-minute clip of the sexual assault in Irreversible was 
associated with a faster heart rate than a positive film with sexual content.  
Participants were informed of the distressing nature of this film before viewing it, 
as well as their right to stop the film (and participation) at any time. Immediately prior to 
the film, participants received written and verbal reminders that they could stop the film 
by pressing the spacebar. (One participant briefly paused the film, but decided to finish 
the film and continue participation.) After film viewing, participants were asked how 
distressing they found the film on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much). 
Participants responded with a mean distress rating of 8.42 (SD = 1.50, range = 5 to 10). 
Based on this item, there were no differences between alcohol conditions in how 
distressing participants found the film, F(2, 95) = .20, p = .817. Participants were also 
asked whether they had seen the film before (2.0% said yes) and to estimate the 
percentage of the French dialogue they understood (M = 9.59%, SD = 17.20%, range = 
0% to 100%). (See Appendix A for Post-Film Questions.) 
Facial affect. Participants’ facial expressions while watching the trauma film 
were video recorded and coded in real time using FaceReader v.5.1.1, a software 
program by Noldus. To improve image quality and facial recognition, a neutral (light 
blue) curtain was hung behind the participant and LED lights were placed in front of the 
participant. Videos of participants were recorded with Logitech c920 HD Pro Webcam 
(placed above the laptop) at 15 frames per second. Video recordings of participants 
corresponded to the exact start and stop times of the trauma film, which was administered 
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via OpenSesame software and connected to FaceReader using the Application 
Programming Interface (Zosky, 2015). Continuous calibration procedures in FaceReader 
were utilized to adapt to any individual biases in facial responses. 
The FaceReader program uses advanced modeling techniques (see Noldus, 2012) 
to code action units in accordance with the Facial Action Coding System (FACS; Ekman 
& Friesen, 1978; Ekman, Friesen, & Hager, 2002) and compute continuous scores for 
each of the six basic emotions (happy, sad, angry, surprised, scared, disgusted) described 
by Ekman (1970) and “neutral” affect. Prior research has demonstrated high convergence 
with trained human raters (den Uyl & van Kuilenberg, 2005; Lewinski, den Uyl, & 
Butler, 2014), high test-retest reliability (r’s > .80), and construct validity (correlations to 
clinical symptoms of schizotypy; Cohen, Morrison, & Callaway, 2013). FaceReader 
measurements of happiness also correlate with facial electromyography data (D'Arcey, 
Johnson, Ennis, Sanders, & Shapiro, 2013). The FaceReader software has also been 
successfully used in past psychological studies (e.g., Chentsova-Dutton & Tsai, 2010; 
Chóliz & Fernández-Abascal, 2012). 
For each frame recorded of the participant, FaceReader generates a value to 
represent the strength of each emotion from 0 (not present) to 1 (fully present). In 
addition, FaceReader computes an overall value for valence ranging from −1 (negative) 
to +1 (positive). Specifically, FaceReader considers “happy” to be a positive emotion, 
“sad,” “angry,” “scared,” and “disgusted” to be negative emotions, and “surprise” to be 
either positive or negative. A valence score, reflecting the overall degree of negativity or 
positivity expressed, is computed by subtracting the value of the most intense negative 
emotion from the intensity of the “happy” score. Given the wide range of negative 
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emotions that could be experienced (and potentially impacted by acute alcohol 
intoxication) during the film, the valence score was utilized in the current study. More 
specifically, a mean change score was computed to represent the change in valence of 
facial affect from the first 105 seconds of the trauma film in which there is no violence (a 
woman is simply walking) to the remainder of the trauma film, which contains violent 
and potentially distressing content.  
Some data recorded from FaceReader were missing at random. Technical issues 
at study onset led to brief crashes in FaceReader for three participants. Occasionally, the 
participant’s face could not be found or modeled by FaceReader in certain frames. 
Although participants were asked to wear contacts instead of glasses if they were equally 
comfortable, 24.1% participants wore glasses, including 5.1% with particularly thick 
frames. Though participants were asked not to cover their face while watching the film, 
other factors could have interfered with modeling participants’ faces (e.g., bangs, facial 
piercings, turning away from the screen). Only one participant had insufficient data (i.e., 
no data coded during the violent portion of the film) to compute a change score. For 
participants with change scores, FaceReader generated data for an average of 99.7% (SD 
= 0.7%, range = 96.2% to 100%) of frames in the baseline period of 105 seconds, and 
98.0% (SD = 5.3%, range = 68.1% to 100%) of frames in the remainder of the film.  
Heart rate. Prior to viewing the trauma film, participants were asked to place the 
Polar H2 Heart Rate Sensor on their chest using an adjustable strap. Sensors on the strap 
were dampened to improve signal conduction. The monitor communicated heart rate data 
to the Polar ProTrainer v.5 software, installed on a nearby computer (not accessible to 
participants), via Bluetooth technology. Three heart rate assessments were conducted: 
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prior to the film to establish a 5-minute baseline, during the 10.5-minute film, and for a 5-
minute period after the film. Consistent with prior trauma film studies (e.g., Chou, La 
Marca, Steptoe, & Brewin, 2014; Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004), the increase in 
the heart rate (i.e., beats per minute) during the film (relative to the pre-film baseline) was 
used as a measure of stress response.  
During each heart rate assessment, study personnel made notes of spikes, dips, 
and signal losses visible on the heart rate monitor, as well as any corresponding 
participant movements. Although some efforts were made to improve the signal during 
the session (e.g., asking the participant to reposition the chest strap), priority was given to 
viewing the film as soon after the alcohol absorption period as possible. Data cleaning 
procedures involved deleting the following artifacts from each heart rate assessment file: 
(a) spikes or dips coinciding with visible participant movements, (b) flat-lines over 10 
seconds, (c) dips below 40 beats per minute, (d) artifacts identified by the Polar Error 
Corrections function, and (e) spikes or dips at the beginning of a data file suggestive of 
calibration. Assessments in which the signal never stabilized or with less than 45 seconds 
of clean data were not utilized and therefore considered missing data. Sufficient data 
were collected during both the pre-film baseline and film assessment to create change 
scores for 91.8% of participants.  
 Free recall task. A novel approach to assess alcohol myopia developed by 
Schreiber Compo et al. (2011) was adapted for use in the present study. The film viewing 
(and heart rate assessment) took place in a separate, staged room. After viewing the film, 
participants returned to the original room and were asked to recall, in writing, all aspects 
of their experience viewing the film, no matter how trivial. A written prompt (see 
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Appendix A) was provided to participants, as well as read aloud by study personnel via 
intercom to confirm all participants comprehended the instructions while intoxicated. 
Participants were given approximately 10 minutes to complete the recall and were not 
informed ahead of time about the task. Trained research assistants subsequently coded 
each response for the number of accurate details reported for (a) each item in the room, 
and (b) each person and object in the film (for coding instructions and record form, see 
Appendix A). A second rater coded 50% of responses and achieved excellent inter-rater 
agreement (ICC = .98). Measurement models described below were utilized to determine 
whether each piece of information recalled best represented central or peripheral 
information. Alcohol myopia was operationalized as impaired recall of peripheral details, 
but no impairment in recall of central details. 
Self-Report Measures. 
 Peritraumatic cognitive processing. The Cognitive Processing Questionnaire 
(Halligan et al., 2002; see Appendix A) was administered immediately after viewing the 
trauma film to assess the degree to which participants engaged in data-driven and 
conceptual processing of the film. The questionnaire consisted of 17 items, including 
eleven items designed to assess data-driven processing (i.e., a focus on surface, sensory-
level details) and six items designed to assess conceptual processing (i.e., making 
meaning of the film). Participants responded to each item on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 
5 (very strongly). Prior studies show satisfactory internal reliability (coefficient alpha of 
.69 for an 8-item data-driven processing scale and .76 for a 7-item conceptual processing 
scale; Halligan et al., 2002). In the current study, coefficients alpha were .78 for the 11-
item data-driven processing scale and .56 for the 6-item conceptual processing scale. 
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Although mean scores were examined in preliminary analyses, measurement models 
were evaluated and modified to obtain more internally consistent representations of these 
constructs.   
Intrusive memory diary. Ecological momentary assessment was used to assess 
intrusive memories. Intrusive memory diaries have proven to be more sensitive than other 
retrospective measures administered at follow-up (e.g., Regambal & Alden, 2012) and 
are commonly used in trauma film studies (Holmes & Bourne, 2008; James et al., 2016). 
Recently, intrusive memories diaries have been successfully administered via daily online 
surveys in trauma film studies (Bisby et al., 2009, 2010) and via handheld devices in 
participants with PTSD (Kleim, Graham, Bryant, & Ehlers, 2013; Pedersen, Kaysen, 
Lindgren, Blayney, & Simpson, 2014; for a review, see Chun, 2016).  
In accordance with procedures used by Holmes et al. (2004) and Bisby et al. 
(2009, 2010), participants were asked to complete diaries at least once daily to report on 
spontaneously occurring thoughts, images, or memories related to the trauma film. In 
each assessment, intrusive memories were differentiated from dreams (through the use of 
a separate dream-related question). Intrusive memories were then described to 
participants as “a memory of the film that pops into your mind spontaneously, out of the 
blue, without deliberately thinking about it. This could be a fleeting memory or more 
vivid.” For each intrusion, participants were asked to provide a description of the content, 
specify the nature of the intrusion (an image, thought, or both), and rate their associated 
distress (Holmes et al., 2004; see Appendix A). Present analyses focus on the number of 
intrusive memories reported each day. 
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Mobile data collection software called MetricWire was used to administer 
intrusive memory diaries via an app on each participant’s smartphone or tablet. Using this 
software, participants were asked to complete a “Daily Diary” survey at the end of each 
day, whether or not they had experienced any intrusive memories. In addition to the 
intrusive memory survey questions, beginning the day after film viewing, additional 
questions (not central to current study aims) assessed daily alcohol use and sexual 
activity. Participants were prompted to complete this survey at 8pm each day, with a 
reminder at 10pm. Surveys were available for up to five hours. The first Daily Diary 
survey was administered on the same day the film was viewed; participants who were 
still present in the lab completing study procedures (and therefore had their phones turned 
off) during the initial prompt were reminded before leaving to complete this survey. In 
addition to the automized daily prompts, participants were also encouraged to initiate a 
“Single Intrusive Memory” diary at any time throughout the day (e.g., immediately after 
an intrusive memory) to reduce rehearsal efforts and minimize the time required for the 
Daily Diary. To reduce participant burden for those who reported a large number of new 
intrusive memories on the Daily Diary (even after excluding previous reports on the 
Single Intrusive Memory survey), event-level details were assessed for a maximum of 
three intrusive memories on each Daily Diary report. Compensation for diary completion 
(as well as the variable assessing total number of diaries completed) was based solely on 
the Daily Diary survey. (For written instructions provided to participants about the 
difference between the Daily Diary and Single Intrusive Memory survey, see Appendix 
A.) 
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On the eighth day after the film viewing, participants returned to the laboratory 
and completed a final intrusion diary online in the lab. At that time, participants were also 
asked to indicate “how accurate” they thought their diaries were on a scale from 1 (not at 
all accurate) to 10 (extremely accurate). At the end of the second laboratory session, 
participants were told they could delete the MetricWire app off their phone at any time; 
no additional data were collected after this lab session. Therefore, those who returned to 
the laboratory more than seven days after the initial laboratory session were only asked to 
complete daily diaries through the seventh day; although a daily diary was completed in-
lab during the second session, this data was not utilized for the four participants who 
completed the second session late (detailed below), given that most participants were not 
provided the opportunity to report on intrusive memories after the eighth day. 
 Trauma memory. During the second lab session, participants also completed a 
version of the Trauma Memory Questionnaire (Halligan et al., 2003) adapted for a film 
(consistent with Halligan et al., 2002; see Appendix A). Though this scale also includes 
an 8-item subscale involving retrospective assessment of intrusions, only the 5-item 
subscale assessing temporal disorganization of the memory for the trauma film was of 
interest here. Sample items include, “I have trouble remembering the order in which 
things happened during the film” and “My memory of the film is muddled.” Participants 
were asked to rate the extent to which each statement applied to their memory of the film 
on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very strongly). In past research, this temporal 
disorganization scale has shown acceptable internal reliability, with coefficient alpha of 
.88 (Halligan et al., 2003). In the current study, the coefficient alpha was .74. 
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Demographics. Participants completed a measure assessing demographics 
including age, education, ethnicity, marital and relationship status, sexual orientation, and 
annual income (see Appendix A).  
Procedure 
 All study procedures were approved by the University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Institutional Review Board (see approval letter in Appendix B).  
Recruitment. Participants were recruited through flyers, newspaper 
advertisements (placed in the classified section of the local Journal Star newspaper), web-
based advertising in the “et cetera jobs” section of Craigslist, Facebook desktop ads, and 
emails sent to a random subset of students enrolled at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
identified by the office of Registration and Records as 21 to 30 years old. All recruitment 
materials advertised the study as recruiting women ages 21 to 30 who drank alcohol. To 
ensure sample diversity, ethnic minority participants were oversampled by posting flyers 
in grocery stores and libraries in ethnically diverse neighborhoods, as well as through 
emails to students identified by the office of Registration and Records as ethnic 
minorities. Participants received compensation at a rate of $10 per hour for the laboratory 
portions of the study, $5 for each of 7 days of complete intrusive memory diary entries, 
and a $10 bonus for completing all daily diaries. Thus, participants were told they could 
earn between approximately $70 and $120 for completing all portions of the study, 
depending on condition and associated length of the first laboratory session. Actual 
compensation for participants who completed all study procedures (including all daily 
diaries) ranged from $75 to $150, and was largely dependent on randomly assigned 
condition and individual variability in the metabolism of alcohol. (For example, the 
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participant who received $150 took 9.5 hours to complete the first lab session, including 
drinking a high dose of alcohol and returning to a BrAC of .030%). 
Data collection. Participants who expressed interest in the study after being 
reached through the various recruitment methods were screened over the telephone to 
assess initial eligibility. Detailed telephone screening procedures are described in 
Appendix A. Those who initially met the inclusion criteria were scheduled for two lab 
visits exactly one week apart. Participants were asked to refrain from drinking alcohol or 
using recreational drugs 24 hours prior to the first laboratory session, and to refrain from 
eating at least four hours prior to the appointment. Participants were asked to arrange 
their own transportation to the laboratory, but were informed that they would either have 
to find a ride or take a taxi home after the first laboratory session (regardless of alcohol 
condition). Participants were sent a reminder email or text message at least 24 hours prior 
to each scheduled lab session.  
Upon arrival, participants provided full verbal and written informed consent (see 
Appendix C). They then completed additional in-lab screening procedures to confirm 
eligibility. These screening procedures involved participants (a) completing a 
breathalyzer test to ensure sobriety, (b) showing study personnel photo identification to 
verify age, (c) completing a urine pregnancy test (i.e., the Alere hCG Combo test, which 
can detect as little as 20 mIU/mL human chorionic gonadotropin [hCG] in urine within 3 
minutes), (d) verbally reviewing their responses to the telephone screening with trained 
study personnel, (e) responding to questions on the HELPS Brain Injury Screening Tool 
(Picard et al., 1991), administered verbally by study personnel, and (f) completing height 
and weight measurements. No participants had a positive breathalyzer or pregnancy test. 
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Four individuals were deemed ineligible in person (indicated as ineligible in the flow 
diagram, Figure 2.1), specifically due to weight as measured in the laboratory (n = 1) and 
responses not reported on the telephone, including a history of sexual assault (n = 1) and 
low frequency of drinking (i.e., below the study-defined criterion of a “social drinker;” n 
= 2). These individuals were compensated $10 for their time before leaving the 
laboratory. Eligible participants handed any car keys to study personnel for safe keeping 
during alcohol administration.  
After eligibility was confirmed, participants completed a 45-minute battery of 
questionnaires online (not central to current study aims). Study personnel then provided 
participants with verbal and written instructions for the intrusive memory diaries and 
helped participants set up the MetricWire app on their smartphone or tablet. Participants 
were then asked to place the heart rate monitor and strap around their chest and turn off 
their mobile device to prevent signal interference with the heart rate monitor. Next, 
participants completed alcohol administration and absorption periods while engaging in 
an emotionally neutral task (e.g., word search puzzles). They then moved to the separate, 
staged room for viewing of the trauma film. Study personnel monitored participants 
through a two-way mirror and provided verbal instructions via an intercom. While in the 
staged room, participants (a) completed a 5-minute baseline heart rate assessment while 
relaxing with their eyes open, (b) completed pre-film ratings of current emotions (not 
central to current study aims), (c) watched the 10.5-minute trauma film while having their 
heart rate and facial affect recorded, (d) completed post-film ratings of emotions (also not 
central to current study aims), and (e) completed a 5-minute post-film heart rate 
assessment while simultaneously monitoring their thoughts for any film-related intrusive 
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memories (not central to current study aims). Therefore, all participants sat in the staged 
room for approximately 20 to 30 minutes, including at least 5 minutes with no 
distractions during the pre-film heart rate assessment. Participants then left the staged 
room and completed additional self-report questionnaires online, including the Cognitive 
Processing Questionnaire (to assess for disruption in peritraumatic cognitive processing) 
and the written free recall task.  
All participants were asked to remain in the lab until their BrAC dropped to 
.030% (National Advisory Council on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, 2005) and they 
could pass a field sobriety test. Though this meant participants in the placebo condition 
could leave soon after study procedures were complete, to reinforce the possibility they 
had consumed alcohol, they were still required to complete procedures confirming 
sobriety and to obtain a ride home. Before leaving, participants were compensated for the 
first lab session. Study personnel confirmed each participant left the laboratory with a 
friend, a family member, or in a taxicab paid for by the study.  
 During the seven days following the lab visit, participants completed the Daily 
Diaries of film-related intrusive memories through their smartphones or tablets. One 
week after the first lab session, they returned to the lab, where they completed one final 
intrusive memory diary, the film-related Trauma Memory Questionnaire (to assess 
disorganization in trauma memories), and other self-report measures. Participants then 
completed an intrusion provocation task (not central to current study aims) in which they 
returned to the staged room, viewed screenshots of the film, and monitored film-related 
intrusions for 2 minutes. Participants then viewed a comedy film of their choice for 
approximately 5 minutes before leaving the staged room. Following the completion of 
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experimental procedures, study personnel asked each participant to guess the study 
hypotheses (“What do you think this study is about?”; “What do you think the hypotheses 
of the study are?”; and “Do you think alcohol might have affected your responses to the 
film you watched, and if so, how?”). Then, participants were told which beverage 
condition they had received and completed a full verbal and written debriefing detailing 
the purposes of the study (see Appendix D). Participants were assessed for any persistent 
distress and provided referrals to mental health services as needed. Before leaving, 
participants were compensated for completing the daily diaries and the second lab 
session.    
Data Analyses 
 Preliminary analyses and manipulation check. All data were examined for 
errors; any data entered by study personnel were double-entered and checked for data 
entry errors. Descriptive analyses, including sample characteristics and bivariate 
correlations, were examined for all study variables. Group differences between conditions 
were examined for all study variables by estimating between-subjects analyses of 
variance (ANOVAs) in SAS PROC MIXED using restricted maximum likelihood 
estimation (i.e., equivalent to least squares); variances for each condition were estimated 
separately using the GROUP command on the REPEATED line. To ensure that alcohol 
intoxication manipulation was successful, between-subjects ANOVAs were specifically 
used to examine group differences in peak BrAC levels following the absorption period 
and at any time in the lab. Individual BrAC levels were considered as a predictor in 
analyses, centered within each alcohol intoxication group.  
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 Specific Aims 1-4. The specific aims and corresponding hypotheses (as shown in 
Figure 1.1) focus on the direct and indirect effects of alcohol intoxication on intrusive 
memories, as mediated through alcohol myopia, stress responses, cognitive processing, 
and disturbances in trauma memory. All aims were examined simultaneously within a 
path model in Mplus v.8 (Muthén & Muthén, 2017). The significance of indirect effects 
was evaluated using maximum likelihood estimation and bias-corrected bootstrap 
standard errors. Models without bootstrapping were estimated using robust maximum 
likelihood (MLR). The MLR estimator provides model fit statistics and parameter 
standard errors that are robust to deviations of normality; however, alternate distributions 
were considered for outcomes whose residuals showed large deviations from normality. 
The influence of alcohol intoxication was examined via two dummy codes representing if 
a participant was assigned to a low dose or high dose alcohol condition, and placebo as 
the reference group; model-implied comparisons between non-reference groups were 
obtained using the MODEL CONSTRAINT option. Finally, as shown in Figure 1.1, the 
outcomes of interest derived from the eight daily diary entries were latent variables that 
indicate individual differences in level of intrusive memories and their rate of change 
over time (i.e., slope). Both linear and nonlinear (i.e., quadratic) functions of change were 
evaluated in order to best describe the pattern of change across days prior to examining 
the specific aims.  
The structural equation model was built sequentially. First, measurement models 
for the cognitive processing and trauma memory questionnaires were examined using 
confirmatory factor analyses. Empirically indicated changes in measurement models 
(based on criteria detailed below) were considered to improve fit. Once the best-fitting 
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measurement model was determined, tau-equivalence was examined by constraining all 
loadings within a factor to be equal. If the fit of the tau-equivalent model was not 
significantly worse than the model with unconstrained factor loadings, the factor could 
have been represented by a mean subscale score (an observed variable) within the larger 
structural equation model. However, in cases where tau-equivalence was not supported, 
factor scores and standard errors were estimated using maximum likelihood with robust 
standard errors for use in subsequent analyses. (MLR estimation was used to create the 
factor scores, regardless of the original estimation method of the measurement model, in 
order to use the expected a priori [EAP] method to estimate factor scores.) Specifically, 
reliability-corrected factor scores (Brown, 2006) were considered observed variables in 
the larger structural model. Corrections involved fixing the residual variance of the factor 
scores to 1− ! !"#$"%&! !" !"#$%& !"#$%! + !""#" !"#$"%&' !" !"#$%& !"#$%!  
where ! = !"#$%& !"#$"%&'!"#$%& !"#$"%&' ! !""#" !"#$"%&' !" !"#$%& !"#$%! . For models with categorical 
indicators, an average reliability estimate was computed and utilized in the larger 
structural model.  
Measurement models were identified by fixing latent factor means to 0 and factor 
variances to 1. In order for factor variance to be predicted in multidimensional structural 
models, factor variance was freely estimated and a factor loading was fixed to 1 for 
identification. Nested model comparisons were conducted using a rescaled likelihood 
ratio test. Non-nested models were compared using a χ2 test of absolute model fit (which 
compares the current model to the best-fitting saturated model, such that non-significant 
p values indicate good fit), the Comparative Fit Index (CFI, which compares fit to a null 
model; values greater than .95 indicate good fit), the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI, a non-
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normed fit index that also compares fit to a null model; values greater than .95 indicate 
good fit), and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA, a test of close fit; 
values and 90% confidence intervals falling under .05 indicate good fit). Local misfit was 
examined using standardized loadings and the residuals for the estimated correlations.   
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CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 
Preliminary Analyses 
The 98 participants detailed above completed the first laboratory session. One 
participant withdrew from the study after completing the first Daily Diary (no reason was 
provided), but was retained in analyses. Of the 97 participants who returned for the 
second laboratory session, 93 (95.9%) completed the second session on time (i.e., exactly 
7 days after the first session), 2 (2.1%) participants completed the second session one day 
late (i.e., 8 days between sessions), 1 (1.0%) participant completed the second session 
two days late (i.e., 9 days between sessions), and 1 (1.0%) participant completed the 
second session 6 days late (i.e., 13 days between sessions). As detailed above, 
participants who completed the second lab session late were considered to have missing a 
missing daily diary on Day 8 (which was typically completed in lab). Although the 
assessment of trauma memory disorganization also took place during this second lab 
session, this measure was not considered to be as time-sensitive, so data were used from 
all participants regardless of day of completion. 
Awareness of study aims. At the conclusion of study procedures, just prior to 
debriefing, participants were asked “suspicion questions” to determine whether they 
could guess the study hypotheses. Given that the study was advertised to participants as a 
study on “alcohol, memories, and emotions,” many of participants’ open-ended verbal 
responses involved acknowledgement of one or more of these three factors. However, 
only 11.3% recognized the purpose of the study was to examine the influence of alcohol 
specifically on frequency of intrusive memories. Other common responses suggested 
participants thought the study might be about alcohol’s influence on the vividness or 
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accuracy of memories. Others thought the study was designed to assess the influence of 
post-film self-initiated drinking episodes on intrusions. Still others guessed that the study 
was about eyewitness memory or bystander responses to sexual assault when intoxicated. 
Of those whose responses did suggest awareness of the current study hypotheses, 60.0% 
thought alcohol intoxication and intrusive memories would be positively related, and the 
other 40.0% thought they would be negatively related. Because these perceptions were 
distributed across all conditions (one to two participants in each condition believed there 
would be a negative association; two participants in each condition believed there would 
be a positive association), these assumptions were not expected to impact the overall 
pattern of results. 
 Alcohol-related variables. Participants were randomized into a placebo 
condition (n = 34), low dose condition (n = 32), and high dose condition (n = 32). As 
shown in Table 3.1, all participants in the low dose condition reached a BrAC of at least 
.030% after the absorption period and before film viewing. Of those in the high dose 
condition, three (9.4%) participants did not reach a BrAC of .070% prior to film viewing. 
Instead, following a 30-minute absorption period, these participants had a BrAC of 
.054%, .061%, and .062%. Though the first participant only reached a peak BrAC of 
.069% during the session, the other two participants eventually reached a BrAC of at least 
.070% in the laboratory.  
Between-subjects ANOVAs allowing variances to differ between conditions 
revealed significant differences between conditions in post-absorption BrAC, F(2, 95) = 
170.30, p < .001 (see Table 3.1). Specifically, pairwise comparisons revealed that 
participants’ post-absorption BrAC in the high dose condition (M = .091, SD = .019) was 
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significantly higher than those in the low dose condition (M = .051, SD = .012), which 
was in turn significantly higher than those in the placebo condition (M = .020, SD = 
.012). Although some participants in the placebo condition did register a BrAC up to 
.047% (beyond measurement error of the device), this test was administered immediately 
after drink consumption and therefore may have been impacted by the small amount of 
alcohol on the glass (though participants were asked to rinse their mouth with water). 
Similarly, between-subjects ANOVAs revealed significant differences between 
conditions in peak observed BrAC, F(2, 95) = 317.67, p < .001. Specifically, pairwise 
comparisons revealed that participants’ peak observed BrAC in the high dose condition 
(M = .110, SD = .017) was significantly higher than those in the low dose condition (M = 
.053, SD = .010), which was in turn significantly higher than those in the placebo 
condition (M = .020, SD = .011). Individual BrAC curves are plotted by condition in 
Figure 3.1. Visual inspection of curves reveals that film viewing typically took place near 
the peak BrAC in alcohol conditions.  
Table 3.1 
Descriptive Statistics and ANOVAs for Alcohol-Related Variables 
 Placebo 
(n = 34) 
Low Dose 
(n = 32) 
High Dose 
(n = 32) 
F(2, 95) 
 M 
(SD) 
Range M 
(SD) 
Range M 
(SD) 
Range  
Post-absorption  
BrAC a, b. c 
.020 
(.012) 
.000 – .047 .051 
(.012) 
.030 – .075 .091 
(.019) 
.054 – .126 170.30* 
Peak observed  
BrAC a, b. c 
.020 
(.012) 
.000 – .047 .053 
(.010) 
.036 – .075 .110 
(.017) 
.069 – .150 317.67* 
Beverage tasted 
pleasant (1 to 4) a, c 
3.32 
(0.48) 
3 – 4 2.34 
(0.65) 
1 – 4 2.22 
(0.66) 
1 – 3 40.91* 
Beverage tasted  
good (1 to 4) a, c 
3.29 
(0.46) 
3 – 4 2.44 
(0.72) 
1 – 4 2.34 
(0.75) 
1 – 4 27.94* 
Perceived intoxication  
(0 to 11)a, b. c 
2.06 
(1.98) 
0 – 8 3.47 
(1.90) 
0 – 7 5.34 
(1.64) 
2 – 8 27.78* 
Perceived impairment  
(0 to 10)a, b. c 
1.71 
(1.75) 
0 – 6 3.16 
(2.19) 
0 – 7 4.81 
(2.16) 
0 – 9 20.61* 
aHigh Dose and Placebo are significantly different, p < .05 
bHigh Dose and Low Dose are significantly different, p < .05 
cLow Dose and Placebo are significantly different, p < .05 
*p < .001 
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Figure 3.1. Individual BrAC curves centered at film viewing (indicated by the yellow 
reference line).  
 
 
Participants in the low and high dose alcohol conditions both reported the 
beverage tasted worse than participants in the placebo condition; there were no 
differences between either question assessing taste between low and high dose 
participants. As shown in Table 3.1, perceived intoxication and impairment also differed 
between conditions, with those in the placebo condition reporting the least perceived 
intoxication and impairment, and those in the high dose condition reporting the greatest 
perceived intoxication and impairment. As indicated in Table 3.2, most (85.3%) 
participants in the placebo condition, and all those in the low and high dose conditions 
believed they consumed alcohol. Thus, only 14.7% of those in the placebo condition 
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guessed their beverage condition correctly. Those who believed they consumed alcohol 
were also asked to guess which condition they were in; the percentage of low dose 
participants who guessed correctly (65.6%) was not significantly different from the 
percentage of high dose participants who guessed correctly (75.0%), p > .05.  
 
Table 3.2 
Perceptions of Alcohol Conditions 
 Placebo 
(n = 34) 
 Low Dose 
(n = 32) 
 High Dose 
(n = 32) 
Believe consumed alcohol 29 (85.3%)  32 (100%)  32 (100%) 
      
… Guessed low dose (1-2 drinks) 25 (73.5%)  21 (65.6%)  8 (25.0%) 
… Guessed high dose (3-4 drinks) 4 (11.8%)  11 (34.4%)  24 (75.0%) 
      
Correctly guessed condition 5 (14.7%)  21 (65.6%)  24 (75.0%) 
 
 
Intrusive memories. Daily diary compliance was good, as the majority of 
participants completed all seven daily diaries (71.4%), 17.3% completed six diaries, 6.1% 
completed five diaries, 3.1% completed four diaries, 1.0% completed three diaries, and 
1.0% completed only one diary (before withdrawing from the study). Participants’ own 
evaluation of the accuracy of their daily diaries ranged from 6 to 10 (M = 8.82, SD = 
0.92), with 10 being extremely accurate. Across all intrusive memory reports provided on 
the app, intrusive memories had a mean distress rating of 1.53 (SD = 1.14, range = 0 to 
4). Participants categorized 25.7% of intrusive memories as thoughts, 33.8% were 
images, and the remaining 40.5% were a combination of a thought and image. Of 
intrusions that involved any imagery, the average vividness of the memory was 4.41 (SD 
= 1.50, range = 1 to 7).  
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for daily reports of intrusive 
memories are shown in Table 3.3. Across all eight days (including the report made during 
the second laboratory session), the total number of intrusive memories per participant 
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ranged from 0 to 22. The vast majority of participants (94.9%) reported at least one 
intrusive memory. The number of intrusive memories reported on any given day was 
correlated with the number of intrusive memories reported on most, but not all other 
days. On average, participants reported the most intrusive memories on the day of the 
film viewing (Day 1); the number of intrusive memories declined each day thereafter. 
There was variability in the time of day participants viewed the film and therefore, 
variability in the amount of time remaining in Day 1 to report intrusive memories. 
However, the hours remaining in the first day (after film viewing) was not significantly 
correlated to the number of intrusive memories in Day 1, r = −.07, p = .531.  
 
Table 3.3 
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations for Daily Intrusive Memory Reports 
 n Mean (SD) Range Correlations 
Intrusive Memories    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Day 1 95 2.21 (2.09) 0 – 12        
Day 2 93 1.61 (1.50) 0 – 8 .47       
Day 3 89 0.87 (1.14) 0 – 8 .23 .11      
Day 4 92 0.54 (0.89) 0 – 4 .00 .09 .28     
Day 5 92 0.43 (0.79) 0 – 4 .22 .25 .46 .29    
Day 6 92 0.35 (0.56) 0 – 2 .28 .27 .24 .24 .29   
Day 7 88 0.20 (0.48) 0 – 2 .14 .28 .18 .17 .41 .44  
Day 8 94 0.20 (0.56) 0 – 4 .05 .40 .18 .04 .01 -.02 -.03 
Note: Bold, italicized correlations are significant at p < .01. Bold correlations are significant at p < .05 
 
 
Between-subjects ANOVA comparisons for intrusive memories (allowing 
variances to differ between conditions) are displayed in Table 3.4 (results of pairwise 
comparisons are indicated by superscripts). Participants in the high dose condition (M = 
2.25, SD = 1.86) reported significantly more intrusive memories on Day 2 than those in 
the low dose (M = 1.39, SD = 1.33) or placebo conditions (M = 1.29, SD = 1.17). 
However, no other differences between conditions were observed between the raw 
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number of intrusive memories reported on a daily basis. The trends for number of 
intrusive memories reported per day in each condition can be viewed in Figure 3.2. 
  
Table 3.4 
Between-Group Comparison of Intrusive Memories 
  Placebo Low Dose High Dose F df p 
  M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)    
Intrusive memories: Day 1 2.18 (1.38) 1.77 (1.69) 2.68 (2.89) 1.25 2, 92 .290 
Intrusive memories: Day 2a, b 1.29 (1.17) 1.39 (1.33) 2.25 (1.86) 2.91 2, 90 .060 
Intrusive memories: Day 3 0.65 (0.75) 0.89 (1.52) 1.07 (1.05) 1.67 2, 86 .193 
Intrusive memories: Day 4 0.39 (0.76) 0.68 (0.94) 0.57 (0.97) 0.94 2, 89 .395 
Intrusive memories: Day 5 0.38 (0.83) 0.45 (0.72) 0.48 (0.83) 0.14 2, 89 .870 
Intrusive memories: Day 6 0.33 (0.60) 0.32 (0.48) 0.39 (0.62) 0.12 2, 89 .894 
Intrusive memories: Day 7 0.13 (0.34) 0.21 (0.49) 0.29 (0.60) 0.82 2, 85 .444 
Intrusive memories: Day 8 0.16 (0.45) 0.17 (0.38) 0.28 (0.77) 0.34 2, 91 .715 
aHigh Dose and Placebo are significantly different, p < .05 
bHigh Dose and Low Dose are significantly different, p < .05 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Mean number of intrusive memories per day, by condition.  
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To examine potential group differences in total number of intrusive memories 
during the eight days, a linear regression was estimated with restricted maximum 
likelihood in SAS PROC MIXED to determine the adjusted mean differences between 
conditions, controlling for the number of diaries completed. Controlling for number of 
diaries completed, those in the high dose condition (Madjusted = 7.42, SE = 0.89) reported 
significantly more intrusive memories than those in the placebo condition (Madjusted = 
5.28, SE = 0.56), t(94) = −2.04, p = .044. Number of intrusive memories reported by 
those in the low dose condition (Madjusted = 5.60, SE = 0.89) did not differ from the 
placebo or high dose condition, ps > .05. Adjusted means (controlling for number of 
diaries completed) are displayed in Figure 3.3.  
 
 
Figure 3.3. Total number of intrusive memories reported per condition, controlling for 
number of daily diaries completed. *p < .05 
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Potential mechanisms. Descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables 
considered to be potential mechanisms (related to alcohol myopia, stress response, and 
cognitive processing) are included in Table 3.5. For the purposes of these descriptive 
statistics, conceptual processing, data-driven processing, and disorganization mean scores 
were computed in accordance with published scoring recommendations. Given that no 
scoring recommendations were available for the myopia variables, total sum scores for 
central and peripheral details were computed for items indicated in the measurement 
model described below. 
 
Table 3.5 
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations for Potential Mechanisms 
 n Mean (SD) Range Correlations 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Total peripheral details 98 22.48 (14.61) 0 – 71       
2. Total central details  98 20.09 (16.30) 0 – 61 -.26      
3. Change in heart rate 90 5.63 (8.43) -30.88 – 34.37 -.17 -.07     
4. Change in facial affect 97 -0.12 (0.20) -0.57 – 0.57 -.13 .05 .05    
5. Data-driven processing 98 2.42 (0.57) 1.36 – 4.55 -.08 -.09 .09 .02   
6. Conceptual processing  98 3.58 (0.64) 1.83 – 5.00 .20 .02 -.09 -.06 -.14  
7. Disorganization of 
trauma memory 
97 0.36 (0.41) 0.00 – 2.40 -.08 -.10 -.01 -.06 .29 -.17 
Note: Bold, italicized correlations are significant at p < .01. Bold correlations are significant at p < .05 
 
With regard to the free recall task, the total number of details reported for 
peripheral and central information (as determined in the measurement model detailed 
below) ranged from 0 to 71, and 0 to 61, respectively. Though participants were 
prompted to write about both the film and room, 11.2% only reported details about the 
film, and 19.4% only reported details about the room. Relatedly, the total number of 
central and peripheral details recalled were negatively correlated, r = −.26, p = .010. 
As described in the methods section, heart rate data were available for 90 
participants. The average film-related change in heart rate was 5.63 (SD = 8.43) beats per 
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minute. Without considering the degree of change, 78.9% experienced at least some film-
related increase in heart rate, and the remaining 21.1% experienced at least some slowing 
in heart rate. In a similar manner, while the overall change in facial affect reflected more 
negative emotions during the film (M = −0.12, SD = 0.20), 79.4% participants had a film-
related decrease in valence and 20.6% had at least some increase in valence.  
Few bivariate correlations between potential mechanisms were significant. One 
significant correlation revealed a positive association between the number of peripheral 
details recalled and conceptual processing, r = .20, p = .046. In addition, data-driven 
processing was positively correlated with the degree of disorganization in the memory for 
the trauma film, r = .29, p = .003. 
Between-subjects ANOVAs allowing for heterogeneous variances were used to 
assess differences in potential mechanisms by alcohol condition (see Table 3.6). With 
regard to the free recall task, the number of peripheral details freely recalled was 
significantly lower in the high dose condition (M = 16.38, SD = 10.98) compared to both 
the low dose (M = 23.66, SD = 12.08) and the placebo condition (M = 27.12, SD = 
17.82). Consistent with expectations, this suggests a narrowing of attention associated 
with high doses of alcohol. In addition, film-related increases in heart rate were greatest 
in the placebo condition (M = 9.52, SD = 6.99) compared to the dampened film-related 
increases in heart rate for both the low dose (M = 4.53, SD = 10.78) and high dose 
conditions (M = 2.79, SD = 5.91). No other significant group differences between 
potential mechanisms were observed.  
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Table 3.6 
Between-Group Comparison of Potential Mechanisms 
  Placebo Low Dose High Dose F df p 
  M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)    
Total peripheral detailsa, b  27.12 (17.82) 23.66 (12.08) 16.38 (10.98) 5.62 2, 95 .005 
Total central details  21.12 (17.82) 20.19 (17.52) 18.91 (13.57) 0.17 2, 95 .845 
Change in heart ratea, c 9.52 (6.99) 4.53 (10.78) 2.79 (5.91) 8.60 2, 87 < .001 
Change in facial affect -0.15 (0.16) -0.09 (0.22) -0.10 (0.22) 0.99 2, 94 .374 
Data-driven processing  2.39 (0.59) 2.36 (0.42) 2.53 (0.68) 0.81 2, 95 .448 
Conceptual processing  3.65 (0.64) 3.63 (0.64) 3.46 (0.64) 0.82 2, 95 .442 
Disorganization of trauma memory  0.35 (0.36) 0.34 (0.36) 0.40 (0.50) 0.16 2, 94 .857 
aHigh Dose and Placebo are significantly different, p < .05 
bHigh Dose and Low Dose are significantly different, p < .05 
cLow Dose and Placebo are significantly different, p < .05 
 
 
Latent Growth Curve Model for Intrusive Memories 
The initial level and change in number of intrusive memories reported each day 
was predicted within a latent growth curve model. Indicators were eight daily variables 
representing the number of intrusive memories reported each day. Because the first report 
occurred during the same day as the film viewing, time remaining in Day 1 was included 
as a predictor for Day 1 intrusive memories. All indicators were count variables (i.e., 
non-negative integers) and therefore modeled using Poisson distributions (e.g., Atkins & 
Gallop, 2007). A log link is used for Poisson distributions to keep estimated values 
positive. Poisson distributions also assume the mean and variance of the distribution are 
equal. An extension of the Poisson distribution, a negative binomial distribution, allows 
the mean and variance to differ through a dispersion parameter. Although negative 
binomial distributions were considered for the intrusive memory variable indicators, the 
dispersion parameters were not significant, and therefore not empirically indicated. The 
more parsimonious model with Poisson distributions was therefore retained.  
 The latent growth curve model was specified such that an intercept was 
represented by a factor with all loadings fixed to 1, a slope was represented by a factor 
with loadings ranging from 0 to 7 (corresponding to Day 1 to 8, increasing by 1 for each 
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day), and a quadratic trend was represented by a factor with loadings ranging from 0 to 
49 (such that the factor loadings of the slope were squared). Fixed and random effects 
were considered for both linear and quadratic trends. Rescaled likelihood ratio tests 
revealed that a model with a random intercept and linear slope fit better than a model 
with a random intercept only, p = .001. Rescaled likelihood ratio tests also indicated that 
including a random quadratic effect would have further improved the fit of the model, p = 
.001. However, in the larger structural model, it was necessary to remove the random 
quadratic effect (by fixing the variance of the factor representing the quadratic trend to 0) 
to facilitate estimation (i.e., the larger model would not converge otherwise). Therefore, 
although a fixed deviation from linearity was estimated within the latent growth curve 
model, only the intercept and linear trend were predicted by study variables. This 
approach lends itself to a clear interpretation; the influence of each study variable on the 
rate of change in intrusions is represented by a single coefficient (instead of separate 
coefficients associated with linear and quadratic components of change).  
 Alcohol variables, including two dummy codes representing alcohol conditions 
and group-mean centered BrAC for both the low and high conditions, were considered as 
predictors of the intercept and slope. Group-mean centered BrAC variables were not 
significant predictors and therefore removed from all subsequent analyses. The more 
parsimonious model representing differences between alcohol conditions in the level and 
rate of change in intrusive memories is represented in Figure 3.4 and Table 3.7. Given the 
inclusion of count variables, unstandardized estimates are presented. 
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Figure 3.4. Intrusive memory latent growth curve model predicted by alcohol conditions.  
 
 
 
Table 3.7 
Unstandardized Estimates of Intrusive Memory Latent Growth Curve Model 
Estimate SE p 
Low dose (v. placebo) ! Level of intrusive memories − 0.11 0.17 .510 
High dose (v. placebo) ! Level of intrusive memories 0.30 0.18 .084† 
High dose (v. low dose) ! Level of intrusive memories (model-implied) 0.42 0.20 .033* 
    
Low dose (v. placebo) ! Slope of intrusive memories 0.07 0.07 .305 
High dose (v. placebo) ! Slope of intrusive memories 0.03 0.07 .619 
High dose (v. low dose) ! Slope of intrusive memories (model-implied) − 0.04 0.06 .567 
    
Hours remaining on Day 1 ! Day 1 intrusive memories − 0.03 0.02 .123 
    
Covariance between level and slope 0.02 0.02 .303 
    
Level Intercept 0.86 0.19 < .001* 
Slope Intercept − 0.69 0.15 < .001* 
Quadratic Mean 0.03 0.02 .153 
    
Level Residual Variance 0.24 0.07 .001* 
Slope Residual Variance 0.02 0.01 .078 
† p < .10, * p < .05 
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Although it was hypothesized that the low dose condition (v. placebo) would 
produce more frequent and persistent intrusive memories, and the high dose condition (v. 
placebo) would produce fewer and less persistent intrusive memories (Hypotheses 1a and 
1b), a different pattern of results was found. With regard to initial level of intrusive 
memories (i.e., number of intrusive memories at Day 1 controlling for number of hours 
remaining), the high dose condition was marginally greater than the placebo (p = .084), 
and significantly greater than those in the low dose (p = .033). The level for the placebo 
was greater than the level for the low dose, but this difference was not significant (p = 
.510). There were no significant differences between conditions in the slope of intrusive 
memories. In sum, instead of observing the expected inverted U-shaped effect of alcohol 
in which the low dose condition produced the most intrusions immediately after the film, 
the high dose condition produced the most intrusions. Contrary to expectations, the 
persistence of intrusive memories was not found to be associated with alcohol condition.  
Measurement Models 
Measurement model for alcohol myopia. Confirmatory factor analysis was used 
to evaluate the distinction between central and peripheral information. To first evaluate 
fit, robust maximum likelihood estimation was used in order to create fit statistics and 
standard errors that were robust to non-normality (all variables were considered to be 
continuous). Given that representing each individual object as a separate indicator would 
have resulted in more parameters than participants, objects were combined into larger 
groupings (i.e., sum scores were created) based on location in the room or film and 
salience. The following four groupings were trimmed from analyses due to low 
standardized loadings on all possible factors: items in a peripheral corner of the room, 
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items under the participant desk, mention of drug use in the film, and context (i.e., 
language and setting) of the film. Although distinctions were originally examined 
between central and peripheral information within the film, all details for the film were 
highly correlated and therefore collapsed into one factor. The final, best fitting model 
involved two subscales: (1) details of the film, reflecting Central information, and (2) 
details of the room, reflecting Peripheral information. Details specific to the perpetrator 
and victim in the film were highly correlated and allowed to covary, r = .55, p < .001. 
Though the χ2 test of absolute model fit was significant, χ2 (133) = 165.82, p = .021, other 
indices suggest the fit of this final model was good, CFI = .948, TLI = .941, RMSEA = 
.050 (90% CI = .018, .073). Standardized factor loadings ranged from .56 to .86 for the 
Central factor and .34 to .69 for the Peripheral factor. Central and Peripheral factors were 
marginally correlated, r = −.24, p = .096. 
After determining a factor model with sufficient fit, appropriate count 
distributions were allowed for each indicator, including Poisson and—where indicated 
and estimable—zero-inflated Poisson distributions. (Although dispersion factors via 
negative binomial distributions were also considered, they could not be estimated.) Given 
that covariances between count variables are not allowed in Mplus, the covariance 
between perpetrator and victim details was represented equivalently by a latent variable 
(loadings constrained to 1). Absolute fit statistics are not available for factor models with 
count distributions and standardized loadings are not interpretable for count variables. 
Measurement model for cognitive processing style. Based on recommendations 
by Halligan and colleagues (2002), a two-factor model representing data-driven 
processing (11 items) and conceptual processing (6 items) was hypothesized to fit data 
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from the Cognitive Processing Questionnaire. Likert-type responses were modeled as 
ordinal with multinomial distributions. Given that absolute fit indices are not available 
for maximum likelihood estimation with categorical indicators, fit was first determined 
using mean- and variance-adjusted weighted least-squares (WLSMV) estimation. This 
original model fit the data poorly as indicated by a significant χ2 test of absolute model fit 
and other fit indices, CFI = .824, TLI = .798, RMSEA = .116 (90% CI = .098, .134). 
Modifications to the factor structure were made after considering standardized factor 
loadings, residual correlations, modification indices, and conceptual groupings. As can be 
seen in Table 3.8, the resultant model included three factors representing data-driven 
processing (8 items), a separate factor for particularly sensory-based impressions (3 
items), and conceptual processing (4 items). Two items were dropped due to low 
standardized factor loadings and vague wording. Though the χ2 test of absolute model fit 
of this revised model was still significant, other fit indices suggest this model achieved 
adequate fit, CFI = .955, TLI = .946, RMSEA = .068 (90% CI = .040, .093). Standardized 
loadings ranged from .56 to .85 for the data-driven processing factor, .38 to .70 for the 
sensory-based impression factor, and .44 to .62 for the conceptual processing factor. As 
expected, the data-driven and conceptual processing factors were negatively correlated, r 
= −.66, p < .001. However, the sensory-based impression factor was positively correlated 
to the conceptual processing factor, r = .71, p < .001, and not correlated to the data-driven 
processing factor, r = −.05, p = .658. Therefore, the sensory-based impression factor was 
deemed theoretically ambiguous and subsequently dropped from the model.  
The resulting two-factor model also had adequate fit, CFI = .966, TLI = .957, 
RMSEA = .076 (90% CI = .042, .106). Standardized loadings ranged from .56 to .85 for 
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the data-driven processing factor, and .37 to .64 for the conceptual processing factor. The 
data-driven and conceptual processing factors were again negatively correlated, r = −.69, 
p < .001. A tau-equivalent model in which the loadings in each factor were constrained to 
be equal fit significantly worse than a model with freely-estimated loadings, χ2(10) = 
28.00, p = .002. Therefore, reliability-corrected factor scores for data-driven and 
conceptual processing were used for subsequent analyses.  
  
Table 3.8 
Cognitive Processing Questionnaire Factor Models 
Item Original Revised 
3. I could not really take everything in. DDP DDP 
4. I did not fully understand what is going on. DDP DDP 
7. It was like a stream of unconnected impressions following each other. DDP DDP 
8. I didn't think clearly. DDP DDP 
9. There were so many sensations I could not put everything together. DDP DDP 
11. I got confused. DDP DDP 
15. It all became a bit of a blur. DDP DDP 
16. My mind was racing but my thoughts were disjointed. DDP DDP 
2. My mind was filled with immediate impressions and reactions. DDP SBI 
13. My mind was fully occupied with what I saw, heard, smelled, and felt. DDP SBI 
14. I was aware of very immediate things, just going from moment to moment. DDP SBI 
1. My thinking was very clear, not muddled. CP CP 
10. I had a clear impression of how one thing followed from another. CP CP 
12. I thought about what was happening. CP CP 
17. I stayed focused. CP CP 
5. I thought ahead. CP  
6. In my mind I talked myself through what was happening in the film. CP  
Note: DDP = Data-Driven Processing, CP = Conceptual Processing, SBI = Sensory-Based Impressions. 
Items not included in the final analyses are shaded gray. 
 
Measurement model for disorganization of trauma memory. Based on 
Halligan et al. (2003), a two-factor model representing temporal disorganization (5 items) 
and sensory information (8 items) was hypothesized to fit data from the Trauma Memory 
Questionnaire–Film. However, only the 5-item temporal disorganization scale was 
conceptually of interest as a possible mediator. Therefore, a one-factor model with five 
categorical indicators and WLSMV estimation was examined and determined to have 
good fit, χ2 (5) = 8.05, p = .153; CFI = .988, TLI = .977, RMSEA = .079 (90% CI = .000, 
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.176). Standardized loadings ranged from .27 to .85. A tau-equivalent model in which the 
loadings were constrained to be equal fit significantly worse than a model with freely-
estimated loadings, χ2(4) = 45.52, p < .001. Therefore, a reliability-corrected factor score 
for temporal disorganization of the trauma memory was used in subsequent analyses.  
Structural Models 
Full structural model. After establishing each component measurement model, 
the larger structural model was built, as shown in Figure 3.5. The full latent growth curve 
model for intrusive memories with Poisson distributions was included in the larger 
structural model (and therefore, fit indices were not produced). All previously discussed 
measurement models were represented as reliability-corrected factor scores. Change 
scores for heart rate and facial affect were observed variables. This model was estimated 
with maximum likelihood and 1000 bootstrap resamples. Unstandardized estimates and 
bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals are displayed in Table 3.9.  
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Table 3.9 
Unstandardized Estimates for Full Structural Model  
          95% CI 90% CI   
    Estimate SE Lower Upper Lower Upper   
Path Coefficients 
       
 
Y X 
       
 
Level of Intrusive Memories 
  
Low dose (v. placebo) 0.02 0.18 -0.278 0.387 -0.244 0.308 
 
  
High dose (v. placebo) 0.50 0.21 0.112 0.850 0.140 0.809 * 
  
High dose (v. low dose; model-implied) 0.48 0.22 0.010 0.795 0.010 0.733 * 
  
Change in heart rate 0.03 0.01 0.004 0.048 0.008 0.045 * 
  
Change in facial affect 0.05 0.34 -0.498 0.933 -0.390 0.744 
 
  
Data-driven processing 0.12 0.23 -0.282 0.574 -0.222 0.504 
 
  
Conceptual processing 0.19 0.37 -0.538 0.845 -0.458 0.683 
 
  
Disorganization of trauma memory 0.15 0.16 -0.161 0.472 -0.105 0.384 
 
  
Peripheral details -0.03 0.14 -0.309 0.237 -0.280 0.186 
 
  
Central details 0.14 0.09 -0.022 0.345 0.018 0.309 † 
          
 
Slope of Intrusive Memories 
  
Low dose (v. placebo) 0.08 0.07 -0.075 0.214 -0.046 0.184 
 
  
High dose (v. placebo) 0.04 0.09 -0.130 0.217 -0.091 0.188 
 
  
High dose (v. low dose; model-implied)  -0.05 0.07 -0.178 0.077 -0.154 0.057 
 
  
Change in heart rate 0.00 0.01 -0.007 0.012 -0.005 0.010 
 
  
Change in facial affect -0.09 0.17 -0.420 0.213 -0.357 0.146 
 
  
Data-driven processing  -0.02 0.09 -0.187 0.183 -0.142 0.174 
 
  
Conceptual processing -0.07 0.14 -0.322 0.261 -0.280 0.140 
 
  
Disorganization of trauma memory -0.01 0.05 -0.123 0.072 -0.106 0.048 
 
  
Peripheral details 0.00 0.05 -0.112 0.084 -0.080 0.078 
 
  
Central details -0.03 0.04 -0.105 0.038 -0.090 0.032 
 
          
 
Disorganization of Trauma Memory 
  
Low dose (v. placebo) -0.02 0.23 -0.529 0.407 -0.512 0.324 
 
  
High dose (v. placebo) -0.03 0.24 -0.634 0.400 -0.451 0.270 
 
  
Change in heart rate -0.01 0.01 -0.041 0.014 -0.029 0.011 
 
  
Change in facial affect -0.14 0.53 -1.281 0.752 -1.176 0.567 
 
  
Peripheral details 0.04 0.15 -0.225 0.386 -0.182 0.353 
 
  
Central details -0.12 0.11 -0.297 0.112 -0.271 0.101 
 
  
Data-driven processing 0.21 0.23 -0.342 0.555 -0.219 0.531 
 
  
Conceptual processing -0.28 0.31 -0.964 0.196 -0.749 0.163 
 
          
 
Data-Driven Processing 
  
Low dose (v. placebo) 0.14 0.20 -0.239 0.534 -0.190 0.492 
 
  
High dose (v. placebo) 0.36 0.24 -0.079 0.780 -0.010 0.710 
 
  
Change in heart rate 0.03 0.01 0.008 0.053 0.012 0.047 * 
  
Change in facial affect 0.13 0.55 -0.982 1.017 -0.819 0.964 
 
  
Peripheral details  -0.19 0.18 -0.550 0.132 -0.511 0.089 
 
  
Central details  0.05 0.12 -0.208 0.279 -0.169 0.244 
 
          
 
Conceptual Processing 
  
Low dose (v. placebo) -0.17 0.20 -0.591 0.194 -0.517 0.133 
 
  
High dose (v. placebo) -0.34 0.21 -0.887 0.018 -0.712 -0.048 † 
  
Change in heart rate -0.02 0.01 -0.049 -0.008 -0.043 -0.010 * 
  
Change in facial affect 0.12 0.52 -0.707 1.196 -0.643 1.032 
 
  
Peripheral details  0.25 0.16 -0.009 0.571 0.041 0.546 † 
  
Central details  -0.06 0.11 -0.265 0.139 -0.235 0.125 
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Table 3.9 cont. 
          95% CI 90% CI   
    Estimate SE Lower Upper Lower Upper   
Path Coefficients (cont.) 
       
 
Y X 
       
 
Peripheral Details               
  
Low dose (v. placebo)  -0.03 0.19 -0.347 0.376 -0.281 0.345 
 
  
High dose (v. placebo)  -0.43 0.24 -0.862 0.006 -0.770 -0.013 † 
          
 
Central Details               
  
Low dose (v. placebo)  -0.06 0.23 -0.447 0.406 -0.379 0.380 
 
  
High dose (v. placebo)  0.09 0.22 -0.407 0.475 -0.317 0.404 
 
          
 
Change in Heart Rate               
  
Low dose (v. placebo) -4.96 2.34 -9.245 0.019 -8.628 -1.267 † 
  
High dose (v. placebo) -6.85 1.54 -9.835 -3.628 -9.368 -4.470 * 
          
 
Change in Valence of Facial Affect 
  
Low dose (v. placebo) 0.06 0.05 -0.042 0.166 -0.017 0.142 
 
  
High dose (v. placebo) 0.05 0.04 -0.043 0.125 -0.019 0.115 
 
          
 
Intrusive Memories on Day 1 
  
Hours remaining in Day 1 -0.03 0.02 -0.068 0.006 -0.058 -0.003 † 
          Covariances 
 
Peripheral details & Central details -0.29 0.08 -0.469 -0.150 -0.450 -0.175 * 
 
Peripheral details & Heart rate 0.61 0.49 -0.383 1.492 -0.211 1.474 
 
 
Peripheral details & Facial affect -0.03 0.02 -0.062 -0.001 -0.058 -0.003 * 
 
Central details & Heart rate -0.66 0.61 -2.000 0.379 -1.914 0.175 
 
 
Central details & Facial affect 0.02 0.02 -0.019 0.051 -0.013 0.048 
 
 
Level & Slope of intrusive memories 0.02 0.02 -0.005 0.063 0.001 0.063 † 
 
Heart rate & Facial affect 0.18 0.15 -0.036 0.510 -0.006 0.463 
 
          Means and Intercepts 
 
Level of Intrusive Memories 0.58 0.17 0.252 0.897 0.297 0.840 * 
 
Slope of Intrusive Memories -0.73 0.11 -1.043 -0.542 -0.950 -0.587 * 
 
Quadratic of Intrusive Memories 0.03 0.02 0.005 0.053 0.011 0.052 * 
 
Disorganization (uncorrected factor score) -0.12 0.19 -0.505 0.219 -0.452 0.132 
 
 
Data-driven (uncorrected factor score) -0.35 0.19 -0.716 0.000 -0.654 -0.036 † 
 
Conceptual (uncorrected factor score) 0.36 0.20 -0.023 0.747 0.052 0.716 † 
 
Peripheral details (uncorrected factor score) 0.15 0.16 -0.232 0.415 -0.194 0.344 
 
 
Central details (uncorrected factor score) -0.02 0.16 -0.313 0.265 -0.262 0.232 
 
 
Heart rate 9.63 1.19 7.481 12.01 7.818 11.89 * 
 
Facial affect -0.15 0.03 -0.206 -0.112 -0.201 -0.119 * 
          Residual Variances 
 
Level of Intrusive Memories 0.18 0.07 0.105 0.271 0.124 0.271 * 
 
Slope of Intrusive Memories 0.01 0.01 -0.009 0.030 -0.003 0.026 
 
 
Disorganization (uncorrected factor score) 0.48 0.09 0.385 0.628 0.411 0.628 * 
 
Data-driven (uncorrected factor score) 0.66 0.10 0.543 0.859 0.568 0.859 * 
 
Conceptual (uncorrected factor score) 0.42 0.07 0.322 0.577 0.341 0.577 * 
 
Peripheral details (uncorrected factor score) 0.74 0.12 0.551 1.012 0.587 0.960 * 
 
Central details (uncorrected factor score) 0.85 0.10 0.633 1.009 0.664 0.973 * 
 
Heart rate 61.97 15.70 39.13 96.79 43.17 95.45 * 
 
Facial affect 0.04 0.01 0.027 0.049 0.030 0.049 * 
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Table 3.9 cont. 
          95% CI 90% CI   
    Estimate SE Lower Upper Lower Upper   
Total Effects 
 
Low dose (v. placebo) → Level -0.13 0.17 -0.389 0.223 -0.318 0.158 
 
 
High dose (v. placebo) → Level 0.33 0.15 0.006 0.563 0.033 0.542 * 
 
Low dose (v. placebo) → Slope 0.07 0.07 -0.068 0.198 -0.045 0.191 
 
 
High dose (v. placebo) → Slope 0.02 0.07 -0.100 0.202 -0.067 0.184 
 
          Total Indirect Effects 
 
Low dose (v. placebo) → Level -0.14 0.13 -0.393 0.114 -0.353 0.068 
 
 
High dose (v. placebo) → Level -0.17 0.15 -0.540 0.056 -0.458 0.025 
 
 
Low dose (v. placebo) → Slope -0.02 0.05 -0.104 0.079 -0.083 0.054 
 
 
High dose (v. placebo) → Slope -0.01 0.05 -0.104 0.110 -0.076 0.106 
 
          Specific Indirect Effects: Low Dose (v. Placebo) → Level of Intrusive Memories  
 
Facial affect 0.00 0.02 -0.028 0.078 -0.016 0.063 
 
 
Heart rate -0.14 0.09 -0.350 0.010 -0.314 -0.024 † 
 
Data-driven 0.02 0.07 -0.066 0.265 -0.046 0.195 
 
 
Conceptual -0.03 0.13 -0.607 0.062 -0.455 0.035 
 
 
Disorganization 0.00 0.06 -0.285 0.075 -0.191 0.045 
 
 
Peripheral 0.00 0.03 -0.066 0.041 -0.062 0.029 
 
 
Central -0.01 0.04 -0.103 0.072 -0.068 0.058 
 
 
Facial affect → Data-driven 0.00 0.01 -0.008 0.045 -0.004 0.035 
 
 
Heart rate → Data-driven -0.02 0.05 -0.151 0.049 -0.125 0.039 
 
 
Peripheral → Data-driven 0.00 0.01 -0.014 0.038 -0.011 0.033 
 
 
Central → Data-driven 0.00 0.01 -0.034 0.006 -0.032 0.003 
 
 
Facial affect → Conceptual 0.00 0.02 -0.014 0.050 -0.008 0.050 
 
 
Heart rate → Conceptual 0.02 0.06 -0.070 0.174 -0.044 0.143 
 
 
Peripheral → Conceptual 0.00 0.02 -0.058 0.050 -0.037 0.028 
 
 
Central → Conceptual 0.00 0.01 -0.008 0.045 -0.004 0.039 
 
 
Facial affect → Disorganization 0.00 0.01 -0.058 0.004 -0.058 0.003 
 
 
Heart rate → Disorganization 0.01 0.02 -0.013 0.083 -0.008 0.051 
 
 
Data-driven → Disorganization 0.00 0.02 -0.006 0.140 -0.002 0.104 
 
 
Conceptual → Disorganization 0.01 0.05 -0.006 0.204 -0.004 0.171 
 
 
Peripheral → Disorganization 0.00 0.01 -0.017 0.012 -0.014 0.008 
 
 
Central → Disorganization 0.00 0.01 -0.011 0.029 -0.007 0.021 
 
 
Facial affect → Data-driven → 
Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.001 0.014 0.000 0.013 
 
 
Heart rate → Data-driven → Disorganization -0.01 0.01 -0.050 0.002 -0.050 0.000 
 
 
Peripheral → Data-driven → Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.002 0.010 -0.001 0.009 
 
 
Central → Data-driven → Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.010 0.001 -0.010 0.001 
 
 
Facial affect → Conceptual → 
Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.020 0.001 -0.020 0.000 
 
 
Heart rate → Conceptual → Disorganization -0.01 0.03 -0.106 0.003 -0.082 0.001 
 
 
Peripheral → Conceptual → Disorganization 0.00 0.01 -0.006 0.028 -0.004 0.023 
 
 
Central → Conceptual → Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.037 0.001 -0.013 0.000 
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Table 3.9 cont. 
          95% CI 90% CI   
    Estimate SE Lower Upper Lower Upper   
Specific Indirect Effects: High Dose (v. Placebo) → Level of Intrusive Memories  
 
Facial affect 0.00 0.02 -0.023 0.065 -0.014 0.061 
 
 
Heart rate -0.19 0.10 -0.369 -0.029 -0.337 -0.057 * 
 
Data-driven 0.04 0.09 -0.113 0.340 -0.063 0.263 
 
 
Conceptual -0.06 0.15 -0.466 0.170 -0.423 0.080 
 
 
Disorganization -0.01 0.07 -0.328 0.066 -0.225 0.048 
 
 
Peripheral 0.01 0.07 -0.109 0.213 -0.070 0.151 
 
 
Central 0.01 0.04 -0.039 0.114 -0.033 0.099 
 
 
Facial affect → Data-driven 0.00 0.01 -0.009 0.022 -0.005 0.018 
 
 
Heart rate → Data-driven -0.03 0.06 -0.190 0.056 -0.153 0.040 
 
 
Peripheral → Data-driven 0.01 0.04 -0.016 0.137 -0.009 0.125 
 
 
Central → Data-driven 0.00 0.01 -0.008 0.027 -0.006 0.021 
 
 
Facial affect → Conceptual 0.00 0.02 -0.012 0.079 -0.006 0.066 
 
 
Heart rate → Conceptual 0.03 0.09 -0.089 0.227 -0.082 0.186 
 
 
Peripheral → Conceptual -0.02 0.07 -0.270 0.024 -0.252 0.013 
 
 
Central → Conceptual 0.00 0.01 -0.062 0.010 -0.039 0.006 
 
 
Facial affect → Disorganization 0.00 0.01 -0.068 0.005 -0.062 0.003 
 
 
Heart rate → Disorganization 0.01 0.02 -0.021 0.100 -0.009 0.073 
 
 
Data-driven → Disorganization 0.01 0.02 -0.003 0.077 0.000 0.059 
 
 
Conceptual → Disorganization 0.02 0.05 -0.007 0.244 -0.004 0.149 
 
 
Peripheral → Disorganization 0.00 0.03 -0.137 0.019 -0.086 0.011 
 
 
Central → Disorganization 0.00 0.01 -0.045 0.009 -0.038 0.005 
 
 
Facial affect → Data-driven → 
Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.001 0.008 0.000 0.008 
 
 
Heart rate → Data-driven → Disorganization -0.01 0.02 -0.044 0.008 -0.033 0.003 
 
 
Peripheral → Data-driven → Disorganization 0.00 0.01 -0.002 0.035 0.000 0.035 
 
 
Central → Data-driven → Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.003 0.006 -0.001 0.003 
 
 
Facial affect → Conceptual → 
Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.020 0.001 -0.020 0.001 
 
 
Heart rate → Conceptual → Disorganization -0.01 0.03 -0.130 0.003 -0.097 0.002 
 
 
Peripheral → Conceptual → Disorganization 0.01 0.03 -0.002 0.128 -0.001 0.091 
 
 
Central → Conceptual → Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.002 0.011 -0.001 0.010 
 
          Specific Indirect Effects: Low Dose (v. Placebo) → Slope of Intrusive Memories  
 
Facial affect -0.01 0.01 -0.034 0.011 -0.031 0.007 
 
 
Heart rate -0.01 0.03 -0.109 0.022 -0.075 0.017 
 
 
Data-driven 0.00 0.02 -0.052 0.039 -0.048 0.025 
 
 
Conceptual 0.01 0.04 -0.023 0.149 -0.010 0.134 
 
 
Disorganization 0.00 0.01 -0.018 0.027 -0.012 0.025 
 
 
Peripheral 0.00 0.01 -0.019 0.020 -0.013 0.015 
 
 
Central 0.00 0.01 -0.022 0.029 -0.013 0.028 
 
 
Facial affect → Data-driven 0.00 0.00 -0.014 0.006 -0.007 0.004 
 
 
Heart rate → Data-driven 0.00 0.02 -0.034 0.032 -0.024 0.025 
 
 
Peripheral → Data-driven 0.00 0.00 -0.012 0.006 -0.009 0.004 
 
 
Central → Data-driven 0.00 0.00 -0.003 0.017 -0.002 0.008 
 
 
Facial affect → Conceptual 0.00 0.01 -0.024 0.005 -0.015 0.002 
 
 
Heart rate → Conceptual -0.01 0.02 -0.058 0.026 -0.050 0.012 
 
 
Peripheral → Conceptual 0.00 0.01 -0.010 0.028 -0.008 0.018 
 
 
Central → Conceptual 0.00 0.01 -0.030 0.003 -0.020 0.001 
 
 
Facial affect → Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.001 0.008 0.000 0.008 
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Table 3.9 cont. 
          95% CI 90% CI   
    Estimate SE Lower Upper Lower Upper   
Specific Indirect Effects: Low Dose (v. Placebo) → Slope of Intrusive Memories (cont.) 
 
Heart rate → Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.015 0.004 -0.008 0.002 
 
 
Data-driven → Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.023 0.003 -0.016 0.001 
 
 
Conceptual → Disorganization 0.00 0.01 -0.049 0.004 -0.029 0.002 
 
 
Peripheral → Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.004 0.004 -0.002 0.003 
 
 
Central → Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.007 0.002 -0.005 0.001 
 
 
Facial affect → Data-driven → 
Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.006 0.000 -0.004 0.000 
 
 
Heart rate → Data-driven → Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.002 0.013 -0.001 0.009 
 
 
Peripheral → Data-driven → Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.004 0.001 -0.002 0.000 
 
 
Central → Data-driven → Disorganization 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
 
Facial affect → Conceptual → 
Disorganization 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.004 
 
 
Heart rate → Conceptual → Disorganization 0.00 0.01 -0.002 0.030 -0.001 0.014 
 
 
Peripheral → Conceptual → Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.007 0.001 -0.004 0.001 
 
 
Central → Conceptual → Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
          Specific Indirect Effects: High Dose → Slope of Intrusive Memories 
 
Facial affect 0.00 0.01 -0.043 0.009 -0.034 0.006 
 
 
Heart rate -0.02 0.04 -0.084 0.034 -0.078 0.026 
 
 
Data-driven -0.01 0.04 -0.113 0.064 -0.075 0.040 
 
 
Conceptual 0.03 0.06 -0.028 0.294 -0.016 0.150 
 
 
Disorganization 0.00 0.01 -0.025 0.032 -0.014 0.024 
 
 
Peripheral 0.00 0.03 -0.047 0.066 -0.037 0.035 
 
 
Central 0.00 0.01 -0.037 0.014 -0.025 0.009 
 
 
Facial affect → Data-driven 0.00 0.00 -0.008 0.006 -0.006 0.004 
 
 
Heart rate → Data-driven 0.00 0.02 -0.039 0.044 -0.032 0.034 
 
 
Peripheral → Data-driven 0.00 0.01 -0.027 0.017 -0.020 0.008 
 
 
Central → Data-driven 0.00 0.00 -0.006 0.004 -0.005 0.003 
 
 
Facial affect → Conceptual 0.00 0.01 -0.020 0.004 -0.020 0.002 
 
 
Heart rate → Conceptual -0.01 0.03 -0.074 0.029 -0.067 0.021 
 
 
Peripheral → Conceptual 0.01 0.02 -0.016 0.072 -0.006 0.070 
 
 
Central → Conceptual 0.00 0.00 -0.005 0.012 -0.003 0.009 
 
 
Facial affect → Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.002 0.005 -0.001 0.005 
 
 
Heart rate → Disorganization 0.00 0.01 -0.033 0.005 -0.023 0.003 
 
 
Data-driven → Disorganization 0.00 0.01 -0.059 0.003 -0.020 0.002 
 
 
Conceptual → Disorganization 0.00 0.01 -0.076 0.004 -0.035 0.002 
 
 
Peripheral → Disorganization 0.00 0.01 -0.005 0.017 -0.002 0.011 
 
 
Central → Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.003 0.007 -0.002 0.005 
 
 
Facial affect → Data-driven → 
Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.005 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
 
 
Heart rate → Data-driven → Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.002 0.014 -0.002 0.009 
 
 
Peripheral → Data-driven → Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.009 0.001 -0.005 0.000 
 
 
Central → Data-driven → Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 
 
Facial affect → Conceptual → 
Disorganization 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 
 
 
Heart rate → Conceptual → Disorganization 0.00 0.01 -0.004 0.027 -0.002 0.019 
 
 
Peripheral → Conceptual → Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.024 0.002 -0.022 0.001 
  Central → Conceptual → Disorganization 0.00 0.00 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 Note: SE = Standard Error, CI = Confidence Interval. † 90% CI does not include 0, * 95% CI does not 
include 0. 
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 Results of the full structural model, estimated as proposed, revealed a significant 
direct effect of the high dose alcohol condition on level of intrusive memories, compared 
to both the placebo (95% CI: 0.112, 0.850) and the low dose condition (95% CI: 0.010, 
0.795), such that those in the high dose condition reported more intrusive memories on 
Day 1, controlling for the time remaining in the day. No direct effect was found for the 
low dose condition v. placebo on level of intrusive memories. Similar to the above 
findings in the latent growth curve model, these findings run counter to expectations 
(Hypothesis 1a) that, compared to placebo, the low dose condition would lead to more 
intrusive memories and the high dose condition would lead to lower levels of intrusive 
memories. Although we also expected alcohol-related differences in rates of recovery 
(Hypothesis 1b), no direct effects of alcohol condition on slope of intrusive memories 
were observed.  
 The second study aim involved investigating the role of alcohol myopia. 
Specifically, higher levels of alcohol intoxication were expected to interfere with recall of 
peripheral, but not central details (Hypothesis 2a). Consistent with these expectations, 
there was a marginal direct effect between the high dose (v. placebo) condition and 
peripheral details (90% CI: −0.770, −0.013), such that those in the high dose condition 
reported fewer peripheral details than those in the placebo condition. Also consistent with 
Hypothesis 2a, no alcohol-related differences were observed in the number of central 
details recalled.  
 In turn, alcohol myopia (i.e., reduced recall of peripheral details) was expected to 
be associated with more data-driven processing and less conceptual processing 
(Hypothesis 2b). Though there was not a unique effect from peripheral details to data-
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driven processing, there was a marginally significant unique effect from peripheral details 
to conceptual processing (90% CI: 0.041, 0.546), such that those who recalled less 
peripheral information also engaged in less conceptual processing. Although associations 
were also expected between alcohol myopia (i.e., reduced recall of peripheral details) and 
greater disorganization in memory for the trauma film (Hypothesis 2c), there were no 
unique predictors of trauma memory disorganization.  
 The third aim involved examining the role of stress response, operationalized as 
film-related changes in heart rate and facial affect. Specifically, the higher levels of 
intoxication were expected to lead to reduced film-related increases in heart rate and 
reduced film-related changes in facial affect (Hypothesis 3a). Consistent with 
expectations, those in the high dose (v. placebo) condition displayed lower levels of film-
related heart rate changes (95% CI: −9.835, −3.628), and those in the low dose (v. 
placebo) condition displayed marginally lower levels of film-related heart rate changes 
(90% CI: −8.628, −1.267). However, contrary to expectations, no direct effects from 
alcohol condition to facial affect were observed.  
 In turn, greater stress responding was expected to be associated with more data-
driven processing and less conceptual processing (Hypothesis 3b). Consistent with 
expectations, greater film-related increases in heart rate were associated with more data-
driven processing (95% CI: 0.008, 0.053) and less conceptual processing (95% CI: 
−0.049, −0.008). However, no unique effects of film-related changes in facial affect were 
observed on data-driven or conceptual processing. Although stress response (displayed 
via heart rate and facial affect) was also expected to be associated with more temporal 
disorganization in trauma memory (Hypothesis 3c), and processing type was expected to 
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be associated with disorganization in trauma memory (Hypothesis 4a), no such effects 
were found.  
 Finally, although more data-driven processing and less conceptual processing 
were expected to be associated with more frequent and persistent intrusive memories 
(Hypothesis 4b) no such effects were found. Similarly, no effect of trauma memory 
disorganization was found on intrusive memories (Hypothesis 4c). 
 With regard to indirect effects, there was only one mechanism that emerged as 
uniquely significant. Specifically, an indirect effect of high dose (v. placebo) condition 
led to lower film-related changes in heart rate, which in turn led to fewer intrusive 
memories (95% CI: −0.369, −0.029). A similar indirect effect was marginally significant 
for the low dose condition (90% CI: −0.314, −0.024). These indirect effects reveal 
inconsistent mediation (see MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007) in that there is a 
negative indirect effect and positive direct effect. That is, alcohol transmitted a negative 
effect on intrusive memories via heart rate, but alcohol led to more intrusive memories, 
overall. Notably, there was also a significant total effect (i.e., sum of all indirect and 
direct effects) from high dose (v. placebo) to initial level of intrusive memories (95% CI: 
0.006, 0.563). In other words, when considering all observed and unobserved 
mechanisms (including the negative indirect effect via heart rate), the high dose condition 
(v. placebo) had a significant positive impact on the initial level of intrusive memories.  
Model trimming and re-specification. To reduce the amount of shared variance 
between conceptually similar mechanisms represented in the model, the model was 
trimmed such that only one variable per concept (as defined in Figure 1.1) was retained. 
With regard to stress response, the change in heart rate was retained, given that it was 
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consistently related to intoxication variables. With regard to alcohol myopia, the 
peripheral details variable was retained given that central details were not expected (nor 
shown) to vary by intoxication level. Similarly, with regard to cognitive processing 
variables, conceptual processing was expected to be most negatively impacted by alcohol 
(thereby increasing reliance on data-driven processing), and was therefore retained.  
Direct paths within the overall model were trimmed in order to evaluate only the 
most parsimonious conceptual model. In this re-specified model, alcohol was only 
expected to predict stress response (i.e., heart rate) and alcohol myopia (i.e., peripheral 
details), in addition to intrusive memory variables. Stress and myopia were only expected 
to predict conceptual processing, which in turn was expected to predict disorganization, 
and in turn, disorganization of the trauma memory was expected to predict intrusive 
memories.  
In addition, given that the rate individuals recovered from intrusive memories 
(i.e., slope of intrusive memories) was not significantly associated with any study 
variables, the dependent variables were changed from a latent growth curve model 
representing intrusive memories, to a single sum score representing number of intrusive 
memories reported during the 8 days (the one participant who withdrew from the study 
during this time was considered to have missing data for the intrusive memory sum). The 
number of diaries completed was not significantly associated with total number of 
intrusive memories reported, r = −.07, p = .498, and was therefore not included as a 
covariate.  
 The results of this revised model, as estimated with maximum likelihood and 
5000 bootstrap resamples, are displayed in Figure 3.6 and Table 3.10. Unstandardized 
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estimates are presented for consistency. The fit of this model was excellent; the χ2 test of 
absolute model fit of this revised model was not significant, χ2(10) = 11.932, p = .290, 
suggesting this model fit no worse than the best-fitting model. Good fit is also reflected in 
other fit indices, CFI = .944, TLI = .889, RMSEA = .044 (90% CI = .000, .123). Though 
no indirect paths were significant as indicated by 95% confidence intervals, 90% 
confidence intervals did reveal some indirect effects that could reach significance with a 
larger sample. Specifically, there was a marginal indirect effect from the low dose (v. 
placebo) to intrusive memories via heart rate, conceptual processing, and disorganization 
of the trauma memory (90% CI: −0.176, −0.002). Specifically, compared to those in the 
placebo condition, participants who received a low dose of alcohol experienced a smaller 
film-related increase in heart rate, which in turn allowed for more conceptual processing, 
less disorganization of the trauma memory, and finally, fewer intrusive memories. A 
similar, marginally significant indirect effect was observed for the high dose (v. placebo) 
condition (90% CI: −0.190, −0.004). In addition, there was a marginally significant 
indirect effect for the high dose (but not low dose) condition due to alcohol myopia. That 
is, those in high dose condition (v. placebo) recalled fewer peripheral details, which was 
associated with less conceptual processing, which was associated with more temporal 
disorganization of the trauma memory, and in turn, more frequent associations (90% CI: 
0.003, 0.222). This indirect effect was also present for the model-implied comparison 
between high and low dose conditions (90% CI: 0.001, 0.208). 
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Supplemental analyses. Given the strong associations between heart rate and 
alcohol conditions, a model with heart rate as a single mediator was estimated with 
maximum likelihood and 5000 bootstrap resamples. The model was just-identified and 
therefore had perfect fit. Unstandardized estimates are shown in Figure 3.7 and Table 
3.11. Bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals revealed indirect effects from alcohol 
conditions to number of intrusive memories via heart rate. Specifically, compared to 
placebo, those in the high dose condition exhibited a dampened stress response to the 
film (i.e., a smaller increase in heart rate), which in turn was associated with fewer 
intrusive memories (95% CI: −1.921, −0.097). A similar indirect effect was observed for 
those in the low dose condition compared to placebo (95% CI: −2.121, −0.367). After 
accounting for heart rate, there remained a significant direct effect from high dose (v. 
placebo) to intrusive memories (95% CI: 0.918, 5.067), but not for low dose (v. placebo; 
90% CI: −0.752, 2.568). As in the full model above, these results reveal inconsistent 
mediation (MacKinnon et al., 2007): the direct effect from high dose (v. placebo) to 
intrusive memories is positive, but the indirect effect via heart rate is negative.  
 Figure 3.7. Unstandardized estimates of heart rate mediation model.  
Low dose (v. placebo) 
Sum of 
intrusive 
memories 
Heart rate 
High dose (v. placebo) 
0.16 
3.03 
−4.89 
0.86 
95% confidence interval does not include 0  
90% confidence interval does not include 0 
90% confidence interval does include 0  
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Integrative Summary 
 Although the study aims were specifically evaluated within the context of the full 
structural model (detailed above), an integrated summary of results across all models is 
warranted. Table 3.12 shows all study aims and hypotheses, as well as expected and 
observed associations between variables across all analyses. With respect to Aim 1, 
Hypothesis 1a was not supported: whereas the low dose condition was expected to 
produce the most intrusive memories, the high dose condition was instead revealed to be 
associated with the most intrusive memories across almost all analyses. Although the rate 
of recovery was also expected to vary by condition (Hypothesis 1b), no analyses revealed 
significant predictors of linear trends of intrusive memories.  
 With respect to Aim 2, alcohol myopia was consistently demonstrated. 
Specifically, compared to those in the placebo condition, those who consumed a high 
dose of alcohol showed impairment in recall of peripheral information, but no 
impairment in recall for central information (Hypothesis 2a). Also as expected, no 
differences between the low dose and placebo conditions were observed for peripheral 
and central details. In turn, alcohol myopia was expected to be associated with cognitive 
processing. Hypothesis 2b was partially supported: impairments in peripheral information 
were consistently related to impairments in conceptual processing, but showed no 
association with data-driven processing. Recall of peripheral information was also not 
associated with disorganization of the trauma memory, contrary to Hypothesis 2c.  
 With respect to Aim 3, stress response was examined. Partial support was found 
for Hypothesis 3a; high levels of intoxication were associated with a dampened stress 
response observed via heart rate, but this was not observed in participants’ facial affect. 
  80 
 
Stress response was in turn expected to impact cognitive processing (Hypothesis 3b). 
This hypothesis was partially supported in that increased stress response (observed as 
heart rate) was associated with less conceptual processing (in most analyses), but was not 
associated with data-driven processing. Facial affect showed no associations with data-
driven or conceptual processing. Contrary to expectations, there was no association 
between stress response and disorganization in any analyses (Hypothesis 3c).  
 With respect to Aim 4, associations among cognitive factors and intrusive 
memories were examined. Though there was a significant bivariate association between 
trauma memory disorganization and the data-driven processing mean score, the data-
driven processing scale was subsequently revised to provide a more internally consistent 
representation of the construct. Within the full structural model, there were no unique, 
direct predictors of trauma memory disorganization. However, the strong correlation 
between conceptual and data-driven processing may have interfered with detecting 
significant unique effects of either processing variable on disorganization. Thus, in the 
revised model, conceptual processing alone was examined as a potential direct predictor 
of disorganization. Indeed, a significant effect was revealed, such that less conceptual 
processing was associated with more disorganization in the trauma memory, in support of 
Hypothesis 4a. Although increased data-driven processing, reduced conceptual 
processing, and increased disorganization were in turn expected to be associated with 
more frequent and persistent intrusive memories of the film (Hypotheses 4b and 4c), no 
such associations were found. 
Finally, although no specific indirect effects were hypothesized, indirect effects 
were examined to determine how these potential mechanisms might impact the effect of 
  81 
 
alcohol on intrusive memories. Results of indirect effects across relevant models are 
summarized in Table 3.13. Although the overall impact of alcohol on intrusive memories 
was positive, there was a negative indirect effect via stress response. Specifically, relative 
to the placebo condition, both the low and high dose conditions displayed stress-response 
dampening (measured as film-related changes in heart rate); greater stress–response 
dampening was in turn associated with fewer intrusive memories. Cognitive mechanisms 
also appear to play a role here; a dampened stress response allowed conceptual 
processing and organization of the memory to be relatively uninterrupted, resulting in 
fewer intrusive memories. 
There was also some support for alcohol myopia as a competing mechanism. 
Specifically, the high dose (v. placebo) displayed evidence of alcohol myopia, and this 
narrowing of attention interfered with conceptual processing of the trauma film, which 
led to greater disorganization of the trauma film memory, and in turn, more intrusive 
memories. This indirect effect was positive (albeit only marginally significant in the re-
specified model), and therefore may help to explain why high intoxication increased 
intrusive memories overall.  
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
The primary goal of this study was to examine whether acute alcohol intoxication 
during an analog trauma exposure would influence the occurrence of subsequent intrusive 
memories, and if so, why. Within this broader goal, there were four primary study aims. 
The first aim was to examine the direct effects of peritraumatic alcohol intoxication on 
intrusive memories. The second and third aims were to investigate the impact of alcohol 
myopia and stress response (respectively) on cognitive mechanisms. The fourth and last 
aim was to examine the effect of cognitive mechanisms on intrusive memories. Findings 
related to each of these aims are discussed in detail below, followed by a discussion of 
limitations, future directions, and clinical implications.  
Descriptive Findings 
  Before discussing findings related to the primary hypotheses, a review of the 
descriptive statistics is warranted. Descriptives for alcohol-related variables were 
consistent with expectations. Specifically, achieved BrAC levels were significantly 
different between alcohol conditions in the expected directions such that the high dose 
was greater than the low dose, which was in turn greater than the placebo condition. 
Achieved BrAC levels were also comparable to other studies in this area. The two prior 
alcohol administration studies involving a trauma film paradigm (Bisby et al., 2009, 
2010) both administered a low dose of .40g/kg, and a high dose of .80 g/kg. Though the 
current study involved administration of a low dose of .36 g/kg and a high dose of .72 
g/kg, achieved alcohol levels were slightly higher in the current study than in Bisby and 
colleagues’ (2009, 2010) studies. Specifically, for the low dose condition, Bisby et al. 
(2009) reported a mean post-absorption blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .33 (SD = 
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.09), Bisby et al. (2010) reported a mean post-absorption BAC of .22 (SD = .11), and 
participants in the current study reached a BAC (as converted from BrAC) of 
approximately .51 (SD = .12). For the high dose condition, Bisby et al. (2009) reported a 
BAC of .74 (SD = .17), Bisby et al. (2010) reported a BAC of .48 (SD = .19), and 
participants in the current study reached a BAC of approximately .91 (SD = .19). Overall, 
these results suggest the alcohol manipulation was effective in achieving desired BrAC 
levels. 
 With regard to participants’ subjective experience of drinking alcohol, those in the 
low and high dose alcohol conditions reported that the drink tasted worse than those in 
the placebo condition. This finding is expected given that the placebo beverage had a 
very low concentration of alcohol, whereas the low and high dose beverages had 
equivalent alcohol concentrations. Such differences in beverage taste ratings have been 
also been found in past alcohol administration studies (e.g., Watkins et al., 2015), though 
they have not been reported in any known study involving alcohol administration and an 
analog trauma exposure. Thus, there is no known evidence that beverage taste ratings 
impact the occurrence of intrusive memories. Though an aversive beverage taste might 
have led to more negative affect prior to film viewing, the use of change scores should 
account for any differences in pre-film affect, whether related to differences in beverage 
taste or otherwise. A strong aversive beverage taste might also be considered a strong 
sensory cue preceding the film viewing, but determining how subsequent drinking 
episodes (and therefore reminders of this sensory cue) might impact intrusive memories 
is beyond the scope of this study.  
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 Despite differences in beverage taste ratings, nearly all participants (94.9%) 
believed they drank alcohol. However, perceived intoxication and impairment levels 
differed by condition, such that those in the high dose condition reported higher levels of 
subjective intoxication and impairment than those in the low dose condition, who in turn 
reported higher levels than those in the placebo condition. Such differences are consistent 
with past alcohol administration designs in which no information is given to participants 
about which dose they will receive (see Martin & Sayette, 1993). In the absence of 
experimenter-provided dosage information, participants rely on both external cues (e.g., 
taste, smell) and interoceptive cues to make judgments about intoxication (Martin & 
Sayette, 1993). It is therefore unreasonable to expect participants in this study (who drink 
regularly) to equate subjective experiences between alcohol and placebo conditions 
(Giancola, Godlaski, & Roth, 2012). Nevertheless, only 51.0% of participants correctly 
guessed their beverage condition. In all, the alcohol administration appears to have 
worked as designed; the blinding of beverage condition appears to have created sufficient 
ambiguity surrounding dosage, allowing the pharmacological effects of alcohol to be 
examined in the present study. 
 Further, although participants were blinded to beverage condition, alcohol 
expectancies (i.e., expectations of the effect of alcohol) were not anticipated to have a 
systematic influence on the occurrence of intrusive memories. Few participants reported 
awareness of the study aims, and those who did had inconsistent expectations regarding 
the manner in which alcohol might impact intrusive memories. This is not surprising 
given that researchers in this area disagree regarding the direction of alcohol’s influence 
on intrusive memories (see Jaffe et al., 2017).  
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 With regard to the analog trauma exposure, participants reported they found the 
film distressing (M = 8.42) at a level similar to participants in Weidmann and colleagues’ 
(2009) study (M = 8.16 when transformed to the 0 to 10 scale used in the current study). 
The distressing nature of this film was also reflected in participants’ facial affect, which 
became more negatively valenced (on average) in response to the violence depicted in the 
film. Consistent with prior research demonstrating the particularly distressing nature of 
trauma films with sexual assault (Weidmann et al., 2009), distress ratings in the current 
study were greater than in the Bisby et al. (2009) study, which employed a trauma film 
depicting traffic accidents.  
To further evaluate the success of the trauma film in inducing stress, film-related 
increases in heart rate were examined. Other studies that have shown participants a film 
clip from Irreversible depicting a sexual assault (Lass-Hennemann, Peyk, Streb, Holz, & 
Michael, 2014; Ossewaarde et al., 2011; Schaich, Watkins, & Ehring, 2013; Weidmann et 
al., 2009) revealed an average increase in heart rate of six to eight beats per minute 
relative to baseline. Consistent with these findings, participants in the placebo condition 
of the current study experienced an average increase in heart rate of 9.52 beats per 
minute. Thus, the stressful nature of the analog trauma exposure in the current study is 
consistent with past work using this stimulus. Therefore, the trauma analog in the current 
study should have been similarly successful in inducing temporarily distressing intrusive 
memories. Though the vast majority of participants (94.9%) reported at least one 
intrusive memory, slight variations in methods (e.g., number of days assessed, paper v. 
electronic diary) and presentation of results (e.g., only counting distressing or image-
based intrusive memories, excluding participants with no intrusive memories, excluding 
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intrusive memories under the influence of alcohol) make it difficult to compare the exact 
frequency of intrusive memories reported in this study to prior work.  
With regard to cognitive mechanisms, increased data-driven processing was 
associated with more disorganization in the trauma memory. This finding is consistent 
with expectations and past research with trauma victims (Halligan et al., 2003) and 
studies using trauma film paradigms (Halligan et al., 2002). However, contrary to 
expectations, mean conceptual processing scores were not associated with either data-
driven processing or disorganization. This null finding may have been due to insufficient 
internal reliability of the conceptual processing measure, as the original alpha of this 
subscale was particularly low (.56). Revised measurement models for data-driven and 
conceptual processing did reveal that the factors were highly negatively correlated. This 
finding is consistent with the notion that low-level, sensory-focused (i.e., data-driven) 
processing is inversely related to the degree of high-level conceptual processing of a 
stressful experience. Similarly, when measured appropriately through reliability-
corrected factor scores, greater conceptual processing was also associated with less 
disorganization of the trauma memory.  
Alcohol and Intrusive Memories 
 Based on prior studies involving alcohol administration and a trauma film 
paradigm (Bisby et al., 2009, 2010), an inverted U-shaped effect was hypothesized such 
that those in the low dose condition (v. placebo) would initially experience more intrusive 
memories, while those in the high dose condition (v. placebo) would experience fewer 
intrusive memories (Hypothesis 1a). This hypothesis was not supported. Rather, those in 
the high dose condition reported the most intrusive memories. Although differences in 
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rate of recovery were expected between conditions (Hypothesis 1b), no such differences 
were observed.  
 The finding that high levels of intoxication led to more intrusive memories 
contrasts with Bisby and colleagues’ (2009, 2010) results, and may reflect differences in 
study methodology. To begin, exact comparisons are difficult to make given 
idiosyncrasies in Bisby and colleagues’ analyses. For example, Bisby et al. (2009) 
excluded participants from analyses who did not report any intrusive memories; the 
number of participants in each condition excluded for this reason is not known, and it is 
therefore not possible to determine if this might have impacted their findings. 
Additionally, Bisby et al. (2010) excluded intrusive memories that occurred under the 
influence of alcohol. Though it is plausible that intrusive memories may be more likely 
during drinking episodes for those who were intoxicated during encoding (i.e., intrusive 
memories could show state-dependent effects), future work is needed to examine this 
possibility. For the purposes of this study, participants in any condition may have been 
reminded of the trauma film and associated laboratory procedures during subsequent 
drinking episodes; this was therefore considered to be a naturally occurring trauma cue 
that should not be excluded.  
In addition to differences in specific analyses, there are broad methodological 
differences between the current study and Bisby et al. (2009, 2010) that may have 
contributed to different findings. As detailed above, participants in the current study 
achieved slightly higher BrAC levels and reported more distress in response to the trauma 
film than those in Bisby’s study. In this way, the current investigation might have more 
closely approximated conditions of real traumatic events. Further, Bisby and colleagues’ 
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analog trauma exposure was a film clip showing five horrific and graphic scenes of road 
traffic accidents. In the current study, the trauma film involved a single unbroken scene 
of one woman being sexually assaulted. Therefore, while the focus in Bisby’s studies 
appears to be on processing distressing images, the trauma film used here likely evoked a 
greater need for cognitive processing. Participants in the current study were women in an 
age range at high risk for sexual assault (Ogle et al., 2013); they were likely cognizant of 
this risk. In addition, although women who reported a personal history of sexual assault 
were excluded, most participants (54.1%) reported knowing someone who has been 
sexually assaulted. Thus, in addition to distressing and violent imagery, this film might 
have evoked a sense of current threat and increased awareness of distress experienced by 
real-life sexual assault victims. Though these factors may also be present for a film 
depicting car accidents, the current film clip also depicted willful acts of violence by one 
person perpetrated on another, as well as a passerby who chose not to intervene. The 
interpersonal violence portrayed in this film may challenge pre-existing beliefs (e.g., 
people are generally good and trustworthy) and therefore require more cognitive 
processing in order to integrate this new information. These increased cognitive 
processing demands may have been uniquely impacted by high levels of intoxication in 
the current study, whereas these cognitive mechanisms might not have been activated by 
the trauma film used by Bisby et al. (2009, 2010).  
Although the experimental studies conducted by Bisby et al. (2009, 2010) were 
most analogous to the current study, the current findings can also be placed in the context 
of prior correlational research. As discussed in the introduction, much of the research 
examining peritraumatic alcohol and PTSD conflates the presence of alcohol use during a 
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sexual assault with perpetrator tactics (e.g., use of force, giving the victims drugs/alcohol 
with or without her knowledge). While perpetrator tactics certainly have important 
implications for the development of PTSD, they are not applicable to the central question 
examined here regarding the pharmacological influence of peritraumatic intoxication. 
Correlational studies most closely addressing this question suggest that pre-assault 
alcohol use (without considering differences in level of intoxication) has a negative or 
non-significant influence on PTSD symptoms (Jaffe et al., 2017; Kaysen et al., 2010; 
Peter-Hagene & Ullman, 2016). Given that all participants in the current study 
technically had at least some exposure to a small amount of alcohol, this clear dichotomy 
would not be expected in the current study. Instead, dose-dependent effects are of 
interest. Indeed, recent studies of sexual assault victims found that retrospective, 
subjective reports of peritraumatic intoxication level were associated with more distress, 
more severe PTSD symptoms, and in particular, more intrusions (Blayney & Read, 2015; 
Blayney et al., 2016; Jaffe et al., 2017). These findings are consistent with the patterns 
shown in the current study; the highest levels of intoxication were associated with the 
most intrusive memories.  
This convergence between prior correlational results and the current experimental 
finding is notable. Sexual assaults involve many unique dynamics that cannot be 
reproduced in the lab. For example, victims of alcohol-related sexual assault often report 
high levels of self-blame (e.g., Littleton et al., 2009), which is now considered a symptom 
of PTSD (APA, 2013). The fact that alcohol was associated with more film-related 
intrusions in a lab study in which participant self-blame was highly unlikely suggests that 
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pharmacological effects (rather than expectancies) of alcohol may play a key role in the 
development of intrusions, and potentially, PTSD.  
Alcohol Myopia  
In support of Hypothesis 2a, greater alcohol intoxication was associated with 
impaired recall of peripheral details for the trauma film, but had no effect on recall of 
central details. This finding suggests that intoxicated participants experienced alcohol 
myopia. More specifically, consistent with Schreiber Compo et al. (2011), participants 
who consumed a high dose of alcohol freely recalled less peripheral information than 
those who consumed a low dose or placebo drink. Also consistent with expectations and 
the Alcohol Myopia Model (Steele & Josephs, 1990), recall of central information did not 
vary by alcohol condition, suggesting that alcohol restricts the range of cues that can be 
attended to, but still allows for encoding important, central information.  
Importantly, the free recall task was completed while the participant was still 
intoxicated, and therefore reflects alcohol-related deficits in cognitive capacity, as well as 
related attentional narrowing to the most central environmental cues. That is, alcohol 
myopia was observed when intoxication impacted both encoding and retrieval. Studies 
using delayed recall (and therefore sober retrieval) show no such impairment in recall of 
peripheral information (Crossland, Kneller, & Wilcock, 2016; Harvey et al., 2013). These 
findings suggest individuals may successfully encode peripheral information while 
intoxicated. Although a recognition task would be required to assess individuals’ capacity 
for retrieval while intoxicated, the immediate free recall task used here reveals 
participants’ choice to focus on recalling central (v. peripheral) information when 
intoxicated. In sum, although the free recall task was adapted from Schreiber Compo et 
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al. (2011) and involved a novel coding system, results were consistent with alcohol 
myopia.  
Alcohol Myopia and Cognitive Mechanisms 
 In turn, alcohol myopia was expected to be associated with increased data-driven 
processing and reduced conceptual processing (Hypothesis 2b). In support of this 
hypothesis, impaired recall of peripheral details was associated with less conceptual 
processing. Though no associations were shown between number of central details 
recalled and conceptual processing, this is consistent with expectations; alcohol myopia 
was only reflected in reduced recall for peripheral information and did not impact recall 
of central information. In turn, any differences in recall of central details was not 
considered to be a reflection of myopic processes, and therefore, not expected to 
influence cognitive processing. Thus, alcohol myopia impaired conceptual processing in 
the expected manner.  
 The hypothesis that alcohol myopia would increase data-driven processing was 
not supported. Specifically, although data-driven and conceptual processing were 
negatively correlated, and recall of peripheral details was associated with conceptual 
processing, recall of peripheral details was not associated with data-driven processing. 
Thus, it appears that alcohol myopia did not impact the degree of self-reported data-
driven (i.e., sensory-based) processing during the trauma film. However, the observed 
alcohol myopia-related impairments in conceptual processing still suggest participants 
had to rely more on data-driven processing (in the absence of conceptual processing) to 
understand the analog trauma. Though no known work has directly examined how acute 
alcohol intoxication might impact self-reported processing of stressful stimuli in a lab, 
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these findings overall are consistent with expectations and mechanisms hypothesized in 
prior work (e.g., Bisby et al., 2009; Jaffe et al., 2017).  
 In contrast to Hypothesis 2c, alcohol myopia (as observed in number of peripheral 
details recalled) was not associated with disorganization in the trauma film memory. No 
known studies have examined the influence of alcohol-related myopic processes on the 
organization (or lack thereof) of stressful memories. This lack of prior work makes it 
difficult to contextualize the present findings. Although trauma memories generally are 
characterized by temporal disorganization (e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Halligan et al., 
2003), it is possible that alcohol-related myopia (at levels of intoxication that can safely 
be observed in a lab) does not lead to further disorganization by exacerbating underlying 
processes. However, other direct effects found here suggest that alcohol myopia does 
impact underlying processes, such as conceptual processing. A more likely explanation 
for the null finding in the present study is a floor effect with regard to disorganization; 
endorsement of disorganization in the trauma memory was minimal across conditions, 
leaving little variance to explain. One possible reason for such a floor effect is that the 
trauma film used here involved relatively few distinct events to organize. Thus, 
participants may not have endorsed items such as, “I have trouble remembering the order 
in which things happened during the film,” because there were few things to order. It is 
also possible that participants had disorganized memories, but could not recognize them 
as such. Metacognitive judgments (e.g., confidence in memory) do not always reflect 
reality (e.g., accuracy of memory; Busey, Tunnicliff, Loftus, & Loftus, 2000). In support 
of this notion, a few participants spontaneously commented that the screenshots shown 
during the second lab session made them realize their memory for the film was worse 
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than previously thought. Further research on trauma memory disorganization is needed to 
shed light on these possibilities.  
Alcohol and Stress-Response Dampening 
 High levels of alcohol intoxication were expected to result in stress-response 
dampening as indicated by reduced heart rate and negative facial affect (Hypothesis 3a). 
This hypothesis was partially supported in that stress-response dampening was observed 
via heart rate but not facial affect. Specifically, consistent with past work involving 
laboratory-based stress-induction and alcohol administration (Sayette et al., 1991, 1992), 
the average increase in heart rate from baseline to the trauma film was greater in the 
placebo condition than the high dose condition. This finding points to reduced reactivity 
to the trauma film at high levels of intoxication due to the physiological, anxiolytic 
effects of alcohol, consistent with past work (e.g., Donohue et al., 2007).  
Stress-response dampening was expected only at high levels of intoxication; 
Donohue et al. (2007) suggested that reduced reactivity to aversive stimuli at low levels 
of intoxication would occur only in the context of complex cognitive demands, most 
often introduced by distracting tasks concurrent with a stressful stimuli. Though this 
current study was designed without any distracting tasks (participants were only asked to 
passively view the trauma film), participants in the low dose condition did demonstrate a 
dampened stress response. Specifically, the film-related increase in heart rate was lower 
for those in the low dose condition than those in the placebo condition. (Although the 
difference between low and high dose conditions was not significant, stress-response 
dampening generally appeared to increase linearly with greater intoxication, such that the 
low dose heart rate change fell in between the placebo and high dose conditions.) Though 
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contrary to expectations, this finding is revealing. Immediately prior to viewing the 
trauma film, participants were simply asked to sit still, try not to cover their face, and 
view the film. They were also reminded they could stop the film at any time by pressing 
the space bar. Although this film-viewing task was expected to involve low cognitive 
demand, the presence of stress-response dampening at low levels of intoxication suggests 
that the cognitive complexity involved in viewing and processing a film clip depicting a 
sexual assault may have been greater than anticipated. For example, during the film 
viewing, some participants may have considered whether to stop the film, started to cover 
their face but remembered they were not supposed to, been aware of the possible 
presence of study personnel behind a two-way mirror, all the while trying to make sense 
of the distressing film content. These cognitive demands may be more challenging and 
complex than some experimental tasks (e.g., passively viewing still pictures; Donohue et 
al., 2007), but are likely less complex than cognitive demands placed on individuals 
during real traumatic events. As an extension of the demands discussed for participants in 
the current trauma analog study, victims of a sexual assault would likely have much 
greater concerns about survival, may weigh their options regarding whether to try to 
leave the situation or stop the assault, consider the presence of bystanders, and 
simultaneously attempt to process the event. Thus, the cognitive demands of the current 
trauma film paradigm appeared to be sufficiently complex to lead to anxiolytic (i.e., 
stress-reducing) effects of alcohol at low levels of intoxication. Alcohol reduces one’s 
cognitive capacity, and in the presence of these complex cognitive demands, fewer 
resources are available for an anxious, fear-based reaction. In this way, reactivity is 
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reduced and the stress-response is dampened. These effects are expected to be greater for 
real traumatic events, given the increased cognitive demands.  
Contrary to expectations and prior research (Sayette et al., 1992), the film-related 
change in valence of participants’ facial affect did not vary by alcohol condition. That is, 
although facial affect is generally considered to be an important form of nonverbal 
communication and a valid and universal reflection of internal states (e.g., Collier, 2014), 
and participants’ facial affect did become more negative in response to the violence 
depicted in the film on average, the degree of change was not influenced by alcohol dose. 
It is possible that changes in emotional expression (or lack thereof) may not directly 
reflect underlying changes in emotional experience.  
Further, discrepancies between expressed and experienced emotion could have 
been impacted by alcohol. Alcohol intoxication might have led to increased expression 
for some individuals. More specifically, despite any dampening in underlying stress 
response, alcohol myopia might have increased participants’ focus on the salient, 
distressing film, while reducing any (peripheral) concerns about expressing emotion. On 
the other hand, alcohol intoxication could have reduced emotional expression in some 
individuals. Because only one participant was in the lab at a time, and participants 
watched the film near a two-way mirror while being video-recorded, it is possible that 
some participants were motivated to control their emotional expression. For these 
individuals, the two-way mirror and webcam may have served as a salient inhibitory cue. 
Further, some individuals have difficulty accepting their emotions (e.g., Gratz & Roemer, 
2004) and tend to suppress their emotional reactions (Gross, 2002). These tendencies 
could have been exacerbated by a compensatory response to perceived alcohol 
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intoxication (e.g., Newlin, 1986). That is, some individuals might have expected that 
alcohol would make them emotional, expressive, or loud (Fromme, Stroot, & Kaplan, 
1993), and in turn, attempted to minimize and suppress their expression of emotions. 
However, suppression only reduces expression (not experience) of emotion (Gross, 
2002). Thus, lack of facial affect would not reflect lack of internal distress in these 
participants.  
In sum, although alcohol was expected to dampen participants’ internal 
experience of distress, individual differences in factors such as emotion regulation may 
have interacted with alcohol intoxication to either hinder or enhance outward expressions 
of affect. In line with this possibility, one lab-based study found that intoxicated 
participants displayed more facial expressions of anger overall, but intoxicated 
participants with long-standing tendencies to control their anger displayed fewer facial 
expressions of anger (Parrott, Zeichner, & Stephens, 2003). Thus, a more nuanced 
examination of factors that influence expressivity (e.g., emotion regulation strategies), as 
well as other indicators of underlying emotional experience, may be required to 
determine alcohol’s impact on emotional reactivity. Given that stress-response 
dampening was not demonstrated via facial affect in this study, facial affect will not be 
discussed with regard to subsequent hypotheses involving stress-response.  
Stress-Response Dampening and Cognitive Mechanisms 
 Consistent with Hypothesis 3b, a greater stress response (operationalized as a 
larger film-related increase in heart rate) was associated with more data-driven 
processing and less conceptual processing. Given that all participants, regardless of 
alcohol condition, reported the film to be highly distressing, this finding is consistent 
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with past work demonstrating that heightened arousal in the presence of strong negative 
emotions can lead to impaired cognitive processing (Bennion et al., 2013), and thus a 
narrowing of attention to the most central, basic information (Easterbrook, 1959). As a 
result, participants who experienced a stronger physiological reaction to the film reported 
engaging in more data-driven processing (which involves a focus on the most basic, 
sensory information) and less conceptual (i.e., higher-level) processing. However, 
contrary to Hypothesis 3c, stress response (measured by heart rate) showed no direct 
association with disorganization in the trauma film memory. Potential limitations to the 
measure of memory disorganization are discussed above and may have also interfered 
with significant findings here.  
Cognitive Mechanisms and Intrusive Memories 
 In support of Hypothesis 4a, and consistent with related research (Halligan et al., 
2002), less conceptual processing was associated with more disorganization in trauma 
memory. However, this finding was not consistently demonstrated across analyses, and 
therefore not very robust. This inconsistency across analyses may be related to problems 
in the measurement of trauma memory disorganization, which was not associated with 
many other study variables (e.g., alcohol condition, alcohol myopia, stress response) and 
displayed floor effects, as discussed above. 
Although increased data-driven processing, reduced conceptual processing, and 
increased disorganization were expected to be associated with more frequent and 
persistent intrusive memories of the film (Hypotheses 4b and 4c), no such associations 
were found. This null finding is inconsistent with past work in this area (Ehring et al., 
2008; Halligan et al., 2002, 2003) and may reflect underlying problems in measuring 
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cognitive mechanisms. Though the self-report measures of cognitive processing and 
memory disorganization have been used in past studies, these measures have not 
undergone formal psychometric evaluation. In fact, substantial revisions to the 
measurement models were required in the current study to achieve adequate fit, but even 
then, did not support the use of aggregate mean scores (which were used in past studies). 
Thus, it is difficult to know whether these measures accurately represent the cognitive 
mechanisms they are designed to assess. These cognitive measures have also been used in 
European samples, but this is the first known administration of such measures with 
Americans. Future psychometric evaluation is needed to determine if these questionnaires 
reflect cognitive mechanisms in the same way between groups (i.e., measurement 
invariance should be examined). In addition, although memory disorganization was 
thought to be a relatively stable construct (at least during one week), both perceived and 
actual memory disorganization could plausibly change over time. Memory 
disorganization was assessed in the second lab session, and therefore after the occurrence 
of intrusive memories. Though not examined here, the frequency and nature of intrusive 
memories might have impacted participants’ perceptions of the trauma film memory. 
More objective assessments of cognitive processing and disorganization are therefore 
needed to clarify the direct impact of cognitive mechanisms on intrusive memories. 
Indirect Effects 
Overall, high levels of peritraumatic alcohol intoxication led to more intrusive 
memories when compared to a placebo beverage. At the same time, alcohol-related 
reductions in stress response led to fewer intrusive memories. Specifically, alcohol 
dampened participant stress responses (consistent with prior work; Sayette et al., 1991, 
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1992), which led to fewer intrusive memories (also consistent with prior work; Pole, 
2007; Weidmann et al., 2009), both directly and via cognitive mechanisms. These results 
comport with predictions from nearly a century ago that a substance-induced “decrease of 
critical self-consciousness and anxiety” (Mott, 1919, p. 224) during a traumatic event 
indeed protects against traumatic stress. However, alcohol’s physiological impact is not 
limited to physiological stress reduction occurring at high levels of intoxication 
(Donohue et al., 2007). Instead, alcohol also causes cognitive impairments by narrowing 
one’s attention.  
In contrast to the impact of stress-response dampening, alcohol myopia appeared 
to have an opposite, exacerbating impact on intrusions. Specifically, alcohol-related 
narrowing of attention intensified cognitive processes unique to traumatic situations (e.g., 
reduction of cognitive resources and processing), consistent with expectations. Alcohol 
myopia was the only mechanism examined that helped to explain why, overall, high 
intoxication was associated with more intrusive memories. Though the effect of stress-
response dampening was more significant than the effect of myopia, stress-response 
dampening did not explain the overall trend, so therefore cannot be considered to 
outweigh the impact of myopia at high doses (as was expected). The fact that the indirect 
effect via myopia was only marginally significant suggests that the exacerbating impact 
of intoxication on intrusions remains largely unexplained by observed variables in this 
study. It is possible that the proposed mechanisms do underlie the alcohol-intrusions 
association, but measurement issues discussed above interfered with the adequate 
representation of the mechanisms (e.g., valence of affect, cognitive processing, 
disorganization of trauma memory). Thus, alcohol-related changes in cognition, including 
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narrowing of attention and impairment of cognitive processing, are promising potential 
mechanisms that should continue to be examined in future studies with multimodal 
assessments.  
On the other hand, there may be mechanisms at work that were not considered in 
this study. For example, possibly as a result of myopic processes, participants in the high 
dose condition may have felt more engaged in the film and lost some awareness of the 
film as a fictional depiction separate from themselves. Such engagement in the film may 
have made the film feel more like a stressful event personally experienced, even if as a 
bystander. High levels of intoxication, particularly in an unusual setting, may have also 
increased perceptions of vulnerability and helplessness. Perceived lack of control during 
a trauma has been implicated in PTSD (e.g., Foa, Zinbarg, & Rothbaum, 1992), may have 
influenced participants’ experience of the film as a trauma analog. In addition, to reach a 
level of sobriety, participants in the high dose condition remained in the lab for 
substantially more time than participants in the other conditions. This may have allowed 
for an extended period to encode environmental cues related to the study, and thus cues 
related to the trauma film. With more cues encoded, these participants may have 
encountered more trauma reminders during the week that reminded participants of the 
lengthier experience. Finally, participants were allowed to complete intrusive memory 
reports after experimental procedures in the first session, whether they were waiting in 
the lab during this time or not. Participants in the high dose condition may have been 
more likely to report intrusive memories on the first day simply because they had fewer 
distractions that might prevent them from initiating a report on their phone. These 
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potential mechanisms should be examined in future work examining the association 
between acute alcohol intoxication and intrusive memories.  
Limitations 
 There are a number of methodological limitations to the current study. With 
regard to possible threats to internal validity, the administration of beverages was single-
blind. Though this was important for data collection purposes, as it allowed for study 
personnel to plan for study sessions that could last vastly different lengths of time, it is 
possible that study personnel could have subtly transmitted knowledge of condition 
assignment to participants. Moreover, although the placebo manipulation led most 
participants to believe they consumed alcohol, a few participants maintained that they did 
not drink alcohol. Though these factors could potentially influence study findings in 
unexpected ways, they were not expected to interfere with study of the pharmacological 
effects of alcohol on intrusive memories, especially because participant expectations of 
how alcohol might impact intrusions was ambiguous.  
 Further, although the multimodal nature of this study was a strength, some 
constructs were assessed via a single assessment type. For example, cognitive 
mechanisms were assessed only through self-report in the current study; future studies 
would benefit from the use of more comprehensive, psychometrically sound measures of 
cognitive processing constructs, post-film memory tasks to infer the type of processing 
(e.g., assessment of viewpoint-dependent memory; Bisby et al., 2010), as well as 
observational measures of disorganization in trauma narratives. Valence of affect was 
also assessed by computerized assessment of facial expressions. Automated modeling of 
facial expressions allows for a high degree of internal consistency, but is also computed 
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without recognition of context. In the current study, for example, participant affect could 
have been coded as surprised (potentially positive), when human coders might have 
recognized a participant was looking above the screen to avoid viewing distressing 
content. Researchers assessing facial affect in future studies might consider converging 
evidence between both computerized and manualized coding systems, as well as 
assessing participants’ internal experience of emotion.  
 With regard to external validity, there are necessarily limitations to a laboratory-
based analog trauma exposure. For obvious ethical reasons, the trauma film paradigm is 
designed to induce only temporary distress and is therefore a much more mild stressor 
than real traumatic events. Although viewing a film under these conditions does not meet 
DSM-5 criteria for a traumatic event (APA, 2013), there is increased recognition that 
indirect exposure can lead to significant distress (see James et al., 2016). The trauma film 
paradigm also focuses only on the development of intrusions; although intrusive 
memories are a hallmark of PTSD that can exacerbate other PTSD symptoms, they do not 
capture the full range of possible PTSD symptomatology. Further, due to concerns about 
extreme film-related distress, individuals with a personal history of sexual abuse or 
forcible sexual assault were excluded in the current study. Though exclusion of trauma 
victims is standard practice in most trauma film studies (James et al., 2016), some studies 
have included victims. Salters-Pedneault and colleagues (Salters-Pedneault, Gentes, & 
Roemer, 2007; Salters-Pedneault, Vine, Mills, Park, & Litz, 2009) found no differences 
in reactions to a film clip of a sexual assault (from the 1988 feature film, The Accused) 
between participants who had experienced physical or sexual assault and those who had 
not. However, because such studies have rarely been conducted with trauma victims, it is 
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not known how the inclusion of victims might have changed the results of the present 
study. For example, a trauma film could have served as a trauma reminder in victims, 
evoking intrusive memories of a past assault and possibly impairing cognitive processing 
of new film content. In addition, the participants in the current study may differ from 
those who actually experience sexual assaults in terms of past experiences (e.g., history 
of child abuse has been associated with adult victimization; Finkelhor, Turner, Hamby, & 
Ormrod, 2011; Messman-Moore & Long, 2003) and psychopathology (see Ullman & 
Najdowski, 2011), both of which may have implications for the cognitive processing of 
the trauma. Overall, caution should be used when generalizing the results of trauma film 
studies to understand the development of PTSD in trauma victims.  
The administration of alcohol in the current study further complicates this picture. 
Alcohol administration in a laboratory setting devoid of typical contextual cues 
encountered when drinking (e.g., a bar, other social drinkers) may lead to differences in 
alcohol expectancies regarding emotional experiences (Wall, Hinson, McKee, & 
Goldstein, 2001) and physiological tolerance (i.e., environment-dependent tolerance; 
Dafters & Anderson, 1982). Further, the amount of alcohol that can be safely 
administered in a lab is limited. Conditions of alcohol-induced blackouts or complete 
incapacitation that may be present during real traumatic events, including sexual assault 
(e.g., Kilpatrick et al., 2007), cannot be reproduced in a lab setting. Though the effects of 
alcohol on processing of traumatic events may depend on dose, with particularly unique 
effects on memory encoding during blackout (see White, 2003), the effects of alcohol at 
these highest doses were not examined here. 
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The composition of the current sample should be factored into considerations of 
generalizability. Though reflective of the local community, the majority of participants 
identified as White and heterosexual. Given that differences in PTSD prevalence have 
been demonstrated in ethnoracial (Pole, Gone, & Kulkarni, 2008) and sexual minorities 
(Roberts, Austin, Corliss, Vandermorris, & Koenen, 2010), caution should be used when 
generalizing the present laboratory findings to communities at large. Future laboratory 
studies may consider the potential for minority stress to influence various factors, such as 
complexity of cognitive demands during the stressful film and experience of distress and 
intrusions. Finally, the trauma film used in the present study was a French film depicting 
a White female victim and a White male perpetrator; future studies should examine 
whether identification with the victim was impacted by differences in racial identity or 
sexual orientation, and if so, whether this translated to differences in intrusive memories.  
Future Directions 
 Future research is recommended, not only to address the above methodological 
limitations, but also to examine new questions evoked by this study. For example, future 
research is needed to assess whether and how alcohol myopia and stress-response 
dampening work in concert to impact intrusive memories and other responses to stressful 
events. Examination of dose-dependent effects on both myopia and stress response is 
encouraged. In addition, more research is needed to disentangle factors that may 
influence cognitive complexity of stimuli, as well as the resulting impact on alcohol-
related stress-response dampening. For example, future studies might consider whether 
cognitive demands during a trauma film paradigm are more complex for participants who 
personally know someone who experienced a similar traumatic event. 
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As an extension of the current work on peritraumatic intoxication and frequency 
of intrusive memories, future work should also consider how peritraumatic intoxication 
might impact the nature of intrusive memories (e.g., image or thought, associated 
distress). The conditions that most often provoke intrusions for alcohol-involved traumas 
should also be explored. For example, state-dependent effects on memory have been 
observed for alcohol such that experiences encoded while under the influence of alcohol 
are retrieved best when also under the influence of alcohol (see Mintzer, 2007). However, 
it remains unclear whether involuntary or intrusive memories might also display a state-
dependent effect. Possible pharmacological influences on memory should be considered 
on such state-dependent effects, in addition to considering drinking as a behavioral cue 
and trauma reminder. If intrusive memories for traumatic events encoded under the 
influence of alcohol are more often reported during subsequent drinking episodes, this 
could have implications for understanding the high co-occurrence of PTSD and alcohol 
use disorders (e.g., Pietrzak et al., 2011).  
Clinical Implications 
  The present findings have a number of implications for clinicians treating victims 
of alcohol-involved sexual assault. First, results support the existence of previously 
proposed cognitive mechanisms underlying PTSD. For example, findings highlight the 
role of poorly elaborated, sensory-based trauma memories in the development of PTSD. 
Thus, current findings suggest that standard treatment for PTSD involving elaboration 
and contextualization of trauma memories (as in Cognitive Processing Therapy; Resick et 
al., 2017) should similarly be effective in treating PTSD following alcohol-involved 
sexual assaults. Though levels of alcohol intoxication typically administered in a 
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laboratory are not associated with impairments in accuracy of recall, even for stressful 
events (e.g., Schreiber Compo et al., 2012), alcohol-related blackouts experienced in 
natural settings may lead to more serious impairments in memory for an assault. For 
victims with alcohol-related limitations in trauma memory, engaging in exposure-based 
treatments focused on the trauma memory may be ill-advised, as this may promote 
rumination in an effort to recall the assault (Gauntlett-Gilbert, Keegan, & Petrak, 2004). 
Though limited attention has been paid to the unique challenges of treating PTSD in 
victims of alcohol-related sexual assaults (for exceptions, see Gauntlett-Gilbert et al., 
2004; Padmanabhanunni & Edwards, 2013), current findings suggest the potential utility 
of targeting memories that are present (e.g., sensory-based memories of the assault, 
events identified as warning signs) to reduce intrusions and promote recovery from PTSD 
more broadly. 
 Second, it is important for clinicians to understand that there are individual 
differences in possible emotional and physiological reactions to a sexual assault. For 
example, alcohol was shown to dampen the stress response in the current study, yet high 
levels of alcohol were still associated with more intrusive memories. Thus, clients who 
experienced alcohol-related assault may present to treatment with PTSD symptoms while 
also reporting less fear or anxiety during the assault than might otherwise be expected. 
This reduced stress response may be a physiological consequence of alcohol intoxication, 
and should not be considered abnormal. By better understanding such underlying 
mechanisms, clinicians can help clients normalize and contextualize their experience, 
reducing self-blame and thereby promoting recovery from PTSD.  
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 Third, current findings highlight the importance of prevention efforts. A high 
degree of alcohol intoxication not only increases risk for sexual assault (e.g., Abbey et 
al., 2004), but among those who experience an assault, the presence of alcohol during the 
assault appears to increase risk for subsequent PTSD. Thus, preventing alcohol-involved 
sexual assault is a particularly important public health issue. Recently, a web-based 
intervention targeting both alcohol use and sexual assault showed initial success in 
reducing alcohol-involved sexual assault (Gilmore, Lewis, & George, 2015). Further 
development and evaluation of such prevention programs would be crucial to prevent 
violent victimization and associated distress.  
Fourth, findings suggest that a reduced physiological stress response during a 
traumatic event may protect against intrusive memories and associated PTSD symptoms. 
Unfortunately, the pharmacological agent studied here (ethanol) is associated with both 
stress-response dampening (which reduced intrusions) and cognitive impairment (which 
increased intrusions). However, should there be a way to induce a dampened 
physiological stress response without the accompanying cognitive impairments, prior to a 
traumatic event, this might allow for clearer cognitive processing and in turn, fewer 
intrusive memories. Recently, for example, the use of propranolol (a beta-blocker often 
used to treat high blood pressure) has been proposed as one such agent. Though a recent 
meta-analysis suggested that propranolol administration soon after a traumatic event did 
not reliably prevent PTSD symptoms (Argolo, Cavalcanti-Ribeiro, Netto, & Quarantini, 
2015), administering propranolol immediately post-trauma may not be sufficient to 
impact the peritraumatic processes discussed here. Although the current study was 
designed to consider implications for alcohol-involved sexual assault, which cannot be 
  112 
 
predicted, some jobs (e.g., emergency responders, active-duty military personnel) involve 
high risk for traumatic exposure. The use of an anxiolytic drug that does not impair 
cognition on a regular basis might allow for stress-response dampening during traumatic 
events, when they are experienced. Prior to field tests, this possibility could be examined 
in a trauma film paradigm. In addition to pharmacological prevention efforts, 
psychosocial trainings could be used to prepare individuals in high-risk professions for 
potentially traumatic situations. For example, there is some evidence that Stress 
Inoculation Training (Meichenbaum, 2007) can lower one’s heart rate (Fontana, Hydra, 
Godfrey, & Cermak, 1999). In addition, biofeedback for heart rate variability has shown 
some success in treating PTSD (Tan, Wang, & Ginsberg, 2013), and could be explored as 
a means to prevent peritraumatic arousal.  
Conclusions 
Although sexual assault often occurs under the influence of alcohol, the specific 
influence of alcohol on cognitive risk factors for PTSD has rarely been examined. The 
current study involved comparing the influence of three alcoholic beverage conditions 
(placebo, low dose, high dose) on cognitive processing of an analog trauma exposure, and 
subsequent intrusive memories. Though not all hypotheses were supported, novel 
findings were revealed in this study. Specifically, high levels of intoxication were 
associated with more intrusive memories. Although only marginally significant, indirect 
effects point to the competing, yet simultaneous mechanisms underlying this process. On 
one hand, alcohol myopia exacerbated the attentional narrowing and cognitive 
impairment typical of highly stressful experiences, thereby increasing intrusive 
memories. On the other hand, alcohol-related stress-response dampening allowed for the 
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experience to be perceived as less stressful, reducing intrusive memories. Despite these 
differing indirect effects, the overall effect remained such that higher levels of 
intoxication were associated with the occurrence of more intrusive memories. These 
findings suggest that women who are highly intoxicated at the time of a sexual assault 
may be at increased risk for PTSD symptoms. Thus, preventing alcohol-involved sexual 
assaults is an important public health issue to be addressed in future clinical and research 
efforts.   
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TELEPHONE SCREENING INTERVIEW 
 
Say to participant: “This study is about alcohol, memory, and emotional responding. You will need to be 
able to participate in a phone screen, two laboratory sessions a week apart, and complete a few 
questions on your phone once a day between the laboratory sessions in order to complete the study. Your 
phone screen should take 20 minutes or less. The first laboratory session could take anywhere from 1.5 to 
6.5 hours and the second laboratory session will take about 1 hour. The daily questions are expected to 
take 5-10 minutes per day.  
 
During the phone screen I’m going to ask questions about your alcohol use, and your medical and 
psychiatric history. There will also be some questions about unwanted sexual experiences, to which I 
will only ask you to respond yes or no. This information is confidential and will only be seen by study 
personnel. This information is used to determine whether you are eligible, and whether it is safe for 
you to participate. Do you have any questions?  
 
Participation in this study is voluntary. You can refuse to participate or withdraw at any time 
without harming your relationship with the researchers or the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, or in 
any other way receive a penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.” 
 
“Do you consent to the phone interview?”    Y     N    (if no, stop here and thank them for their time) 
 
“Are you in a private situation and feel you can answer questions freely?”  Y   N  (if no, stop here 
and ask them when would be a better time to complete the phone screen) 
	
“Now, before we begin, I would like you to rate your level of distress right now on a scale from 1 to 7 
where 1 is no distress and 7 is extremely distressed.”   ______    (If the participant is a 6 or 7, ask 
if this is their typical level of distress and use active listening. Reschedule the phone 
interview if needed.) 
 
 “What is your age?”:____ (exclude if under 21 or over 30) 
 
“What is your gender?”: F____ M____ (exclude if male) 
 
“Where did you hear about our study?”  ________________________________________  
 
“What is your ethnic background?” __________________________________________ 
 
“How tall are you and how much do you weigh?” _________________________________ 
(exclude if participant is under 6 feet tall and weighs more than 250 lbs)  
(exclude if participant is over 6 feet tall and weighs more than 300 lbs) 
 
“Do you own an Apple or Android smartphone?”   Y N 
 If Yes: “Is your device running iOS 7.0+ or Android 4.0+?”   Y N 
  (Android: Settings > About Phone /About Device > Android Version) 
  (iPhone: Settings > General > About) 
  If No: “Would you be willing/able to install an upgrade?”  Y N 
If No:  
“Do you own an iPod Touch or iPad with iOS 7.0+, or a tablet with Android 4.0+?”         Y      N 
 If Yes: “Would you be willing to carry this device with you every night for one week?”   Y      N 
 
(exclude if participant does not own a smartphone, iPod Touch, or iPad with a supported 
operating system, or is not willing to carry this device with them regularly) 
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MEDICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC INFORMATION 
 
1) “Are you taking any prescription and/or nonprescription medications?”  Y N 
 (if YES, what are they, how often, and doses)  
Medication Name Dosage How often take? 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 (Exclude if medication is listed on harmful interactions list) 
 
2) “Can you drink alcohol with this medication?”      Y N 
 (exclude if answer is NO) 
 If unknown, continue with screen.  At end of screening tell participant we will contact 
them to let them know if we can schedule. Medications will need to be run by Dr. Grant 
before being scheduled. 
 
3) “Is there any reason that you should not drink alcohol, medical or otherwise?”  Y N 
 (exclude if YES) 
 
4) “Have you ever had, or do you currently have, any major illnesses?” 
 (seizures, gastric bypass, liver cirrhosis, hepatitis, cancer, tumors, HIV/AIDS)  Y N 
 
 ____________________________________________________________________ 
 (If yes, continue with screen.  At end of screening tell participant we will contact them to 
let them know if we can schedule. Major illnesses will need to be run by Dr. Grant before 
being scheduled.) 
 
5)  “Have you ever been diagnosed with a traumatic brain injury?” 
 (exclude if answer is YES)        Y N 
 
6)  “Have you ever hit your head and lost consciousness for 20 minutes or longer?” 
 (exclude if answer is YES)        Y N 
 
7) “Have you ever been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder?”         Y N 
  
8) “Have you ever received treatment for a psychiatric disorder?”     Y N 
if either 7 or 8 yes, fill out table 
Disorder Name Age Diagnosed Current status 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 (Exclude if any psychotic, paranoid, or bipolar disorders, or current major depression) 
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9) “Have you ever been treated for alcohol or drug problems?”    Y N 
 (exclude if yes) 
 
10) “Have you ever been hospitalized due to alcohol use?”     Y N 
 (exclude if yes) 
 
11) “Do you have a physical disability?”      Y N 
 (exclude if necessary) 
 
12) “Do you have any hearing problems?”      Y N 
 (exclude if significant hearing loss) 
 
13) “Do you have significant visual impairment 
 that is not correctable with glasses or contacts?”     Y N 
 (exclude if significant visual impairment) 
 
14)  “Do you have a cardiac pacemaker?”      Y N 
 (exclude if answer is YES) 
 
15) “Do you have Asthma”                    Y N 
 [if YES then ask the following questions] 
 
a) “Have you had an emergency room visit related 
      to asthma in the past year?”      Y N 
        (exclude if answer is YES) 
 
b)  “Do you use your inhaler more frequently when drinking?”  Y N 
       (exclude if answer is YES) 
 
c)   “Have you used oral steroid treatments for asthma in the past year?” Y N 
        (exclude if answer is YES) 
 
IF subject reports having asthma but did not say yes to a, b, or c. 
AND they can regularly tolerate 3-4 alcoholic drinks per occasion. 
THEN they can participate. 
 
16) “Do you have any legal restrictions against your drinking (e.g. 
         as a condition of probation or parole)?”      Y N 
         (exclude if answer is YES) 
 
17) “Are you currently nursing (breastfeeding)?”     Y N 
         (exclude if answer is YES) 
 
18) “Are you currently pregnant?”       Y N 
   (exclude if answer is YES)    
  
 19) “How often do you have 3 or more drinks containing alcohol?”___________________ 
  (e.g. less than monthly, once a month, twice a month, three times a month or more) 
Person must consume 3 or more drinks at least twice monthly to be eligible. 
 
20) “Immediately after drinking even a small amount of alcohol, have you ever had a reaction that included 
flushing, blushing, nausea, vomiting, or a feeling of impending doom?  Y N 
   (exclude if answer is YES to a consistent response after any alcohol) 
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“Next I’m going to ask you about prior sexual experiences.” 
 
Select items from the Computer Assisted Maltreatment Inventory (CAMI) 
 
“It is now commonly known that many people have sexual experiences during childhood or adolescence.  
These experiences may occur with other children, adolescents, or adults and can include a wide range of 
behaviors including witnessing sexual activity, touching or being touched in a sexual way, and sexual 
intercourse.  
  
“We would like to ask you about some of the sexual experiences you may have had before you turned 14.  
First, I am going to read through a list of sexual experiences.  Then, I will ask you a few questions that 
will require a simple yes or no answer.”  
  
• Someone kissed, touched, or fondled your body in a sexual way or you touched or fondled them.  
• Someone attempted to have sexual intercourse with you (oral, anal, or vaginal).  
• You and another person actually had sexual intercourse (oral, anal, or vaginal).  
 
1. Before you were 14, did ANY of the above ever happen with anyone against your will or when you did 
not want it to happen?    
[**For RAs to read when reviewing responses with participants:  
! Before you were 14, did you have any sexual experiences with anyone against your will 
or when you did not want to?]  
 
Y N 
 
2. Before you were 14, did ANY of the above ever happen with an immediate family member or other 
relative? (Please EXCLUDE any voluntary sexual play that may have occurred with a similar age peer – 
for example “playing doctor.”) 
[**For RAs to read when reviewing responses with participants:  
! Before you were 14, did you have any sexual experiences with an immediate family 
member or other relative?] 
 
Y N 
 
3. Before you were 14, did ANY of the above ever happen with anyone who was more than 5 years older 
than you? (Please EXCLUDE any VOLUNTARY activities that occurred with a dating partner.)  
[**For RAs to read when reviewing responses with participants:  
! Before you were 14, did you have any sexual experiences with anyone who was more 
than 5 years older than you?] 
 
Y N 
 
(Exclude if participant endorsed any of the above activities.) 
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“Now I will ask you some questions about experiences since the age of 14.” 
 
Select items from the Sexual Experiences Survey (SES-F) 
 
1. Has anyone used some degree of physical force with you to try and make you engage in 
kissing and petting (fondling) when you didn’t want to? 
Y N 
 
  
2. Has anyone ever threatened you or used physical force (twisting your arm, holding 
you down), in an attempt to obtain sexual intercourse but for various reasons the person 
did not succeed?  
Y N 
 
  
3. Have you ever had oral, anal, or vaginal sex with anyone when you did not want to, 
because that person threatened to use physical force if you did not cooperate?  
Y N 
 
  
4. Have you ever had sex with anyone when you did not want to, because that person used 
physical force?  
Y N 
 
   
(Exclude if participant endorsed any of the above activities.) 
 
 
 
 
 
----------------------------------------------[RAs: STOP HERE] ---------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “Do you wear contacts or glasses?”   Y N 
 
“Do you smoke cigarettes?”    Y N 
 
“Do you have a photo ID displaying your age?”  Y N 
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“Could you please rate your level of distress right now on a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 is no distress and 
7 is extremely distressed.” ________  
 
(If their self-reported level of distress increased by 3 or more points since their rating at the beginning of the study, talk 
the participant through strategies for tolerating distress. Assess distress again. Continue until back to pre-experiment 
levels. If the participant is at immediate risk of harm, contact Dr. David DiLillo immediately.) 
 
 
If not eligible: “Thank you for taking the time to email me about the study and to answer these 
questions over the phone.  Because this study involves alcohol consumption, this study has a number of 
very specific exclusion criteria. Many people are not eligible to participate for one reason or another.  
From the information you have provided, it appears that you are not eligible for this study at this time. 
Do you have any questions for me?”  “Thank you again for your time.” 
 
 
If eligible: “Thank you for your time. Those are all the questions I have for you right now. 
It appears that you are eligible for the study at this time. Participating in this study would involve 
attending a laboratory session that may involve drinking alcohol. We would also ask you to watch a film 
that may be potentially distressing.” 
 
• “You will have to undergo a pregnancy test if you decide to participate because the study may include 
alcohol consumption. In order to complete the pregnancy test you will have to produce a urine 
sample within the first ½ hour of arriving at the laboratory.” 
• “Please do not drink alcohol 24 hours before coming in.  If you read a positive BAC, we will not run 
you.” 
• “Please refrain from recreational drugs from the time of this interview.” 
• “Please do not eat 4 hours prior to arriving at the laboratory.” 
• “Food and water will be provided.” 
• “Please bring a form of ID displaying your age. If you do not bring a picture ID, you will not be able 
to participate.” 
• “Please also remember to bring your smartphone with you to the study session and make sure you 
can use it; so if you need, bring a charger.” 
• (IF WEAR BOTH CONTACTS & GLASSES:) “If it doesn’t matter to you whether you wear contacts or 
glasses, we encourage you to wear contacts to the study session. If you would be more comfortable in 
glasses, that’s fine too.” 
• (IF SMOKES:) “You cannot smoke during the experimental part of the study (a couple hours).  After 
is fine.” 
• “If at all possible, we encourage you to walk or have someone drop you off to participate in the study, 
rather than driving yourself. You should also arrange if at all possible to have someone come and 
pick you up. If you are not able to find someone, we will provide a taxi for you to get home. If you 
walk to the building, you will have to arrange to have someone walk or drive you home.” 
• The lab is located on UNL City Campus in the 501 Building, which is across from the Stadium Garage. 
I will send you a link to a map, as well as a reminder of this information, before your first session.  
 
“As I mentioned, you qualify for the study. Can I schedule you for an appointment to come to our lab?” 
• Settle on a day and time for them to come in 
• Schedule both the first and second session. These should be exactly one week apart, though the 
second session can be at any time in the day.  
 
 “Would you prefer to receive a reminder for the session by email or text?” 
• Schedule reminder to be sent at least 24 hours prior to the session. 
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HELPS BRAIN INJURY SCREENING TOOL 
 
 
The original HELPS TBI screening tool was developed by M. Picard, D. Scarisbrick, R. Paluck, 9/91, International Center for the Disabled, TBI-NET, U.S. 
Department of Education, Rehabilitation Services Administration, Grant #H128A00022. The Helps Tool was updated by project personnel to reflect recent 
recommendations by the CDC on the diagnosis of TBI. See http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/tbi_toolkit/physicians/mtbi/diagnosis.htm. 
 
This document was supported in part by Grant 6 H21 MC 00039-03-01 from the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) Health Resources and 
Services Administration, Maternal and Child Bureau to the Michigan Department of Community Health. The contents are the sole responsibility of the authors 
and do not necessarily represent the official views of DHHS. 
Consumer Information:  
 
   headaches 
  dizziness 
  anxiety 
  depression 
  difficulty concentrating 
  difficulty remembering 
 
  difficulty reading, writing, calculating 
  poor problem solving 
  difficulty performing your job/school work 
  change in relationships with others 
  poor judgment (being fired from job, arrests, 
fights) 
 
 
 
Agency/Screener’s Information:  
 
 
 
H  Have you ever Hit your Head or been Hit on the Head?   Yes     No   
Note: Prompt client to think about all incidents that may have occurred at any age, even those that did not seem 
serious: vehicle accidents, falls, assault, abuse, sports, etc. Screen for domestic violence and child abuse, and also for 
service related injuries. A TBI can also occur from violent shaking of the head, such as being shaken as a baby or child. 
 
E  Were you ever seen in the Emergency room, hospital, or by a doctor because of an injury to your 
head?   Yes     No  
Note: Many people are seen for treatment. However, there are those who cannot afford treatment, or who do not think 
they require medical attention. 
 
L  Did you ever Lose consciousness or experience a period of being dazed and confused because of 
an injury to your head?   Yes     No 
Note: People with TBI may not lose consciousness but experience an “alteration of consciousness.” This may include 
feeling dazed, confused, or disoriented at the time of the injury, or being unable to remember the events surrounding 
the injury.  
 
P  Do you experience any of these Problems in your daily life since you hit your head?    Yes     No 
Note: Ask your client if s/he experiences any of the following problems, and ask when the problem presented. You are 
looking for a combination of two or more problems that were not present prior to the injury. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S  Any significant Sicknesses?   Yes     No 
Note: Traumatic brain injury implies a physical blow to the head, but acquired brain injury may also be caused by 
medical conditions, such as: brain tumor, meningitis, West Nile virus, stroke, seizures. Also screen for instances of 
oxygen deprivation such as following a heart attack, carbon monoxide poisoning, near drowning, or near suffocation. 
 
Scoring the HELPS Screening Tool 
A HELPS screening is considered positive for a possible TBI when the following 3 items are identified: 
1.) An event that could have caused a brain injury (yes to H, E or S), and 
2.) A period of loss of consciousness or altered consciousness after the injury or another indication that the 
injury was severe (yes to L or E), and 
3.) The presence of two or more chronic problems listed under P that were not present before the injury. 
Note:  
 A positive screening is not sufficient to diagnose TBI as the reason for current symptoms and 
difficulties - other possible causes may need to be ruled out 
 Some individuals could present exceptions to the screening results, such as people who do have 
TBI-related problems but answered “no” to some questions 
 Consider positive responses within the context of the person’s self-report and documentation of altered 
behavioral and/or cognitive functioning 
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  Demographics 
 
1. Gender Identity – Do you consider yourself to be:  
1 = Female   
2 = Male  
3 = Transgender – Female to Male  
4 = Transgender – Male to Female 
5 = Other – Please specify _________  
 
2. Sexual Orientation – Do you consider yourself to be:  
1 = Heterosexual / Straight  
2 = Lesbian / Gay  
3 = Bisexual  
4 = Other – please specify _____________________ 
 
3. What is your age (in years)? _____  
 
4. Are you currently a student?  
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
 
4a. (If yes:) What best describes your status as a student?  
1 = Undergraduate student 
2 = Graduate student 
 
4b. Are you a student at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln? 
1 = Yes 
0 = No, another college or university, Specify: ______ 
 
5. Years of education including kindergarten: _____ 
 
6. What is your current legal marital status?  
1 = Single   
2 = Married (or in a Civil Commitment or Marriage-Like Relationship) 
3 = Separated  
4 = Divorced  
5 = Widowed  
 
7. [For those who are not married:] Are you currently in a romantic relationship?  
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
 
8. Are you Latino, Hispanic, or of Spanish origin?  
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
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9. Which of the following best describes you? (You may check more than one.)   
1 = African American/Black  
2 = American Indian/Native American/Alaskan Native   
Specify: __________________  
3 = Asian/Pacific Islander   
Specify: __________________  
4 = White  
5 = Other 
Specify: __________________  
 
10. YOUR average yearly income if you support yourself or your parents’ average yearly income 
if they support you (please check one). 
 
___ $0-$5,000      ____ $40,000-$50,000 
___ $5,000-$10,000     ____ $50,000-$60,000 
___ $10,000-$20,000     ____ $60,000-$70,000   
___ $20,000-$30,000     ____ $70,000+ 
___ $30,000-$40,000 
 
11. What is your occupation? ______________________ 
  
   147 
Alcohol Consumption Questions 
 
1) Taste of beverage: I found the beverage to taste (circle one): 
 
a. (1) Very unpleasant  (2) Unpleasant (3) Pleasant  (4) Very pleasant  
 
b. (1) Very bad   (2) Bad   (3) Good  (4) Very good  
 
2)  How intoxicated do you feel RIGHT NOW on a scale from 0 to 11, with 0 = Not drunk 
at all, 8 = Drunk as I have ever been, and 11 = More drunk than I have ever been. 
 
0  1 2 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11 
 
3) Please rate how much impairment the alcohol you drank has caused on a scale from 0 to 
10, where 0 is no impairment, 5 is moderate impairment, and 10 is strong impairment. 
 
0  1 2 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
 
4) Do you believe you consumed alcohol? (circle one)  
 
Yes  No 
 
5) [If yes]: Do you believe you consumed a low dose or high dose of alcohol?  
Low dose (1-2 drinks) 
High dose (3-4 drinks) 
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Cognitive Processing Questionnaire, Adapted for a film 
(Halligan, Clark and Ehlers, 2002) 
 
Below are a number of statements that describe the experiences people sometimes have while 
watching a stressful film. Rate the extent to which the following statements apply to your 
experiences while watching the film. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions; we 
are interested in your personal experience.  
 
Please rate the extent to which each of the following statements applies to your experiences 
DURING THE FILM by circling the most appropriate number. 
 
WHILE WATCHING THE FILM.... Not at 
all 
A 
little 
Moderately Strongly Very 
Strongly 
1. My thinking was very clear, not muddled. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. My mind was filled with immediate impressions 
and reactions.* 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I could not really take everything in.* 1 2 3 4 5 
4. I did not fully understand what is going on.* 1 2 3 4 5 
5. I thought ahead. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. In my mind, I talked myself through what was 
happening in the film. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. It was like a stream of unconnected impressions 
following each other.* 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. I didn’t think clearly.* 1 2 3 4 5 
9. There were so many sensations I could not put 
everything together.* 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I had a clear impression of how one thing followed 
from another. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I got confused.* 1 2 3 4 5 
12. I thought about what was happening. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. My mind was fully occupied with what I saw, 
heard, smelled and felt.* 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. I was aware of very immediate things, just going 
from moment to moment.* 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. It all became a bit of a blur.* 1 2 3 4 5 
16. My mind was racing but my thoughts were 
disjointed.* 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. I stayed focused. 1 2 3 4 5 
(* Denotes data-driven processing items; other items conceptual processing) 
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Post-Film Questions 
 
1. Have you ever seen this film before?  No  Yes 
 
2. What percentage of the French dialogue did you understand? ___% 
 
3. How distressing did you find the film clip? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not 
at all 
         Very 
Much 
 
4. How much attention did you pay to this film? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
None 
at all 
         Total 
Attention 
 
5. How engaged did you feel in the scene? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not 
at all 
         Very 
Much 
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Free Recall 
 
Now, please take some time to think about what you saw and heard in the other participant room 
where you watched the film clip. Picture the room and think back to where you were sitting. Try 
to remember details about the environment, objects in the room, the tasks you completed, and the 
film clip.  
 
Please take the next 10 minutes to write out all you can remember about what you saw and heard 
in the other participant room where you watched the film clip. Please write down any detail you 
can remember, even if it might seem trivial. There is no limit to the amount of text you can 
provide.  
 
The researcher will notify you when time is up, though you can also choose to end the task and 
complete the survey at any time.   
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Coding of Free Recall 
 
Instructions provided to study personnel:  
 
1. Code the number of objects/people mentioned. Any mention of an object (regardless of the 
term used) should be included. For example, if a participant stated there was a “veil” in the 
room, you would indicate, YES, the “curtain” was mentioned.   
 
2. For each object that is mentioned, code the number of accurate details. For each person that 
is mentioned, code the number of accurate details and actions. Only count each action once 
(assign it to one subject). Only consider observable details (not judgments or inferences). 
Determine accuracy by referring to the relevant photos and the film clip. 
 
3. For people in the film, locations/possessions should only be considered a detail when not 
referring to a separate film-object.   
 
4. Determine whether there was any inaccurate information reported. Count up and indicate the 
total number of inaccurate units.   
 
5. If you have other questions or are unsure how to code something, make a note to Anna in the 
text box at the end of the survey. (If you say you were unsure whether to code something, be 
sure to indicate whether you counted it or not in the response you submitted.)   
 
6. Do NOT code any of the following:  
a. Emotional reactions, judgments, personal anecdotes, or other editorializing   
b. Tasks completed as part of the study   
c. Grammatical or spelling errors   
d. Organization of the response   
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Participant ID: ______  RA coding: ___________ 
 
Alcohol, Memories, & Emotions Study 
RA Coding of Free Recall Task 
 
ROOM 
Indicate whether each object is mentioned in the text response. If it is mentioned, indicate the number of accurate details or 
descriptive pieces of information (i.e., adjectives, physical location) mentioned.  
Refer to the (paper) photos to see where each item is in the room.  
Object Mentioned? 
Number of 
details List details 
1. Curtain ! No ! Yes   
2. Trash bin ! No ! Yes   
3. Paint can ! No ! Yes   
4. Coat rack ! No ! Yes   
5. Umbrella ! No ! Yes   
6. Heart rate strap ! No ! Yes   
7. Cloth ! No ! Yes   
8. Tripod ! No ! Yes   
9. Bookcase ! No ! Yes   
10. Lamp ! No ! Yes   
11. Mug ! No ! Yes   
12. Highlighter/pens ! No ! Yes   
13. Book(s) ! No ! Yes   
14. Student directory ! No ! Yes   
15. Clipboard/pad of 
paper (if both, detail=1)  
! No ! Yes   
16. Cup ! No ! Yes   
17. Anchor ! No ! Yes   
18. Phonebook(s) ! No ! Yes   
19. Boombox ! No ! Yes   
20. Paperclip ! No ! Yes   
21. Tree ! No ! Yes   
22. Butterfly ! No ! Yes   
23. (Second) trash bin ! No ! Yes   
24. Desk ! No ! Yes   
25. Chair (not pictured) ! No ! Yes   
26. Computer tower ! No ! Yes   
27. Tissues ! No ! Yes   
28. Light(s) ! No ! Yes   
29. Speaker(s) ! No ! Yes   
30. Laptop ! No ! Yes   
31. Cord(s) ! No ! Yes   
32. Webcam ! No ! Yes   
33. Mouse ! No ! Yes   
34. Mousepad ! No ! Yes   
35. Intercom ! No ! Yes   
36. Hand sanitizer ! No ! Yes   
37. Mirror ! No ! Yes   
Provide total number of details for #38, as well as number of details for each photo separately (38a-d below). These should 
NOT be redundant. 
38. Photo(s) ! No ! Yes   
38a. Elephant photo ! No ! Yes   
38b. Mountain photo ! No ! Yes   
38c. Flower photo ! No ! Yes   
38d. Bird photo ! No ! Yes   
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Film- People 
Indicate whether each PERSON from the film mentioned in the text response.      
For each person mentioned, indicate the following:    
- The number of accurate DETAILS or descriptive pieces of information (e.g., adjectives, clothing ON the person, 
descriptive features) 
- The number of accurate ACTIONS (i.e., verbs) committed by the person 
Person Mentioned? 
Number 
of details List details 
Number 
of actions List actions 
1. Main woman 
 
 
! No ! Yes     
2. Perpetrator 
 
 
! No ! Yes     
3. Woman (who 
provided directions)  
! No ! Yes     
4. Person (who 
escaped perpetrator's 
first attack)  
! No ! Yes     
5. Bystander 
 
! No ! Yes     
6. Other people 
(walking around on 
the street) 
! No ! Yes     
 
Film- Objects 
Indicate whether each object from the film is mentioned in the text response. If it is mentioned, indicate the number 
of accurate details or descriptive pieces of information (i.e., adjectives, physical location) mentioned.  
Object Mentioned? 
Number of 
details List details 
1. Door/building (that the woman left) ! No ! Yes   
2. Plant in building ! No ! Yes   
3. Street ! No ! Yes   
4. Cars/bus/trucks/motorcycle ! No ! Yes   
5. Street lamps ! No ! Yes   
6. Sidewalk ! No ! Yes   
7. Railing ! No ! Yes   
8. "Passage" sign ! No ! Yes   
9. Stairs ! No ! Yes   
10. Tunnel ! No ! Yes   
10a. Ground/floor of the tunnel ! No ! Yes   
10b. Walls of the tunnel ! No ! Yes   
10c. Lighting in the tunnel ! No ! Yes   
11. Trash (in the tunnel) ! No ! Yes   
12. Graffiti ! No ! Yes   
13. Knife ! No ! Yes   
14. Woman's bag ! No ! Yes   
15. Woman's coat ! No ! Yes   
16. Drugs ! No ! Yes   
17. Male nudity ! No ! Yes   
18. France/French language ! No ! Yes   
19. Time of day (night/dark out) ! No ! Yes   
 
Refer to the paper copies of photos and the film. Was there any inaccurate information? 
! No 
! Yes; specify:  
 
Number of inaccurate units: _____ 
 
If you have any other notes to Anna about this entry, enter them here: 
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Daily Diary Instructions 
 
Definition: 
• Film-Related Intrusive Memories:  
o Thoughts or images related to the film that pop into your mind spontaneously, out 
of the blue, without a clear reminder and without making an effort to think about 
something. 
o Can take the form of words and phrases (“verbal thoughts”) 
o Can take the form of mental pictures (“images”) in your minds eye, which can 
include any of the five senses (including sounds) 
o Can be fleeting or longer-lasting 
 
Surveys: 
• “Single Intrusive Memory” 
o Includes questions about a single intrusive memory 
o Can be completed at any time 
 
•  “Daily Diary” 
o Includes questions about memories, alcohol use, and sexual activity in the past 
day 
o Each experience should only be reported once. If you already reported a memory 
on the “Single Intrusive Memory” survey, this experience should not be reported 
on the Daily Diary. 
o Alarm will sound every day at 8pm; reminder at 10pm 
o Window to complete the survey closes at 1am 
o Compensation is based on completing this survey 
" $5 for each Daily Diary completed 
" $10 bonus for completing all 7 days 
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Intrusive Memory Diary 
 
Do you recall having any dreams in the past day with content related to the film?    
Yes No 
 
Below are some questions about intrusive memories. We define intrusive memories as a memory 
of the film that pops into your mind spontaneously, out of the blue, without deliberately thinking 
about it. This could be a fleeting memory or more vivid.  
 
What goes through our minds can either take the form of words and phrases (“verbal thoughts”), 
or it can be like mental pictures (“images”) in your minds eye. Although mental “images” often 
take the form of pictures they can actually include any of the five senses, so you can imagine 
sounds too. Please record all intrusive memories of the film you viewed.  
 
In addition to any experiences you reported on the “Single Intrusive Memory” survey…. did you 
have any other film-related intrusive memories today (or since you completed the last diary)?  
Yes  No 
 
[If Yes:] 
1. About how many intrusive memories did you have?  
 
[For each intrusion:]  
2. Briefly describe the content of the intrusive memory. 
 
 
3. What was the approximate time of the intrusive memory?  
 
4. What was happening just prior to the intrusive memory? 
 
5. How distressing was the intrusive memory? 
a. Not at all 
b. Slightly 
c. Moderately 
d. Very 
e. Extremely 
6. How would you best describe this intrusive memory? 
a. A thought 
b. An image 
c. A combination of a thought and image 
7. [If this was an image:] How vivid was this memory from 1 (no image at all) to 7 (as 
clear as normal vision)? 
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Trauma Memory Questionnaire, Adapted for a film 
(Halligan, Michael, Clark & Ehlers, 2003) 
 
The following questions relate to the ways in which people sometimes describe their 
MEMORIES OF THE STRESSFUL FILM. Please rate the extent to which these 
statements apply to YOUR MEMORIES OF THE FILM by circling the appropriate 
number. If the statement is not true for you, please circle ‘not at all.’ There are no right 
and no wrong answers to these questions. 
 
SINCE THE FILM...      Not 
at all 
A 
little 
Moderately Strongly Very 
strongly 
1. I feel that my memory for the film is 
incomplete. 
0 1 2 3 4 
2. There are periods of time during the 
film that I cannot account for. 
0 1 2 3 4 
3. I have trouble remembering the order in 
which things happened during the film. 
0 1 2 3 4 
4. My memory of the film is muddled. 0 1 2 3 4 
5. I cannot get what happened during the 
film straight in my mind. 
0 1 2 3 4 
6. Many different things trigger memories 
of the film. 
0 1 2 3 4 
7. I experience feelings similar to those I 
had during the film even when I am not 
thinking of it. 
0 1 2 3 4 
8. I am reminded of the film for no 
apparent reason. 
0 1 2 3 4 
9. I find myself unexpectedly 
remembering the film. 
0 1 2 3 4 
10. My memories of the film consist of 
vivid images. 
0 1 2 3 4 
11. I experience strong emotions when 
remembering the film. 
0 1 2 3 4 
12. The feelings I had during the film keep 
coming back to me. 
0 1 2 3 4 
13. When I remember the film it is like I 
am watching it again, here and now 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
Compute mean scores. 
Items 1 to 5: disorganization of trauma memory 
Items 6 to 13: intrusion items 
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July 14, 2014  
 
Anna Jaffe 
Department of Psychology 
238 BURN, UNL, 68588-0308  
 
David DiLillo 
Department of Psychology 
216 BURN, UNL, 68588-0308  
 
IRB Number: 20140714402FB 
Project ID: 14402 
Project Title: Effects of Peritraumatic Alcohol Intoxication on Intrusive Memories 
 
Dear Anna: 
 
This letter is to officially notify you of the approval of your project by the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) for the Protection of Human Subjects. It is the Board's opinion that 
you have provided adequate safeguards for the rights and welfare of the participants in 
this study based on the information provided. Your proposal is in compliance with this 
institution's Federal Wide Assurance 00002258 and the DHHS Regulations for the 
Protection of Human Subjects (45 CFR 46). 
 
Date of Full Board review: 06/05/2014 
 
You are authorized to implement this study as of the Date of Final Approval: 07/14/2014. 
This approval is Valid Until: 06/04/2015. 
 
We wish to remind you that the principal investigator is responsible for reporting to this 
Board any of the following events within 48 hours of the event: 
* Any serious event (including on-site and off-site adverse events, injuries, side effects, 
deaths, or other problems) which in the opinion of the local investigator was 
unanticipated, involved risk to subjects or others, and was possibly related to the research 
procedures; 
* Any serious accidental or unintentional change to the IRB-approved protocol that 
involves risk or has the potential to recur; 
* Any publication in the literature, safety monitoring report, interim result or other 
finding that indicates an unexpected change to the risk/benefit ratio of the research; 
* Any breach in confidentiality or compromise in data privacy related to the subject or 
others; or 
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* Any complaint of a subject that indicates an unanticipated risk or that cannot be 
resolved by the research staff. 
 
For projects which continue beyond one year from the starting date, the IRB will request 
continuing review and update of the research project. Your study will be due for 
continuing review as indicated above. The investigator must also advise the Board when 
this study is finished or discontinued by completing the enclosed Protocol Final Report 
form and returning it to the Institutional Review Board. 
 
If you have any questions, please contact the IRB office at 472-6965. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Julia Torquati, Ph.D. 
Chair for the IRB 
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Participant Initials _____ 
 
Department of Psychology 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
Alcohol, Memories, and Emotions 
 
 
Purpose of the Research:  
   
You are invited to participate in a research study investigating how alcohol use affects memories and 
emotional responding. You were invited to participate because you are a female between the ages of 21 
and 30, and are a social drinker.  
 
Some of the questions may ask about sensitive information. Anyone in this study can choose to stop at 
any time for any reason, opt-out of any portion of the study, or choose not to participate at all. 
  
Procedures:  
  
If you agree to participate, the experimental portion of the study will take about 1.5 hours to complete in 
the first lab session.  However, if you are assigned to the alcohol condition, you must stay at the location 
of the study until you reach a breath alcohol concentration (BrAC) of .03% and pass a field sobriety test.  
The average sobriety period will be approximately 5 hours, though this could be longer in some people. 
You must remain in the lab until two separate readings on the breathalyzer indicate a level of .03% or 
lower and you pass a field sobriety test.  
 
The study will take place in the 501 Building on the campus of UNL. Today, you will participate in the 
following procedures described below.  
 
Screening Procedures 
First, you will be asked to blow into a breathalyzer in order to ensure sobriety. If you have a 
positive BrAC test, you will be given an opportunity to reschedule the study for another time. 
You will then be asked to complete a urine pregnancy test. If your test is positive, then you will 
not be able to participate in the rest of the study due to the harmful effects of alcohol consumption 
on fetuses. Also if you are nursing, you will not be able to participate in the study. For safety 
reasons, if you are less than six feet tall, you must be less than 250 pounds to participate; if you 
are over six feet tall, you must be less than 300 pounds to participate. 
 
Following the BrAC and pregnancy tests, you will be asked to review the answers of your phone 
screen. After this, you will be asked some questions about past potential head injuries. If you are 
eligible, you will be asked to proceed to the next part of the study. 
 
Experimental Procedures 
First, you will be asked to complete several questionnaires. These will ask questions about your 
demographics, past experiences, and your emotions and behaviors.  
 
Next, you will be randomly assigned to a high dose alcohol condition, a low dose alcohol 
condition, or a no-alcohol condition. If you are in the high dose alcohol condition you will be 
asked to drink the equivalent of three to four alcoholic drinks. If you are in the low dose alcohol 
condition, you will be asked to drink the equivalent of one to two alcoholic drinks. In either 
condition, the exact number of drinks you receive may vary depending on your weight.  
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Participant Initials _____ 
 
Next, you will be asked to place a strap around your chest, which will be used to measure your 
heart rate. You may be asked to place this under your clothes to ensure accurate assessment of 
your heart rate. You will be given privacy to do so. 
 
You will also be asked to view a potentially distressing film clip depicting a sexual assault. You 
can stop this film (and end your participation) at any time using the space bar on the keyboard. 
Your facial reactions to the film will be video-recorded. These recordings will not be released and 
your name will not be attached to them.  
 
After completion of the lab session, you will be asked to complete a few questions on your 
smartphone about memories, substance use, and sexual activities once a day for 7 days. These 
questions are expected to take 5-10 minutes. You will receive daily reminders to complete these 
questions.  
 
In one week, you will be asked to return to the lab to respond to additional questions and discuss 
your reactions to the study. This lab session is expected to last about one hour. You will receive a 
reminder call, text, or email prior to this session. 
 
Risks and/or Discomforts:  
  
It is possible that you might experience some discomfort or distress when answering questions about your 
emotions and past experiences, or when viewing the stressful film. You may refuse to answer the 
questions or stop at any time without penalty and for any reason.  
 
Small to moderate doses of alcohol consumption may sometimes be associated with nausea, vomiting, 
headache, sadness, and mildly disinhibited behavior. There are also safety risks associated with allowing 
you to leave a study in a state of intoxication. For these reasons, the following are required for you to 
consent to the study. Specifically, if you consume alcohol, you agree to: 
_____  Stay at the location of the study until you reach a BAC of .03% and pass a field sobriety test. 
(initial)  You will not be allowed to leave until two separate readings on the breathalyzer indicate a 
level of .03% or lower and you pass a field sobriety test.  
_____  Either have a friend pick you up from the study location or take a taxi that the study will 
(initial)  provide.  
_____  Refrain from consumption of alcohol or other drugs for 24 hours and to not operate dangerous 
(initial)  equipment for 12 hours. 
  
Despite all the precautions described above, there is still a small chance that you will have a negative 
physiological reaction following alcohol consumption. In the case of a non-emergency physiological 
reaction, you will be assisted in calling the University Health Center if you are a UNL student. If needed, 
you will be escorted to the campus Health Center.  If you are not a UNL student, you will be assisted in 
calling ____________________ (please list preferred medical facility). If needed, ___________________ 
(please list family member or friend) will be called at _______________ (phone number) to escort you to 
the medical facility listed above. If the physiological reaction is more serious or urgent, medical services 
will be called using 911. In the unlikely event that medical care is needed, you will be responsible for 
paying for any medical treatment received. 
 
If you wish to stop your participation in the study at any time, you may do so without harming your 
relationship with the researcher or with the university. In the event of emotional distress or similar 
problems resulting from participation in the study, psychological treatment is available at the UNL 
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Participant Initials _____ 
 
Psychological Consultation Center, (402) 472-2351, 325 Burnett Hall or the University Counseling and 
Psychological Services for UNL students, 15th & U Streets, (402) 472-7450.  
  
Benefits:  
  
Although there are no known direct benefits to you, this project may provide researchers with a better 
understanding of how alcohol affects memories and emotional processes. 
  
Confidentiality:   
  
Any identifying information (e.g., names) obtained during this study will be protected and will not be 
disclosed unless required by law or regulation. The responses you provide will be identified only by a 
randomly assigned participant identification number. Only study personnel will be able to link your name 
and the data you provide for the purpose of providing reminder texts and emails. These study personnel 
have agreed to a professional code of conduct that includes maintaining confidentiality. 
 
Your name and social security number will also be required so that you can be paid for your participation 
in the study. However, your name and social security number, which will appear on a copy of the 
participant receipt, will be kept separate from all study data and will be delivered to the UNL Bursar for 
permanent storage. 
 
Any paper data will be stored in a locked cabinet in the principal investigator’s office and will be kept for 
five years after the study is complete. Any computerized data that you provide will be stored without any 
identifying information on a password-protected computer. Video recordings will be saved on a 
password-protected computer until researchers have recorded the relevant information from the videos. 
Only the researchers listed at the bottom of this form and study personnel will have access to your data. 
The knowledge gained from this study may be published in scientific journals or presented at scientific 
meetings, but it will be reported only as aggregate data.  
  
Compensation:  
  
You will receive $10 per hour for participating in each lab session and $5 for each daily questionnaire you 
complete (up to 7). If you complete all 7 daily questionnaires, you will earn a $10 bonus. If you are 
excluded from the study after the in-person screening procedures, you will receive $10. If you withdraw 
before completing all elements of the study, you will still receive compensation for your time, but not the 
$10 bonus.    
 
Opportunity to Ask Questions:  
  
You may ask any questions concerning this research and have those questions answered before agreeing 
to participate in or during the study.  You may contact the investigator, Anna Jaffe, M.A. at anytime (402-
603-0244) to ask research-related questions.  You may also contact the University of Nebraska – Lincoln 
Research Compliance Services at 402-472-6929 if you have any questions regarding your rights as a 
research participant.  
 
Freedom to Withdraw:  
  
Participation in this study is voluntary. You can refuse to participate or withdraw at any time without 
harming your relationship with the researchers or the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, or in any other way 
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Participant Initials _____ 
 
receive a penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.   
 
Consent, Right to Receive a Copy:  
 
You are voluntarily making a decision whether or not to participate in this research study. Your signature 
certifies that you have decided to participate having read and understood the information presented. You 
will be given a copy of this consent form to keep.  
 
_____     Initial here if you agree to be video-recorded while viewing the stressful film.  
(initial)     
 
 
Signature of Participant: 
 
______________________________________    
        Name of Research Participant  
 
______________________________________   ___________________________ 
         Signature of Research Participant                 Date 
 
 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent 
 
In my judgment, the participant is voluntarily and knowingly giving informed consent to 
participate in this research study. 
 
______________________________________   ___________________________ 
  Signature of Person Obtaining Consent     Date 
 
Names and Phone Numbers of Investigators 
 Anna Jaffe, M.A., Principal Investigator    (402) 603-0244 
 David DiLillo, Ph.D., Secondary Investigator   (402) 472-3297 
______________________________________________________________________________                   
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Alcohol, Memories, and Emotions 
Debriefing Form 
 
Thank you for participating in the Alcohol, Memories, and Emotions study!  
 
The goal of this study was to examine the influence of alcohol consumption on your 
emotional and cognitive responses to a stressful film, and how this influenced the 
formation of memories for this film.  
 
Prior to viewing the stressful film, you either received an alcoholic beverage equivalent 
to approximately 3 to 4 mixed drinks at a bar, an alcoholic beverage equivalent to 1 to 2 
mixed drinks, or a placebo beverage (the rim of the glass was sprayed with alcohol). 
Viewing the stressful film was meant to serve as an analogue for a traumatic event. While 
you were viewing the stressful film, we recorded your heart rate and emotional reactions 
to the film. We also asked you a number of questions about your experiences of intrusive 
memories. We are interested in whether the impact of alcohol consumption on intrusive 
memories is related to one’s cognitive and emotional processing of stressful situations. 
 
Because the study depends on people not knowing about the study prior to participating, 
we ask that you please refrain from discussing the study with others. 
 
If you experience any distress after you leave the study, there are two mental health 
facilities you can contact: the UNL Psychological Consultation Center, 325 Burnett Hall, 
telephone (402) 472-2351, which offers affordable services based on a sliding fee scale; 
and the University Counseling and Psychological Services, 15th & U, telephone (402) 
472-7450, which offers three free clinic visits to UNL students enrolled in more than 
seven credits. 
 
If you have questions and/or concerns about this study, you may contact the principal 
investigator, Anna Jaffe, at (402) 603-0244 or anna.e.jaffe@gmail.com. 
 
Thank you! 
 
 
 
